

NIGER DELTA AND THE CHALLENGE OF NIGERIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

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Abstract

The Niger Delta question has become a recurrent decimal, just like a deadly disease that has defied all palliative means. This study takes a cursory look at the Niger Delta persistent crisis and the challenges it poses to the Nigeria's national security. No doubt, the people of the region have suffered neglect for a longtime, and the resources there that have been badly explored are in deplorable state. The study establishes that there remains a million and one question unresolved, vis-a-vis resource allocation and control, hostage taking, militancy, among others, though the government, at a time takes a new look towards the region, conflict still remains exacerbated and has since assumed a new dimension. It adopts Conflict Theory to interrogate the discourse and uses secondary sources to gather the needed information. Ironically, some group of people who at the initial stage struggled to bail the region out of her predicament under activism, now see the situation of violent conflict as plausible and means to enrich and negotiate better deals for themselves. Will the crisis ever be resolved? It

further probes into the underlying factors responsible for the present state of the crisis and the neo-elastic dimension of the crisis. In summary, the study overviews several factors responsible for the crisis and why the plight has endured for so long. In view of the challenges it poses for national security, it recommends that Nigerian government must be sensitive enough to address issues that are urgently begging for attention while a subtle but discreet military approach will suffice a method to resolve the contemporary phase of militancy in the region.

Keywords: Conflicts, Nigeria, Niger Delta, National Security, Militancy

Introduction

Nigerian history is replete with agitation by people from the Niger-Delta expressing fears of possible domination by the so-called majority ethnic groups in an independent Nigeria. They have also 'voiced' their lack of socio-economic development from the huge oil and gas revenue generated from their region. The stages of agitation have changed overtime; writing of petitions and letters; protests and

demonstrations; litigations and taking up of arms (militancy). But unlike in the previous cases, the pre-2016 visible proponents of the Niger-Delta *casus belli* showed enormous strategic goodwill by voluntarily giving up their violent methods for rapprochement. The aforementioned group made up of different militant groups accepted in principle the Nigerian government strategy of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR). However, fast-forward seven years from the implementation of the Amnesty Programme in 2009, the Niger Delta militants known as the “avengers” are back in the creeks blowing up pipelines and other gas infrastructures, promised to shut down Nigeria’s crude oil production and threatening to test missiles in order to break up the Nigerian state. Has the amnesty programme failed? What are the factors responsible? What are the issues at stake? Why is there a renewed outbreak of militancy in the Niger Delta? Interest of this paper is to seek a review of the amnesty programme as implemented so far, to see if it meets its set objective of incrementally empowering the oil producing communities in the Niger-Delta or if it is yet another stage in the temporarily placating the people by tokenistic measures and non-sustainable interventions of the Nigerian government in the region snowballing into another wave of violence been witnessed presently.

Over the past four decades, the issues confronting the Niger Delta region have caused increasing national and international concern. The region produces immense oil wealth and has become the engine of Nigeria’s economy. But it also presents a paradox, because these vast revenues have barely touched the delta’s own pervasive local poverty (UNDP, 2005). Today, there are formidable challenges to sustainable human development in the region,

including the conflicts over resources among communities, and between communities and oil companies. In other words, the Niger Delta produces the oil wealth that accounts for the bulk of Nigeria’s foreign earnings. Paradoxically, however, these vast revenues from an international industry have barely touched the Niger Delta’s own pervasive local poverty. This has spurred formidable challenges to sustainable human development in the region, particularly as conflicts over resources tighten their often vicious grip. Behind the Delta’s poor performance on human development is a complex brew of economic, social, political and environmental factors. Social instability, poor local governance, competition for economic resources and environmental degradation has taken a toll. The general neglect of infrastructure, often rationalized by the difficulty of the delta’s terrain, has worsened people’s access to fundamental services such as electricity, safe drinking water, roads and health facilities that are taken for granted in many other parts of Nigeria. Other elements include the negative impacts of the oil industry, a constricted land area, a delicately balanced environment and extreme economic deprivation.

The Delta today is a place of frustrated expectations and deep-rooted mistrust. Unprecedented restiveness at times erupts in violence. Long years of neglect and conflict have fostered a siege mentality, especially among youths who feel they are condemned to a future without hope, and see conflict as a strategy to escape deprivation. Persistent conflict, while in part a response to poor human development, has also entrenched it, serving as a consistent drag on the region’s economic performance and expectations for advancement. The sabotage of oil production hurts the economy through the loss of sorely

needed foreign exchange to finance national development. Blown pipelines interrupt the supply of crude to refineries and produce shortages that cause sudden spikes in oil prices. Hostage-taking is not only a stress on foreign captives, their families and the companies they work for, but also presents a challenge to international diplomacy and foreign direct investment. But the disruption also has adverse effects on the local people, as ensuing violence threatens individuals and communities. Lives are lost, and investments drop along with the availability of jobs (Ikelegbe 2005, Ogoro 2008). The response to violence has at times meant further violence is unleashed randomly on unsuspecting communities or oil workers. Whole villages have been destroyed and their populace displaced because of disputes that could have been amicably resolved. The human development implications extend to the harm done to the life chances of children unable to go to school and the further constraints on human and social capital.

There is a general concern that some people, particularly unscrupulous politicians and political organizations, benefit from violence, and that they sponsor some of the youth gangs in the region. Arms merchants along with police and military personnel have supplied weapons to various gangs, and the increased incidence of oil theft has been linked to the need for foreign exchange to purchase arms. Development experts and policy makers have engaged in many debates about the delta's human development dilemma, questioning why abundant human and natural resources have had so little impact on poverty. Why do conflict and youth restiveness simmer despite years of development interventions? What should be done to calm the situation? How can environmental sustainability and poverty reduction be achieved given continued

extraction of oil and gas resources? What path leads towards sustainable human development?

Nigeria is at a crossroad. Now, more than any other time in history, Nigeria has the opportunity to build a society that can guarantee justice, human dignity and civil liberties to all Nigerians. It is a propitious time. Nigerians are committed to nation building and democratic consolidation. The burning question is: will Nigeria's people and leadership grasp this opportunity to move the country forward on the path of justice, peace, and economic development or will Nigeria repeat its pattern of a short break of civilian government between long stretches of military rule? On 29 May, 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as Nigeria's first democratically elected president since 1983. Almost twenty-two years into the country's democratic experience, Nigeria has continued to face economic, political and social uncertainties. Flash points of ethnic, communal, religious and resource conflicts still persist, the economic environment is still unstable. The Niger Delta crisis has yet to be resolved and environmental degradation in oil-producing regions remains a problem. Exacerbating this is the public perception that the government has been insensitive and slow in addressing fundamental issues affecting Nigerians, such as poverty alleviation, resource distribution, infrastructure development and security. An air of anxiety and uncertainty continues to pervade Nigerian society (International IDEA, 2001:1). It is generally agreed that since then progress has been made in the area of personal freedom. The transition has made possible a new, more open society in which people no longer live in fear of the military. Nigerians remain loyal to the idea of a corporate entity called Nigeria, despite the conflicts and tensions that have unranked the

polity since May 1999 (International IDEA, 2001:2).

Democracy is good in itself as a political value. It is even better because of its economic promises. A principal economic value of democracy is that it enhances welfare. On the other hand, economic well-being determines, or at the very least, is essential for the survival of democracy. Both in theory and practice, therefore, the relationship between economy and democracy is fundamental to the sustainability of democracy (Ajakeiye & Roberts, 2002:7). While battling with serious and acute economic challenge, the security threat both in the Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgency compounded and worsened the economic situation. The growth of informal institutions like the Oodua People's Congress (OPC); Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND); Bakassi Boys; Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB); *Boko Haram*; The Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in Nigeria are typical manifestations. Arguably, the most important global issue today is human security. More human lives have been lost during the last twelve years than in any period in Nigeria history. With all the resources, it will require the Nigerian leaders to seize the opportunity to commit to making the country safer for Nigerians – safe from violent insurgency, safe from injustices that ignite communal violence; but safe from conducts that divert resources for people centered development to irrelevant ends. Beyond military action to curtail, degrade and defeat militancy in the Niger Delta and Boko Haram in the North-East Nigeria, there is also need to address underlying conditions that these groups seems to exploit. The conditions include: poverty, unemployment, deprivation,

illiteracy, social disenfranchisement and unresolved political and ethnic disputes.

In actual fact, over the past four decades, the issues confronting the Niger Delta region have caused increasing national and international concern. The region produces immense oil wealth and has become the engine of Nigeria's economy. But it also presents a paradox, because these vast revenues have barely touched the delta's own pervasive local poverty (UNDP, 2005). Today, there are formidable challenges to sustainable human development in the region, including the conflicts over resources among communities, and between communities and oil companies. In other words, the Niger Delta produces the oil wealth that accounts for the bulk of Nigeria's foreign earnings. Paradoxically, however, these vast revenues from an international industry have barely touched the Niger Delta's own pervasive local poverty. This has spurred formidable challenges to sustainable human development in the region, particularly as conflicts over resources tighten their often vicious grip.

Niger Delta: Historical Background

The aforementioned zone is endowed with resources ranging from rubber, timber, palm fruits and the relatively recent commodity of crude oil and gas. Consequently, the zone has been enmeshed in the mercantilism associated with international trade of such products. This has left the region embroiled in the political economy of the area in the fight for the control or/and participatory empowerment by internal and external stakeholders. The consequent social and economic activism on the part of internal stakeholders has a long history, with notable proponents such as King Jaja of Opobo (1821 - 1891), Garrick Sokari Braide (1882-1981), Chief Mowoe, Isaac Boro and Ken SaroWiwa, as well as notable events such as The Willink Commission (1957-58); the

Kaiama Declaration, the Declaration of the Ogoni Bill of Rights amongst others. Among the issues raised by such proponents was the lack of direct beneficence through royalties for the exploitation of the resources of the region, the limited participation of the citizens in the exploitation of the resources and the lack of infrastructural development in the Niger Delta roads and transportation (including waterways); potable water; electricity; telecommunications; housing; reclaimed land and planned settlements with proper sewerage. Although the central governments in Nigeria have responded to each crises arising from the activism based on these issues, such responses have been considered temporary and in some cases even brutally indifferent. Some governments in the past created agencies aimed at addressing the concerns of the internal stakeholders; such as the Willink Commission (1957-58), The Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) [1992] and The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) amongst others.

Defining the Niger-Delta has depended on contextual prism. Peters (2010) asserts that Franki and Cordry using the geological prism first introduced the term "Niger Delta Oil Province" at the 7th World Petroleum Congress in 1967 indicating the region southward from Onitsha, Benin and Umuahia, where oil and gas occur in commercial quantities. The peoples of the Niger-Delta could be found in the small ancient city-states and kingdoms such as Bonny, Brass, Akassa, Kalabari, Okrika, Nembe, Ogoni, Opobo, Bassan, Andoni, Itsekiri and Urhobo.

Geographically, the Niger Delta region is defined as comprising the area covered by the natural delta of the Niger River and the areas to the east and west, which also produce oil. The natural limits of the Niger River Delta can be

defined by its geology and hydrology. Its approximate northern boundaries are located close to the bifurcation of the Niger River at Aboh, while the western and eastern boundaries are around the Benin River and the Imo River, respectively. The area covers approximately 25,900 square kilometers (ERML, 1997). The broader Niger Delta region, which includes all oil producing areas and others considered relevant for reasons of administrative convenience, political expedience and development objectives, extends the land area to 75,000 square kilometers. The Niger Delta Development Bill equates the Niger Delta with the South-South geopolitical zone, comprising Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwalbom and Cross River States, to which neighboring oil producing parts of Ondo, Abia and Imo States were included. Put differently, succinctly and more graphically, defined in this way, the Niger Delta consists of nine states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers) and 185 local governments.

The Niger Delta region is extremely heterogeneous with respect to culture and ethnicity. The five major linguistic and cultural groups—the Ijoid, Edoid, Delta Cross, Yoruboid and Igboid—are each composed of numerous sub-groups. The Ijoid, who are said to have the longest settlement history in the Niger Delta, are the most complex linguistically. Each of the numerous clans of this group has some linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. In certain cases, villages in the same clan have linguistic differences. This group which occupies virtually the whole of Bayelsa State, is also found in Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Edo and Ondo states. The Edoid group is made up mainly of the Isoko and Urhobo of Delta State, the Edo of Edo State, the Engenni and Apie-Atissa of Bayelsa State, and

the Degema of Rivers State. Even within these groups, several sub-groups exist; many claim to have their own individual identity. The groups within the Urhobo are good examples. Typical cases are the Okpe and Uvbie. Among the Edoid groups, the Urhobo is the largest. Although the Edo is a larger group overall, most of them are found outside the Niger Delta region. The Edoid groups in Bayelsa and Rivers states are considered largely within the Ijoid group because of the cultural impact the latter has had on the former (Ojo, 2002; Watts, 2007). The Delta Cross comprises mainly the Ogoni, Ogba, Abua, Odual and Obolo/Andoni in Rivers State and the Ibibio, Oron and Ibeno of AkwaIbom State. The Ibibio is the largest of these groups. The most well-known, especially internationally, is the Ogoni because of its agitation for resource control and autonomy. The ethno-cultural complexity of the Niger Delta region is vividly illustrated by the fact that even a small ethnic group like the Ogoni (about 500,000 people) is made up of at least four cultural groups: the Khana, Gokama, Tai and Eleme. In spite of the fact that the Yoruba and the Igbos are two of the largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, the related groups in the Niger Delta are some of the smallest there. The main Yoruboid groups are the Itsekiri of Delta State, and the Ilaje and Ikale in the borderlands of Ondo State. The main Igboid groups are the Ikwerre, Ndoni, Egbema, Ogba and Ekpeye in Rivers State and the Ukuwani in Delta State (Ekpo 2003, Alagoa 1998).

Noticeably, before the colonial interlude, there was considerable interaction among the groups of the Niger Delta region, especially those of the core Niger Delta. This interaction has always been in terms of trade and inter-group marriages. One major system of exchange is the trade between the Ijaws, who fish, and the agricultural Urhobos (G.I.Jones 1961, Dike

1956)). Until recently, Itsekiri female traders were important facilitators of this trade. Inter-group marriages have been so significant, particularly among the Urhobo, Itsekiri and Western Ijaws, that a large proportion of families in some areas are multicultural. Given such interactions, it is curious that inter-ethnic conflicts have been common in the Niger Delta. But the competition for resources, especially land in this land-short region, has been intense. The emergence of petroleum on the scene seems to have accentuated such conflicts. There is no doubt that the incidence of conflicts may have been considerably less if there had been no oil and gas in the region. The development challenge is how to manage these conflicts so that the business of promoting human development can go on without interruption.

However, settlement patterns in the Delta are influenced by topography and drainage. In the coastal beach ridge zone, dry land is readily available, though in narrow strips. Settlements in this area typically stretch along the coast with little breadth. Various wide estuaries separate settled areas. A number of sizeable settlements, such as Bonny, Akassa and New Forcados, are located here. Given the fact that the mangrove swamp zone is a massive swamp with scattered islands, population is sparsely distributed. The swamp is virtually uninhabited except for fishing camps; some settlements exist on dry islands. Settlement size is dependent on the size of a given island. Large settlements include Buguma, Nembe and Burutu. Land is more or less continuous in the freshwater swamp region, save for the numerous creeks. Since much of the land is swampy, habitation is usually in areas of high land. The levees along the rivers and creeks are the favoured sites, and often densely populated. Other areas are very sparsely settled. Major

settlements include Sagbama, Oleh and Patani. Of all the zones, the lowland rainforest zone provides the best places for settlement. Most of the large settlements are found here, although the largest towns in the Niger Delta—Port Harcourt and Warri—are found in the transition zone between swampland and the more solid land of the lowland rainforests.

The Militants in the Niger Delta

A pertinent question at this juncture is: who are the militants in the Niger Delta. This question is germane in the sense that without knowing these elements, their objectives and *modus operandi*, it might be extremely difficult to find solution to the seemingly unending crisis in the region. The militants in this area consist of both individuals and organizations who have various reasons for fighting against the governments and the oil multinationals. It is however important to stress that it is difficult for an individual to function as a militant. This requires a concerted effort and collaboration with other individuals with similar beliefs and goals. In this regard, one could state that there are more than ten militant organizations in the area. Some of these include: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), General” Boyloaf, Outlaws, Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) and People’s Liberation Force (PLF). Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) emerged in late 2005, and was able to draw national attention to itself by kidnapping four foreign oil workers while at the same time articulating a set of demands which included increased political participation, a greater share of the profits derived from local oil and gas, socioeconomic development, and the reduced militarization of the region (*Strafor Global Intelligence*, April 25 2011).

The MEND is not a single entity with clear political objectives. Rather it has metamorphosed into a conglomeration of distinct militant groups with Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC) is often referred to as Western MEND and was founded in Delta State where militants organize along more rigid ethnic lines than in Bayelsa or Rivers. The primary goal of the group is Ijawself determination in the Warri area and it was intensely opposed to both the oil industry and the Nigerian government. Politically it was led by Oboko Bello and militarily by Tom Polo a former oil industry employee who later became one of the most militant elements in the zone. It should however be stressed that the group built a heavily fortified complex in the region’s creeks and was overall committed to the overall Ijaw political objective of gaining greater access to their own oil wealth (*Strafor Global Intelligence*, April 25 2011). Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF) operated under the MEND umbrella in Rivers State and it is often referred to as Eastern MEND. It was formed in 2005 by Farah Dagogo, a former independent commander of a separate militant organization. At inception this organization developed a close partnership with the Outlaw’s Soboma George. However, by 2008, the two groups had become sworn enemies while remaining nominally linked through their association with MEND.

“General” Boyloaf operated mainly in Bayelsa and is believed to have benefitted from the state government and it operated under the leadership of Victor Ben who worked closely with Henry Okay. It is generally referred to as central MEND. Outlaws, another militant organization operated from the River State and believed to have benefitted from immense

political patronage from Governor Rotimi Amaechi. Outlaws were formed by the NDV's former number two, Soboma George.

Similarly, Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) is another militant organization was founded by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and has Rivers State as its operational base. It broke away from the mainstream Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 2004 and threatened an all-out war on the oil industry. But at a later stage member of the Reformed NDPVF participated in the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC) alongside members of MEND and a group known as the Martyrs Brigade. (*Strafor Global Intelligence*, April 25 2011). Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV) was formed in Rivers state in 2003 by Ateke Tom who has remained a bitter rival of Mujahid Dokubo-Asari. Also, it battled other groups over control of oil bunkering in territories they perceived as their areas of jurisdiction and competence. Ateke embraced a government amnesty in late 2009 and agreed to surrender arms (Amaize, 2010) People's Liberation Force (PLF). This group is led by Egbiri Papa who is also known as Soboma Jackrich and often acts in concert with Dagogo's NDS. (*Los Angeles Times*, October 26, 2009). A new group-the Niger Delta Avengers was formed in 2015.

Militancy and Peace in the Niger Delta

The concept of militancy is such that has gained global usage not only in the contemporary epoch but also in the hitherto socio-political relations amongst humans in the centuries past. The coming together of man to live in groups produced complicated socio-economic relations which favored some individuals and groups at the expense of others. This expectedly brought with it protests against perceived injustices. Where there are pacific

instrumentalities by which these contradictions could be resolved, then such protests could be ameliorated without a recourse to violence. On the other hand, where such conflicts are allowed to fester and degenerate into violent conflict, so many options are open to resolving them in a rather violent form. These could include: militancy terror attacks, insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and outright civil war. While a declaration of a civil war would involve the use of powerful and sophisticated weapons, terror attacks, insurgencies and even guerrilla warfare might not involve the use of such weapons on a consistent basis. When pacific settlement fail, militancy is usually one of the options often resulted into.

What constitutes militancy is nebulous and devoid of consensus. Apart from the aggressiveness which is common to all militant acts, there are variants of in terms of components and mode of the concept. It could involve terror attack, kidnapping, killing, maiming, attacks on economic and infrastructural installations and so on. For the purpose of this paper, the acts of militancy in the Niger Delta will be limited to kidnapping, pipeline vandalisation, oil theft, and killings. After seemingly unending violent attacks and kidnapping of oil workers and government officials, the Yar'dua government announced on June 26, 2006 that it would grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta. The programme which commenced on 6 August, 2009 ended on 4 October 2009 (60 days). After consultation with the Nigeria's Council of State, President Yar' Adua Signed the amnesty offer. Inter alia, the programme required that within sixty days, the militants should surrender their weapons which included: rocket-propelled grenades, guns, explosives, ammunition and gunboats (As an incentive, the government offered to pay

£225 a month in cash and food allowances during the rehabilitation period) (The Guardian, August 2009).

As a sign of goodwill and commitment to the amnesty programme, the government freed Henry Okah, a suspected leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. All charges of treason and gun-running leveled against him were dropped. Also Ebikabowei Victor Ben, another MEND's leader in Bayelsa State also accepted the offer. Before the deadline expired on October 4, 2009, 26,000 youths had already embraced the programme. In November, 2010, the second phase of the programme was initiated and 1, 166 erstwhile militants were added to the number. The third phase became a reality in September, 2012 with additional 3, 642 joining the fray (*The News*, 17 November 2012: 38-39). While briefing press men on the third anniversary of the programme on 4 October, 2012, the former Special Adviser to the President on the Amnesty Programme Kingsley Kuku submitted that in line with its objectives of demobilizing and reintegrating the former combatants into civil society, the entire 26,358 ex-agitators enlisted in the programme had been fully demobilized, having successfully undertaken non-violence, transformational training at the Amnesty Demobilization Camps in Obubra, Cross River State and Akodo in Lagos State. The Amnesty Office also said it had within three years successfully placed a total of 11,525 former militants in skill acquisition/training and formal education centers within and outside the country. Some of the beneficiaries, said Kuku, were being trained in different skills that would make them self-reliant in 39 local training centre in 12 states of the Federation, while some others had been

placed in off-shore educational and skills acquisition centers in the United States of America, Italy, Russia, South Africa, Malaysia, England, Israel, Sri Lanka, India, Benin Republic, Cyprus, Poland, Ghana, Turkey, Romania, Belarus, United Arab Emirates, The Philippines as well as Trinidad and Tobago. According to him more of the trainees are due to be deployed to skills acquisition facilities in Greece, Germany and Canada (*The News*, 17 September, 2012).

Peace in the Niger Delta is an imperative for the Nigerian government and its citizens. While peace is needed in virtually all parts of Nigeria, peace in the Niger Delta bears an overtone of urgency because of its strategic economic importance to the Nigerian nation. Without being hyperbolic, the Niger Delta today is the crux of the Nigerian economy. Violent conflicts that are short-lived could have serious implications for Nigeria's economy but a prolonged disruption of the peace in form of sustained militancy, insurgencies or a civil war in the zone could spell immense disaster for the Nigerian fragile economy. If oil companies in the Niger Delta are compelled to shut down for long, undoubtedly, the country's economy will start hemorrhaging very badly and with devastating consequences for all segments of the Nigerian national life. Essentially, peace in the Niger Delta is an important panacea to the overall survival of Nigeria, irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliations. While the Boko Haram insurgencies and bomb blasting in the northern part of the country could adversely affect the peaceful co-existence in the country, the negative activities of the Niger Delta militants which might culminate in the halting of production of oil in the region could result in almost total paralysis of the country's

economy. The Odua Peoples' Congress (OPC) in the Southwest and the Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC) in the northern parts of the country could afford to foment troubles in their enclaves for a relatively long period of time with the country soldiering on. But a prolonged crisis in the Niger Delta is a luxury that the country could ill-afford. There must be the financial where- withal with which to fight the militant groups or even to negotiate with them. To fight any act of insurgencies or other forms violent conflagrations, weapons have to be bought and soldiers would have to be deployed and maintained in the affected places for a period of time. All of these have serious financial implications. And the bulk of these funds come from the Niger Delta.

Most of the literature on the Niger Delta that attempt to provide lasting panacea to the crisis in the region tend to be externalist in their therapy, recommending increased derivation funds to the area and agitating for more corporate responsibilities of the oil companies (Asuni, 2009; Ibeanu, 1998; Ibeanu, 2002; Hazen & Honer, 2007; Ikelegbe, 2005; Imobighe, 2004; Okocha, 2003; Saliu, 2008). They tend to be silent on the predatory leaders like James Ibori and others who have seriously pillaged their states' treasuries. Without doubt, these prognoses are infallible and highly incontrovertible. The many years of neglect and occupation by the military under successive federal governments could hardly be excused on any legitimate grounds. The indifference of the oil companies and the criminal environmental degradation perpetrated by these companies have permanently altered the socio-economic relations in the region. Many of the erstwhile fishermen and women in area are now engaged in menial jobs that could hardly sustain them in

a decent way. In fact, a vast majority of them are now jobless in an atmosphere of rising cost of living which oil exploration and production have fostered on the entire community. For instance, Port Harcourt is one of the most expensive cities in Nigeria today and the impact of this on the jobless and the under-employed cannot but be staggering and profound. Faced with a situation of severe deprivation as well as hopelessness, so many of the indigenes of this zone turn to criminality and brigandage. Deployment of armoured tanks, sub-machine gun and other military weapons are not the solutions to these problems. Rather a holistic approach that incorporates far-reaching socio-economic engineering and provision of employment and other basics of life tend to be a more pragmatic and lasting approach to the quagmire in the region (Toboro 2010).

Clearly, the amnesty saga is one realistic option taken by the late President Umaru Musa Yar'dua. The earlier militaristic approach adopted by President Obasanjo was largely ineffective and in fact, a dismal failure. There is always a limit to oppression and repression, especially in an atmosphere of pervasive and unrelenting social injustice. At the level of the federal government, the olive branch has been extended to the militants and the positive aspects of this gesture are being manifested in the skill acquisition programmes for these erstwhile militants both at home and abroad. For enduring peace to be achieved in the region, not only should this gesture be sustained and strengthened, the scope must be broadened to accommodate millions of other marginalized youths whose existence now hangs precariously in the balance. The issue of derivation principle is also intimately related to peaceful coexistence in the region. Yet, despite the increase of the derivation funds to thirteen

per cent since 1999 there is little to show for this increase. The issue of internal contradictions that culminated in worsening poverty as a result of the profligate conspiracy of the politicians is an element that we have touched on earlier and which we still revisit shortly. However, there is still the urgent need to revisit the issue of derivation in the Nigerian federation. The current fiscal federalism in the country is undoubtedly flawed and could hardly promote the cause of peace either in Nigeria or in the Niger Delta (Ekpo, 2003; Watts, 2007; Strause, 2009; Ikejiani-Clark, 2007). The impact of environmental degradation in form of gas flaring, oil spillage and destruction of the marine life in the zone will simply remain an issue of intellectual and academic discourse until one closely associates with the stark realities in the zone (Onduku, 2001).

Conflict Theory

“Conflict theory” is, generally speaking, a social theory that emphasizes the importance of conflict over consensus in understanding society. The term is somewhat confusing since Marxism and its progeny are by definition all conflict theories (remember the class struggle?) Yet, in a narrower sense we can use the term to refer to a group of non-Marxist theorists writing mainly in the 1950s and 1960s who criticized the obsession of functionalists with social consensus. These conflict theorists borrowed from both Marx’s idea of the class struggle and Weber’s discussion of forms of power and authority to criticize some of the main tenets of functionalism (Mann, 2008:40).

The conflict perspective holds that conflicts result from the contradiction in the human environment. It points out that a state of domination and subjection can be ended by a total transformation of the conditions which give rise to conflict. It is noted that conflict is inevitable but it is only reduced by the use of

force or other means by the ruling class to prevent the subordinate classes from seeking emancipation. Clearly, therefore, the conflict approach sees conflict in the society as emanating from the interaction between social aggregates, that is classes (Anyo, 2014:47). Whereas conflict according to Simmel (1950), can be treated broadly as a philosophical category denoting the clash of power against power in the striving of all things to become manifest. Or, conflict can be seen simply as a distinct category of social behavior – as two parties trying to get something they both cannot have at the same time.

More often than not, individuals, groups and sub-groups will seek heterogeneous or incompatible goals, using diverse or heterogeneous means or technologies. French and Bell (1992:185) puts this into perspective when they argue that:

The three primary conditions which give rise to conflict are scarcity (there are not enough desired resources to allow all parties to have all they want), interdependence (the parties are related to each other in such a way that the distribution of resources affects everyone in some way, and incompatible goals and/or means to goals. When these conditions exist, conflict is a probable result.

Social-conflict theory highlights the link between war and social inequality. Karl Marx who helped develop social–conflict–approach,

considered political leaders the servants of the capitalist class, the people who own the means or production, capitalists want ever increasing profits, which they get from finding new sources of raw materials, manufacturing new products, and selling them in new markets. In Marx's day, capitalists did all these things through colonizing the world, which led the rich nations in Europe to conquer and control other countries (Maciouis, 2008:500). By linking war and terrorism to social inequality, the social – conflict approach helps explain ongoing support for militarism in the United States even during times of peace.

In general, conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies, and the effects it brings. The central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scarce resources and power. What these resources are might be different for each theorist, but conflict theorists usually work with Weber's three systems of stratification: class, status and power. Conflict theorists generally see power as the central feature of society; rather than thinking of society as held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of cultural standards, as functionalists do. Where power is located and who uses it (and who doesn't) are thus fundamental to conflict theory. In this way of thinking about things, power isn't necessary bad; it is a primary factor that guides society and social relations.

Concept of National Security

Buzan (2012) sees national security as the “survival and pursuit of freedom from threats and the ability to maintain a nation's independence, identity and functional integrity against forces of change that are seen as hostile”. National security is best described as

a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and well-being. It is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory, to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms. All through there is often a legitimate military dimension to national security, Further studies have proven that national security cannot be measured by military parameters alone. It is also a function of economic strength, political cohesiveness, social equity, cultural outreach, and environmental soundness. This security dilemma is not peculiar or unique to Third World Countries and Nigeria in particular, but a universal concern particularly in these contemporary times of growing interdependence, globalization, shared danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and varying nature of terrorist acts. Since the end of the cold war in 1989, there has been a serious debate over the redefinition of national security to respond to new global challenges.

The debate is essentially premised on the need to focus more on political threats posed by regional, ethnic and religious conflicts-as a result of explosion in global interdependence, communication and information technology and crisis on public world order. Apart from the issue at stake-the menace of the Boko Haram sect, order security problems currently confronting the nation have been identified to include political and election conflicts, socio economic agitations, ethno-religious crisis, ethnic militias, boundary disputes, cultism, criminality and organized crimes. These problems individually and collectively constitute threat to the peace, security and development of the country. These have implications for the continuity and survival of the nation's nascent democracy. Indeed, the

question has been, whose interest does national security serve in Nigeria? According to Olukoshi (2014) and Imobighe (2013) states and dominant class interests obviously overshadowed national security in Nigeria. The security thrust is often directed toward the interests of the governing class and their propertied allies while most Nigerians are left high and dry and alienated from the security processes.

The bad state of national security in Nigeria has become more alarming than the issue of power and energy in the country. It finds explanation at the rate in which armed robbery, kidnapping, adoption, religious fanaticism, political assassination and other criminal act have become the rampant. A situation where these brigands demonstrate superior fire power to the police is critical and warrison and that can only serve to dampen the moral of the law enforcement agencies. There is no gain-saying the fact that Nigerian government has been very careless over security matters, for instance, the porous nature of Nigeria's borders is one of the challenges of the national security system. For too long, the borders have been thrown open as of 1980s to all manner of aliens from Niger, Chad and Sudan is very prominent in most of the cities and towns of northern Nigeria. Most migrated to Nigeria without Nigerian immigration ministry actually challenging their identities. Perhaps, Nigerian government open its flanks to these nations in the spirit of one in Brotherhood-Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) but fails to realize that these countries are strong members of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and are capable of coming in to the country to indoctrinate the Muslim youths in the northern region. The United States is markedly known as the melting point in relation to cultural assimilation or multiculturalism, yet, it does not

easily open its door to just any nation for security proposes.

Changing Phase of the Conflict and Challenges to National Security

Disturbingly, production of most of the crops from the regions witnessed terminal decliners from the time oil war discovered in 1956 at Oloibiri in the present Day Niger Delta of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2005). This in no small way affect the total condition of people in the region various diplomatic effort ranging from peaceful demonstration and protest to outright militancy have been embarked upon with little effect. As such, the agitation for development and restoration of right of the people started as a pocket protest from various communities. But the establishment of MOSOP by Ken Saro Wiwa for the emancipation of the Ogoni people gave u more articulated dimension to the protest of the people; this also gave it an international outlook. When MOSOP was established, it was not a secret cult but a mass movement that has clearly articulated goals with several publications. In fact, the outings of MOSOP (Movement for the Emancipation of Ogoni People) was what created ripples among Nigeria's political establishment. But little was done by the government and oil companies to constructively engage MOSOP, what later became the recompense of MOSOP leaders was the execution of Ken Sarowiwa and eight Ogoni leaders by the General Abacha Junta. But today in its place, there is ethnic Militias that are faceless and ubiquitous without clear, achievable and measurable objective. On the 13th May 2009 the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) gave an ultimatum for oil companies to move their holdings from their area for the purported declaration of civil war in the area. The import of this is that the new consciousness is being misdirected by people without the requisite

skills for non-violent and peaceful change. (Onuoha, A. 2005 p43)

As a brief departure, it may be instructive to state here that government has made concerted effort in redressing the problem in the Niger Delta right from the establishment of the Willinks Commission which was set up before independence to recommend the best strategies for the development of the region. The report was tuned in 1958 and recommended that the Niger Delta deserves special attention and should be made a special area for development. Conversely, however, this dovetailed into the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Board, (NDDDB) in 1960 to cuter for the unique developmental needs of the area. The NDDDB was at best Moribund and did not achieve the lofty objectives for which it was established other agencies which were established after NDDDB equally failed.

These include:

- The River Basin Development Authority which was established after the civil war, not just for the development of the Niger Delta but for the whole country, negating the prescriptions of the Williak's Commission report. ‘
- The Presidential Task force which devoted 1.5% of the Federation Account to the development of the Niger Delta Region.
- The Belgore Commission which was to identify the root causes of the disaffection in the oil producing areas and suggest the best way forward. It recommended the establishment of developmental agency and this save birth to the oil mineral producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) in1993.

Ironically, all these intervention efforts failed. Timi Abaibe (2009) gave the following reasons for the failure of previous intervention effort, and they include:

- There was no regional master plan that conveyed an aggregate of regional development needs and the peoples' aspirations and hope.
- There was manpower and leadership instability within the organization and policy. As a result appointments were made more on political expediency than professional competence, know-how and ability.
- Funding was grossly inadequate
- Lack of planned intervention and coordination resulted in duplications and white elephant projects.
- Poor governance, instability and lack of transparency and vision often led to official recklessness and rampant corruption.
- The political will to succeed was lacking.

The failure of these efforts ‘according to Timi Alaibe (2007) worsened the peoples' condition, leading to frustrated expectations. This slowly gave rise to tension, anger and conflict and by 1999 the region was awash with thousands of abandoned projects, relics of the peoples' expectations. The people had developed a serious mistrust of government intention and become more and more unwilling to wait for government initiatives. The region particularly through youth groups, had begun to take their own destinies into their hands, moreover, the government later introduced another intervention scheme such as Niger Delta Development commission NDDC which part of its strategy brought about the Niger Delta

Regional Development master plan (NDRDMP) which development import is quite robust, coordinated and comprehensive and later the introduction of the ministry of the Niger Delta, which are all aimed at bringing lasting peace to the region.

It is important to emphasis at this juncture that the problem in the Niger Delta region would not have been so devastating and deteriorating if at least the Niger Delta leaders (Political and traditional alike) have been faithful to the region. For instance, Timi Alaibe (2007) gave an instance of the unfaithfulness and improbity of such leaders where he said:

'One of the sad realities of education in the region is that even today, in 2007, there are many children who study under trees and on floor in many communities, despite huge allocation to local government councils. For instance, between January 2001 and July 2007, the 185 local government councils in the region have received approximately, N822.336 billion, averaging N4.4 million our experience shows that a standard school building requires N12 million to complete yet, infrastructure which is vital for qualitative education is grossly lacking, in public schools, this even more dire. There are few functional school buildings, poor inadequate furniture, very limited and poorly equipped science labs. No computer

training and other aids are non-existent. The net result: high dropout rates, low skills and capacity and unemployed ability. The schools, therefore, have become factories and breeding grounds for restive youth waiting for crisis profiteers ".

Sadly, enough, because of the insensitivity of the so called leaders to manage the problem in the region, the game has changed! Today, many youths have joined the rank of what the world refers to as militants. Unfortunately, due to intractable unemployment and crippling poverty they are armed with sophisticated weapon, self-funding from huge proceeds of oil bunkering, have sophisticated intelligence on oil companies and even security agencies, recruiting across the region and running multiple camps, enjoy substantial community sympathy, despite condemnations, and containing them has become more challenging ('Timialaibe, 2007). The whole efforts have been complicated and shrouded in mystery; the militia men embark on vandalism, kidnapping and hostage taking in turn for ransom, their prayer is for the conflict to continue so that they can continue to milk from it - the economic value of the conflict is their interest and not to emancipate the innocent Niger Deltans. '

Austin Onuaha (2005) gave his personal experience when he was travelling to the region on research and their vehicle was stopped, all the people in the vehicle were ransacked and their valuables collected, he reported that nothing was collected from him because the militia saw an identity card of a newspaper house which they claimed has been supporting their course. One may then ask what if it was

otherwise, would he have been killed? What about the innocent travelers whose valuable were taken away? How many would have been a victim of this unrefined act? and how many more yet unknown. When a region is becoming inhabitable, it is a signal of a failed state. Somalia is referred to as a failed state because it is being control by pocket of war lords who collect toll at the Airport, commit piracy at the sea port and kill one another to settle scores unhindered. Many of such situations is prevalent in the Niger Delta now. That is the reason why the writers argue here that government should religiously follow all lines of peaceful settlement to bring about lasting solution and development in the region-while a discreet but subtle military approach should also be utilized to curb the excesses of unguided militancy at the region. What I mean is that concerted effort should be made by government, to negotiate, work with the real militants who are truly agitating the people 's course, to be able to detect and apprehend the criminals among the militants, that I refer here as unguided militancy. This seems to be working, in recent time, since joint task force JTF have engaged the militants while government equally extend her hands of amnesty to the repentant ones, Ateketom, one of the renowned leader of militant groups with his members agree to surrender their arms, we also heard of another militant lender by name Cen Africa, he also applaud the amnesty plan of the government and implore that the government should be very sincere with it. Perhaps, this would not have been possible if the Federal Government has not exerted her authority and monopolistic claim to the legitimate use of arm as JIF began in recent time.

Other components of the DDRR programme entails; nonviolent training and education in

line with the nonviolent movement of the Albert Luthuli programme of the apartheid era in South Africa, to ensure that there is maintenance of civil behaviour in the Niger Delta; career guidance and counseling where these militants will take their own decisions in terms of what careers or skills they want to acquire; provision of micro-credit to fund the businesses of those who want to go into business ventures and opportunity to go back to school or get job training for others.

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

Summary

The study attempted to conceptualize the terms and unravel the immediate and remote causes of Niger Delta activities in the recent times. It explored the issues of Nigeria's national security and terrorism, evolution of the Islamic sect and some of the reasons the government is unable to tackle the problem of insecurity in the nation. The study submits that there is the need to design appropriate tactical initiatives to properly address the problems of national security system in Nigeria which include among others, investing heavily in intelligence gathering. There is the need to break the barrier of security insurgencies by developing a scientific methods and effective machinery to checkmate terrorist acts in the country. The present administration should intensify efforts to provide inclusive governance and redirect the nation's resources mainly to the marginalized and less developed areas of the country. Promoting fair and balanced development in the country is imperative to stability and legitimacy of any government.

All hands must be on deck to bring about all round resolution to crises in the region, the government (local and state inclusive) N.G.O's and oil companies must come together to advance a developmental change in the region.

There cannot be meaningful development where violence prevails, it was in the bid to achieve the sustainable peace that Onuoha Austin (2005) developed a model he called 'Community Education and Institution Building' (CEIB). According to this model, it is hoped that the people should be properly educated on the need to leave in peace and be reminded of the glorious past where they had always enjoyed and enjoined peaceful co-existence, while at the same time educating people in the art that will bring personal economic independence. This simultaneously will have to go with institution building of real project for development like schools, roads, hospital, fishery farm and military institution indigenous to the people's area. All the stakeholders must be accountable and this is part of education that will be given to the people, that, rather than blaming the distance government, all institutions of government from local to state level must be made to be responsible.

Prof. Nuhu Yaqub in his key note address in an Agenda for a New Nigeria: The Imperative for Development (2006), noted what constitute serious problems and challenges to the continued existence of the country, he started by emphasizing that it is not the military take over that is the issue, but the discipline and single minded devotion of the leadership to address what should have been considered to be the real issues. These are hereby listed as the fight against corruption; the assurance of good governance; and the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy.

The DDDR strategy is a commendable initiative in so far as it brings back the developmental problem of the Niger-Delta atop the in-tray of the national policy agenda in Nigeria and allows the proponents of the Niger Delta developmental issues to ventilate their

concerns through an administrative rather than an adversarial platform. However, there are many indications that the implementation of the vision driving the strategy was not well thought out and many of the solutions its purports to offer the Niger Delta development problems are unsustainable in the long term. It is suggested that a holistic approach be taken to account in implementing the strategy, with the stakeholders carried along at all stages and the front line implementers are required to exhibit transparency and accountability to gain the trust of the beneficiaries and of the people of the Niger Delta.

To do this effectively, there are several examples of the sustainable use of oil revenues to enhance community development and economic growth, and the planners and implementers of the DDDR strategy need only to adapt such examples to the local context and the peculiar needs of the Niger Delta situation without necessarily expending time and effort in re-inventing the wheel. Promote peace as the foundation for development. There cannot be any meaningful human development without peace. A peace agenda must include education, easier access to justice and a more equitable distribution of resources. Make local governance effective and responsive to the needs of the people. Governance is very central to achieving meaningful development outcomes. The effectiveness of governance, especially at the local government level, is an issue of serious concern. At the core of promoting effective governance is the urgent need to institutionalize the practices of accountability, transparency and integrity to guide the flow of development resources at all levels.

There is the need to improve and diversify the economy. The Niger Delta region, with its

stock of natural and human resources, offers immense opportunities for developing a diversified and growing economy. A diversified economy would reduce dependence on oil and gas, jumpstart new industries and provide sustainable livelihoods. A growth agricultural and mineral product, and galvanize local economies. Promotion of social inclusion and improved access to social services is another point. A major concern is the region's longstanding exclusion from the mainstream of Nigeria's socio-economic and political activities. The majority of the people in the delta live on the margins. Reducing exclusion and achieving more evenhanded development will depend on the empowerment of socially marginalized groups and individuals, stronger social institutions and infrastructure, and the development of the capacity of existing local groups.

Also, promote environmental sustainability to preserve the means of people's sustainable livelihoods. The mainstreaming of environmental sustainability into all development activities must be complemented by proactive steps to conserve natural resources; to reduce pollution, especially from oil spills and gas flares; and to set and achieve adequate targets for clean air and water and soil fertility. These should be backed by rigorous enforcement of environmental laws and standards. Build sustainable partnerships for the advancement of human development. Many stakeholders must work together to achieve meaningful change. All levels of government and the NDDC, the oil companies, the organized private sector, civil society organizations and development agencies should form partnerships around plans for sustainable development and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Conclusion

In conclusion, It has been argued noted in this paper that part of the real issues or challenge to national cohesion is the Niger Delta which remains a question, it was however emphasized that the hierarchy of conflict in the Niger Delta are real issues but became complicated with the presence of oil and multination activities, the militancy is another real issue discussed in the paper, it was however suggested that in order for Nigerian state not to loose its potency to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force and to prevent a contagious effect of conflict in the state, a discreet but subtle military approach may be expedient to curb the excesses of militancy in the region.

5.3 Recommendations

The consideration of the future sustainable use of the oil revenues from the Niger-Delta to ensure peace and prosperity in the region, it is pertinent to examine some recent models in other countries. A recent innovative approach to the sustainable use of oil revenues was put in place in Chad, where the oil revenue from the country's Doba oil field will be used effectively for important investments in health, education, environment, infrastructure and rural development to reduce poverty. The Chadian model was developed under a new law which provides for 10 percent of the special oil revenue account to be placed annually in a savings account for future generations (future generations fund); 80 percent to be spent in priority sectors such as education, health, rural development, water resources and the environment; 5% for the oil-producing regions for special development projects; and the remainder 5% for general government operating expenditures. An Oversight Committee was established to monitor all the

revenue flows and approve the spending from a special oil revenue account. The Committee has members from the executive branch of the government, the legislative branch, the judiciary, human rights groups, women groups and faith-based organizations. Half of the members of the Committee have no ties to the Chadian government.

Similarly, in Kuwait, the UAE and Norway, revenues from oil and gas has been used for the welfare of the present and future generations (Mehlum et al, 2008). Welfare being not only pure economic benefit, but also education, health, safety, environmental restoration and protection, and the quality of life in general. Thus, if the DDRR strategy is to work, it has to go beyond the symptomatic action of pacifying militants and take a holistic post-amnesty approach using the examples of countries like Norway, United Arab Emirate and Kuwait and heeding the insights of Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian, in which they advised that oil rich countries may be potentially harmed by the following features;

- Volatile oil prices, compared with prices of manufactured goods, resource-exporting countries are exposed to a much greater risk;
- Natural resources create large “rents” that require little human effort, and these rents are easy to appropriate by the state or a few powerful people. Thus, “the state is relieved of the pressure to tax and has no incentive to promote the protection of private property rights as a way of creating wealth”;
- As representation goes with taxation in established democracies, untaxed citizens have no effective means to hold the government accountable; and

- The effect of these rents is corruptive of public officials and in extreme cases, such as in Angola, Gabon and the Congo, the few control the riches and effectively become the state. Fights over wealth distribution can lead to civil war, as happened in several African countries, for example Liberia and Sierra Leone over diamond extraction and trade. If these valuable insights are taken seriously and heeded, then for the future prosperity and peace of the Niger-Delta and consequently Nigeria, which depends on the region for a large part of its revenue, the following recommendations may be instructive.

Commensurate beneficence of the oil producing areas should be accelerated. But this should be done with the delegation method of Tannenbaum & Schmidt taken to account. The Tannenbaum and Schmidt Continuum is a simple model, which shows the relationship between the level of freedom that a manager chooses to give to a team, and the level of authority used by the manager. As the team's freedom is increased, so the manager's authority decreases. This is a good way in which both teams and managers develop. In this model the level of delegation is dependent upon the level of maturity and competency of the delegate. Thus, as revenue flows are increased to the region it should be accompanied with supervised sustainable programme, with supervision provided by non-profit organizations which allows different communities (considered as teams managed by NGO supervision for the purpose of allocated funds) to handle their increased revenues with a degree of autonomy that is dependent on the amount of capacity within the community for the handling of such revenue flows, until they can

completely do so autonomously and in a sustainable way.

More importantly too, environmental concerns in the region should go beyond rhetoric. Action should be taken on zero tolerance for gas flaring, and such other factors which degrade the environment of the Niger-Delta during exploitation. The political matrix upon which the regional economy can develop is very important, therefore, it is necessary to nurture a transparent democratic process which respects the sovereign will of the people as expressed through their votes and consultative channels that allows unrestricted media attention, as well as the development of a political leadership that is accountable.

In short, measurable indicators for value creation in the region should be established with the roles of all stakeholders specified and consequences for abdication of roles also spelt out. This should be made clear especially in the creation of values in investments on employment using oil revenues, transfer of skills and technology and social infrastructure for recreation, health and education. The achievement of these indicators should be monitored and coordinated by a consultative forum which involves communities in the region and other stakeholders. A periodic review of the amnesty programme with the beneficiary stakeholders involved in the design, implementation and evaluation from the pre and post amnesty should be instituted, as a matter of necessity.

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