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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CORRUPTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A FRAME WORK OF ANALYSIS.....	1
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NIGERIA’S BORDER CLOSURE ON NEIGHBOURING WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 2019 – 2021	20
CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURS AND PERPETUATION OF TIV-JUKUN ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN WUKARI, TARABA STATE	55
URBANISATION AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF ABDULSALAM ABUBAKAR GENERAL HOSPITAL, GULU/VATSA, NIGER STATE.	76
AN ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING DURING GENERAL SANI ABACHA REGIME IN NIGERIA	91
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON VOTER’S BEHAVIOUR: A STUDY OF THE 2023 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF GIWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF KADUNA STATE.....	119
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS, MILITARY REGIMES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRANSITION TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC IN NIGERIA (1993-1999)	142
AN EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON CREATING AWARENESS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN KADUNA NORTH, KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA.....	165
MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF A PLURALITY GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE 2023 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION	185
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FIREWOOD PRODUCTION AMONG THE GBAGYI WOMEN OF CENTRAL NIGERIA	208
PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF JOB SATISFACTION FOR LIBRARY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA	231
ASSESSMENT OF WORLD BANK INTERVENTION IN COMBATING POVERTY IN BAKOLORI IRRIGATION SCHEME IN NIGERIA.....	251

CORRUPTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A FRAME WORK OF ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Corruption and sustainable development are processes that have continuously played a major role in Nigeria's national development. Using secondary method of data collection and analysis, this study exposed and unveiled that absence of, rule of law, constitutionalism, dedicated and willing, accountable and committed leadership among others as paraphernalia to sustainable development in Nigeria. Thus, inconsistency and lack of coherence in Nigeria's national development apparatus became apparent. The paper further discovered that factors such as, poor states of economy, high level of unemployment, illiteracy, ignorance, and poverty were also considered as impediments responsible for the crippling sustainable development in Nigeria. Among others the paper recommends that critical appraisal of political and civil reforms are veritable steps towards ensuring a true and reliable sustainable development in Nigeria.

Keywords: *Corruption, Development, sustainable development, Nigeria.*

1.1 Introduction

Corruption as a phenomenon, is a global problem, and exists in varying degrees in different countries (Luna, 2002). Corruption is not only found in democratic and dictatorial politics, but also in feudal, capitalist and socialist economies. Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist cultures are equally bedeviled by corruption (Dike,

2005). Corruption is an effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means for private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit. Corruption like cockroaches has co-existed with human society for a long time and remains as one of the problems in many of the world's developing economies with devastating repercussions.

World Bank studies put corruption at over \$1 trillion per year accounting for up to 12% of the Gross Domestic Product of nations like Nigeria, Kenya and Venezuela (Nwabuzor, 2005).

In Nigeria, it is one of the many unresolved problems Madichie (2005) that have critically hobbled and skewed development. It remains a long-term major political and economic challenge for Nigeria (Maduagwe, 1996). It is a canker worm that has eaten deep in the fabric of the nation. It ranges from petty corruption to political / bureaucratic corruption or Systemic corruption (Abimbola, 2007).

Corruption is endemic as well as an enemy within (Acemoghi, 2000). It is a canker worm that has eaten deep in the fabric of the country and had stunted growth in all sectors. It has been the primary reason behind the country difficulties in developing fast. This is evident in Transparency International's has consistent rating of Nigeria as one of the top three most corrupt countries in the world (Ribadu, 2003).

As part of effort at fighting corruption and strengthening the economy, Nigeria embarked on an aggressive pursuit of economic reform that through privatization, banking sector reform, anti-corruption

campaigns and establishment of clear and transparent fiscal standards since 1999.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

As captured above, corruption right from time immemorial both as a concept and a phenomenon has eaten deep in to the bedrock of Nigerian society. It has constituted itself and posed a serious threat to the corporate existence of the nation. These can be understood glaringly from the perspectives that the endemic nature of corruptions has nearly and totally retarded socio-economic and political progress of the entity called Nigeria and by and large subjugated sustainable development. It is however pertinent to note that the fundamental question that yet remain unanswered in our daily discourse is centered on whether the government is aware of the gravity at which corruption has brought about absence of good and responsible governance, justice, equity and rule of law and poverty which metamorphose as a result of wealth circulating only in the hands of few individuals.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- i. Identify the main causes of corruption in Nigeria.

- ii. Establish the linkages between corruption and sustainable development in Nigeria.
- iii. To examine the extent of damage caused by corruptions to socio economic and political fabrics of Nigeria.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What are the causes of corruptions in Nigeria?
- ii. What are the relationship between corruptions and sustainable development in Nigeria?
- iii. To what extent does corruptions hamper overall sustainable development in the country?

1.5 Hypotheses

- i. That corruption is one of the major cause of Nigeria's underdevelopment.
- ii. That there exists strong relationship between corruption and sustainable development in Nigeria.
- iii. That corruptions derailed and retarded sustainable development in Nigeria through siphoning of public goods for private purpose.

1.6 Methodology

This work employs the secondary source of data as its method of data gathering and also uses the content approach to effect the analysis of the data generated via other people's documentations on the socio-economic effects of corruptions on sustainable development of the nation.

1.7 Scope

The work attempts to assess the damages by corruptions on Nigeria's socio-economic, political and sustainable development. Its restricted period is the current democratic dispensations. The justification of this period is premised on the fact that the period serves as a point of reference that disposes the intensity of corruptions in the country.

1.8 Literature Review and Theoretical framework

1.8.1 Literature Review

1.8.2 Corruption

It is very easy to talk about corruption, but like many other complex phenomena, it is difficult to define corruption in concise and concrete terms. Not surprising, there is often a consensus as to what exactly constitutes this concept. There is always a danger as well that

several people may engage in a discussion about corruption while each is talking about a different thing completely, (Balasa, 1985). But in recent years there is a body of theoretical and empirical research on corruption (Bardhan, 1997). To avoid the confusion of definition of corruption, this paper gives an operational definition of corruption as conceptualized by some studies. Corruption is like cancer, retarding economic development. According to Balasa (2001) corruption is seen as a “daunting obstacle to sustainable development”, a constraint on education, health care and poverty alleviation, and a great impediment to the Millennium Development Goal of reducing by half the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.

The World Bank defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gains. Public office is abused through rent seeking activities for private gain when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe. Public office is also abused when private agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs, through patronage and nepotism, the theft of state assets or the diversion of state resources (Basu, 1992). A

public official is corrupt if he accepts money for doing something that he is under duty to do or that he is under duty not to do. Corruption is a betrayal of trust resulting directly or indirectly from the subordination of public goals to those of the individual.

In an elaborate analysis, C.B.N (2006) divided corruption into seven distinct types: autogenic, defensive, extortive, investive, nepotistic, supportive, and transactive. Autogenic corruption is self-generating and typically involves only the perpetrator. A good example would be what happens in cases of insider trading. A person learns of some vital information that may influence stocks in a company and either quickly buys or gets rid of large amounts of stocks before the consequences arising from this information come to pass. Defensive corruption involves situations where a person needing a critical service is compelled to bribe in order to prevent unpleasant consequences being inflicted on his interests. For instance, a person who wants to travel abroad within a certain time frame needs a passport in order to undertake the journey but is made to pay bribes or forfeit the trip. This personal corruption is in self-defense.

Extortive corruption is the behavior of a person demanding personal compensation in exchange for services.

Investive corruption entails the offer of goods or services without a direct link to any particular favor at the present, but in anticipation of future situations when the favor may be required. Nepotistic corruption refers to the preferential treatment of, or unjustified appointment of friends or relations to public office, in violation of the accepted guidelines.

The supportive type usually does not involve money or immediate gains, but involves actions taken to protect or strengthen the existing corruption. For example, a corrupt regime or official may try to prevent the election or appointment of an honest person or government for fear that the individual or the regime might be probed by the successor(s). Finally, transactive corruption refers to situations where the two parties are mutual and willing participants in the corrupt practice to the advantage of both parties. For example, a corrupt businessperson may willingly bribe a corrupt government official in order to win a tender for a certain contract, (Girling, 1997).

There are different vocabularies used to describe corruption in Nigeria. Some of these are bribery, extortion (money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or threats), embezzlement (theft of public resources by public officials. It is

when a state official steals from the public institution in which he/she is employed, betrayal of trust, unfair advantages, financial malpractices, *egunje*, *dash*, gratification, brown envelopes, tips, emoluments, greasing, softening the ground, inducements, sub-payments, side payments, irregular payments, payment under the table, undocumented extra payments, facilitation payments, mobilisation fees, "routine governmental action," revised estimates, padded contracts, over(under)-invoicing, cash commissions, kickbacks, payoffs, covert exchanges, shady deals, cover-ups, collusion, "10% rule" (bribe surcharge), "50% rule" (sharing bribe within the hierarchy), "let's keep our secret secret," "highly classified" transactions, customary gift-giving, tribute culture, nepotism (a special form of favoritism in which an office holder prefers his/her kinfolk and family members) (Greenaway,1994).

Corruption manifests itself in Nigeria inform of abuse of positions and privileges, low levels of transparency and accountability, inflation of contracts, bribery/kickbacks, misappropriation or diversion of funds, under and over-invoicing, false declarations, advance fee fraud and other deceptive schemes known as "419", collection of illegal tolls, commodity

hoarding, illicit smuggling of drugs and arm, human trafficking, child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes, and prohibited goods”, (Goodling, 2003).

1.8.3 Sustainable Development

The Diploma of sustainable development online (2012) refers to the term as the type of economic growth pattern where the use of resources meets the needs of the human population while conserving the environment at the same time. Sustainable development means resources are used in such a way that both current and future human needs can be met.

The sustainable development guide online (2012) also describes the term as the development that meet the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. According to Ukaga (2010) ask a sample of people about the term “sustainability” and you are likely to get a variety of answers representing diverse perspectives, experiences and circumstances. This confirms that a “one size fits all” approach to

sustainable development is inappropriate, ineffective and unnecessary.

He stressed further, scratch below the surface, however, and you will find that while there is a diversity of viewpoints on the concept of sustainable development, as well as specific policy and practice options for achieving it, there is more agreement on some of its core principles such as: meeting basic human necessities fairly and efficiently; preserving options for both present and future generations to meet their needs; promoting community well-being based on broad participation and active citizenship; maintaining that diversity and productivity of nature; managing and utilizing resources with prudence and precaution; linking various aspects of sustainability (i.e. economic, ecological and social); assuring accountability for all; avoiding or at least minimizing waste having a long term view; maintaining a holistic perspective; and fostering cooperation and shared responsibility.

Adebayo (2010) also maintains that the concept of sustainable development is the efforts at improving the environment or natural resources for the purpose of improving the quality of human life in such a way that the needs of the future generation are not jeopardized. To this end, sustainable

development is the ability to preserve the existing resources of the state for the collective use of the citizens while conscious efforts are made to conserve the resources for the use of future generations.

1.8.4 Theoretical framework

The economic growth approach has the ability to test the relationship between sustainable development and corruption, but its main limitation lies in using the correct index of corruption in the objective function. Most of indices of corruption that had been used Bardhan (1997) and Mandapaka (1995) were based on surveys. These indices reflect either the general perception of the people on the level of corruption present in the country or the expertise perception, and they fail to reflect the actual level of corruption present in the country. The current literature on the impact of corruption lacks a theoretical framework that incorporates the potential effect of corruption on output through its impact on the arguments to the production function. Nor does it address the effect of corruption through its impact on sustainable development. The literature to date, has only examined the hypothesized influences separately, ignoring the larger potential aggregate impact of corruption on

development. To overcome the shortcomings in the theoretical reviews, neo-classical model of sustainable development that explicitly includes human capital accumulation and the direct and indirect effects of corruption on sustainable development. Our theoretical model suggests that development and growth are influenced by the level of corruption. If one of the physical inputs in the production function suffers a quality loss in the presence of corruption, then this will also affect growth and the steady state level (Jain, 1998).

1.9 Causes of corruption in Nigeria

A number of factors have been identified as instrumental to enthrone corrupt practices in Nigeria. These include, briefly, the nature of Nigeria's political economy, the weak institutions of government, and a dysfunctional legal system. Absence of clear rules and codes of ethics leads to abuse of discretionary power. Most Nigerian vulnerable to corrupt practices. The country also has a culture of affluent and ostentatious living that expects much from "big men," extended family pressures Maduagwe (1996), village/ethnic loyalties, and competitive ethnicity.

The country is also one of the very few countries in the world where a man's source of wealth is of no concern to his neighbours, the public or the government. Once a man is able to dole out money, the churches, the Mosques pray for him, he collects chieftaincy titles and hobnobs with those who govern. The message to those who have not made it is clear: just be rich, the ways and means are irrelevant (Ubeku, 1991).

Low civil service salaries and poor working conditions, with few incentives and rewards for efficient and effective performance, are strong incentives for corruption in Nigeria. Other factors are: less effective government works with slow budget procedures, lack of transparency, inadequate strategic vision and weak monitoring mechanisms make Nigeria a fertile the environment for corrupt practice. The overall culture of governance has also played an important role. Most of Nigeria leaders and top bureaucrats are setting bad examples of self-enrichment or ambiguity over public ethics thereby promoting the lower level officials and members of the public into corrupt practices, (I.M.F, 2005). Informal rules are found to supercede formal ones, thereby making stringent legal principles and procedures to loose their

authority. Hence, bribery and corruption are taken by many Nigerians as norm even in the face of anti-corruption crusades intended to support clean governance.

Corruption and inefficiency are characteristics of service delivery in Nigeria, although private companies seem to perform more efficiently and less corruptly than public enterprises (Amadi, 2004). Corruption has become so blatant and widespread that it appears as if it has been legalized in Nigeria (Imohe, 2005). As Goodling (2003) notes, "since 1996, Nigeria was labeled the most corrupt nation three times: 1996, 1997, and 2000: and placed in the bottom five four more times: fourth from the bottom in 1998 and second in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003".

The 1996 Study of Corruption by Transparency International and Goettingen University ranked Nigeria as the most corrupt nation, among 54 nations listed in the study, with Pakistan as the second highest (Kaufman, 1998). As this was not too bad enough, the 1998 Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI) of 85 countries, Nigeria was 81 out of the 85 countries pooled . In 1999 Transparency International (TI) released its annual Corruption perceptions Index (CPI) ranking 99 countries in order of their perceived levels of corruption with number one being the least

corrupt, Nigeria at number 98, was only one rank above its neighbor Cameroon.

In the 2001 corruption perception index (CPI), the position of remained unchanged as the second corrupt nation in the World (ranked 90, out of 91 countries pooled) with Bangladesh coming first. In October 2003 reports released in London, Nigeria at number 132 was still only one rank above Bangladesh – even though the number of countries in the latter poll had increased to 133 countries, (Knack, 1995).

The 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, released by Transparency International (TI), the watchdog on global corruption again ranks Nigeria as the third most corrupt country in the world. Up till June 2007 Nigeria has not been exonerated from the list of the top ten leading countries on corruption.

On sectoral distribution, the nationwide corruption survey in the Nigeria Corruption Index (NCI) 2007 identified the Nigerian Police as the most corrupt organization in the country, closely followed by the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN). Corruption in the Education Ministry was found to have increased from 63 per cent in 2005 to 74 per cent in 2007, as against 96 per cent to 99 per cent for the Police in the corresponding period. The

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), was the only new organisation identified as corrupt among the 16 organisations on a list which included Joint Admission Matriculation Board, the Presidency, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Commission (NNPC). While the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) and the Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC) have been identified as the least corrupt organizations with respect to bribe taking from the populace as at June 2007 (Abimbola, 2007).

Another area in which corruption has manifested itself in Nigeria is in the area of project execution. For instance, Ajaokuta, a steel mill in Nigeria, has been under construction for the past seventeen years and throughout that period of time has consumed seven billion dollars. It has produced no steel. The mill is a white monolith of steel and concrete, epitomizing the inefficiency of corruption. Another example is Alscon upper block (an aluminum plant in Nigeria) which has consumed three billion dollars over the past five years. The project was to produce 190,000 tons of aluminum, but, like its predecessor, Ajaokuta, has not produced any aluminum to date, (Mauro, 1995).

1.10 The Nexus Between Corruption And Sustainable Development

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, chapter two (2) contains the Fundamental Objectives and Directives Principles of State Policy, which are direct offshoots of international treaties on human rights and good governance (CFRN, 1999). These treaties specifically defined the fundamental economic, social, political and cultural rights of individuals. These rights generally bother on factors that contribute to the continuous improvement of living conditions of Nigerians. Succinctly put, the principal purpose of this class of rights is to place the state under a legal obligation to utilize its available resources maximally in order to correct social and economic inequalities and imbalances among Nigerians. However, as laudable as those provisions could have been to the advancement of better living for Nigerians, corruption has been one of the major factors affecting this provision. The implications of this on politics and socio-economic development as noted by Jega (2004) are that:

The masses, especially in urban areas take, out their anger with the hopeless socio-economic situation on the well-to-do

neighbours in the settlers' communities. Youth's anger arising from unfulfilled promises, shattered expectation, hopeless unemployment and poverty, find expression often in the violent ethno- religious conflicts, or in violent protests and criminal activities such as armed robbery, extortion and fraud. The atmosphere becomes perpetually tense, charged, even overheated and characterized by violence (Jega, 2004: 19-20)

In a similar vein, Kamaldeen (2012: 119) observed that no country can bear the cost of corruption which impedes development and minimizes the ability of the government in meeting the basic needs of the society. This . therefore, suggests that sustainable development as human efforts towards high quality of living condition and the sustenance of same is only possible where there is absence of corruption.

1.11 Anti-corruption institutions in Nigeria

Government Efforts at combating Corruption in Nigeria: Nigeria remains mired in

corruption, crime, poverty, and violence despite the promulgation of several laws like in other countries as the principal mechanism for curbing corruption. The legal instruments used to fight corruption in Nigeria include the Criminal Code, Code of Conduct Bureau, the Recovery of Public Property Act of 1984 and the newly formed commissions (the EFCC and the ICPC). Prior to 1966, the Criminal Code was the primary source of law dealing with corruption in Nigeria, (Guhan,1997).

But due to the narrow nature in dealing with corruption such as only criminalizing the conduct of bribe-taking public servants leaving the private, it was replaced by Criminal Justice (Miscellaneous provision) Decree in 1966. This however failed to stem the tide of corruption. The rules were confusing, thus leaving open the livelihood that guilty persons might escape punishment on technical grounds.

The code of Conduct was thereafter formed in the 1979 Nigeria constitution where complaints on corrupt practices are referred to Code of Conduct Bureau Tribunal. The Bureau forbids public officers from simultaneously receiving remuneration of two public offices and from engaging in private practices while in the employment of government, the code bar public servants from accepting gifts or benefits in kind for

themselves or any other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done in the discharge of their duties. It prohibits public officers from maintaining or operating foreign bank accounts. Public officers are required to declare their assets and those of their families immediately after taking office, at the end of every four years in office, and at the end of their terms. Due to the non inclusion of the private sector which are also corrupt in all these laws, In year 2000, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other related Offences Act was promulgated which eventually gave birth to the ICPC and the EFCC charged with the responsibility of investigating, arresting and charging any offenders with corrupt practices either economic or financial crimes in Nigeria to court, (Hadi, 1999).

The introduction of two institutions (the EFCC and ICPC)) to tackle corruption has yielded positive results in curbing corruption in Nigeria. There have been a number of high profile convictions since it inception. Many advance fee fraud (“419”)kingpins have been detained, two judges have been sacked and two others suspended, several legislators (including a past Senate president) have lost their legislative posts and are being prosecuted, three ministers have been dismissed, a former

Inspector General of Police, the top law enforcement official in the country has been tried, convicted and jailed for corruption with some state governors impeached by their state assemblies for corruption (Okonjo-Iweala, 2005).

Through the government anti-corruption crusade, about N84 billion was recovered from the family of the late Head of State, Sani Abacha as at 2001. Between May 2003 and June 2004, the EFCC in Nigeria recovered money and assets from crime of over \$700 million, as well as recovering of £3 million through the British Government. The commission prosecuted a fraud case involving \$242 million arising from a bank fraud in Brazil in 2005.

Overall, about 350 EFCC cases are at an advanced stage of prosecution. About 5,000 people have been arrested over the past three years. There have been about 91 convictions for various corruption crimes and assets worth over \$55 billion have been seized, confiscated and refunded to the state and various victims of crime (Ribadu, 2006). The body has increased the revenue profile of the nation by about 20% due to its activities in the federal Inland Revenue service and the seaports, recovered billions to government in respect of failed government contracts, curbed oil bunkering in the Niger Delta, from

about 300,000 –500,000 daily to less than 50,000 barrels with the Prosecution of over 20 persons involved in the vandalism of oil pipelines (Imohe 2005).

Recent survey data from Kaufman (2005) indicate that there has been a reduction in the perception of corruption by Nigerian firms in obtaining trade permits, in paying taxes, in procurement, in the judiciary, in the leakage of public funds, and in money laundering.

However, the recent reports by the World Bank and Transparency international 2007 identified Nigeria Police as the most corruption-riddled organization in the country, followed by the Power Holding Company Limited (PHCL). Investigation has shown that Nigerian police has scaled up roadside bribery from N20 to N50. That is to say, whenever any driver was pulled over at a checkpoint for any reason whatsoever, he or she would be expected to shell out N50.00 as bribe. This amounts to a hundred and fifty percent increases from the amount that was recently paid as bribes to the "Nigerian department of police roadblock". This ritual is repeated at every ten or twenty miles when a commercial vehicle driver confronts a different squad of police, (Tirole, 1996).

1.12 Negative consequences of corruption on sustainable development in Nigeria

Corruption is a plague, a disease, spreading itself throughout developing nations, and the world needs to inoculate these nations against this infection. Corruption is a tool of evil wielded by the wealthy and powerful of developing nations in order to make themselves richer, and even more powerful at the expense of the society. These are the only people benefited by this disease. The lower classes in developing nations are hard hit by the excessive bribes and loss of infrastructure which invariably affect sustainable development (Ubeku, 1991).

Several empirical studies have shown a negative relationship between corruption and sustainable development (Mauro, 1995). Corruption diverts resources from the poor to the rich; increases the cost of running businesses, distorts public expenditures, and deters foreign investment (Mauro, 1997 and Alesina, 1999). Corruption saps a country's economy by hampering tax collection and undermining the enforcement of important regulation. Corruption also creates loss of tax revenues and monetary problems leading to adverse budgetary consequences Knack (1995), and is likely to produce certain composition of capital flows that makes a country more vulnerable to shifts in

international investors' sentiments and expectations (Balasa, 1985). In addition corruption has an adverse effect on human development, and increases the cost of basic social services (Kaufman, 1998).

Corruption has had severe negative consequences on sustainable development of Nigeria. Even where improper conduct, such as fraud and bribery, does not directly involve government, the public effects are severe. Corruption has adversely affected governance and the larger social structure. It has crippled the state's ability to deliver for its citizen's enjoyment of even the minimum social and economic rights, including health and education. This generally leads to a retardation of sustainable development and to the deterioration of whatever public infrastructure has been put in place, (Dike, 2005).

Critically, it has been observed that in Nigeria, unbridled corruption has led to bad governance. Corruption and mismanagement swallow about 40 percent of Nigeria's \$20 billion annual oil income (Ribadu 2004). Corruption disrupts the capital flow throughout entire developing nations. Tax income is generally far below what the government requires in order carrying out basic services in corrupt nations. Corruption also stunts international trade. The World

Trade Organization (WTO) increases impediments on trade if a country maintains an "out-of-control" level of corruption, or extortion. If a developing nation attempts to deal with these problems, the WTO will decrease the impediments, giving the nation incentive to reduce skyrocketing corruption levels. The anti-corruption crusade of Nigeria might then be one of the reasons while the country is enjoying the support of the international communities, (C.B.N, 2006).

Other specific negative consequences of corruption in Nigeria are: loss of much needed revenue; decrease in the level of Foreign Direct Investment and loss of viable businesses by Nigerian banks. Corruption diminishes national prestige and respect, leads to brain drain, civil unrest, business failure and unemployment, election rigging, absence of law and order, and failure of government institution (Ribadu, 2003).

Most Nigerians are treated with suspicion in most business dealings thereby making some honest Nigerians to suffer the stigma of corruption due to stereotyping. Ribadu (2006) opined that, corruption is worse than terrorism because it is responsible for perpetual collapse of infrastructure and institutions in Nigeria; it is the cause of the endemic poverty and underdevelopment and

cyclical failure of democracy to take root. Poverty is found to persist in Nigeria because of the mismanagement of resources and corruption, found particularly not only in the public sector (Alesina, 1999).

Corruption stifles businesses that are unwilling to engage in this nefarious activity; ironically, it also eventually destroys the companies that yield to this practice, thus halting or at least delaying considerably, the march toward economic progress and ultimately sustained development (Basu, 1992).

1.13 Conclusion

There is a clear-cut correlation between corruption and sustainable development, and if stringent measure is not taken about it, the development of Nigeria would be impaired.

Corrupt regimes always yield disastrous results. Corruption which is equal to monopoly plus discretion, minus accountability has serious impediment to sustainable development especially in developing countries. It has stolen the wealth of resource-rich nations like Nigeria thereby making people to be trapped in poverty. Even while thinking of some firms/people as if better off through payment of a bribe by most people, the overall effect of corruption on

economic development still remains negative. The more corrupt a country is, the slower its economic growth rate. Corruption is a stigma that destroys the reputation of affected country. It lowers investment thereby lowering economic growth of the country.

Despite the existing challenges facing Nigeria after the establishment of the two major anti-graft institutions (ICPC and the EFCC) by the government in 2000 and 2003 respectively, the reforms have yielded some concrete results with a reduction of corruption levels when compared with the pre-reform periods when Criminal Code and Code of conduct Bureau were used to check corrupt practices on public office holders only. It is in the rules and practices of governance that the foundations of sustainable development are shaped or undermined. The very basis of development becomes compromised when these rules and practices are not effectively monitored and applied. Development suffers where the rules of governance allow arbitrary resource allocations and the diversion of public resources in defiance of the public good and to the exclusive benefit of corrupt officials, politicians and their collaborators.

1.14 Recommendations

The paper recommends as follows:

- i. There is the need for enlightenment in discouraging excessive materialism and the culture of 'get rich quick', employment for the teeming youths and incorporation of human rights and development perspectives into anti-corruption work.
- ii. There is the need for a mechanism that will transform dramatically the culture and legacy of corruption. Positive transformation of Nigeria can only occur through addressing the root causes of corruption and through effectively implementing the legal mechanisms already in place. Nigeria has introduced economic reforms through privatization, deregulation, removal of market restrictions, and civil service reform with the aim at promoting the integrity of public service. These measures are all very important in the fight against corruption, but the key factor to galvanize and orchestrate these measures is having honest leaders with the political will to tackle corruption.

- iii. There is the need for enlightenment in discouraging excessive materialism and the culture of 'get rich quick', employment for the teeming youths and incorporation of human rights and development perspectives into anti-corruption work. Provision of appropriate punishment for corruption in and of itself is not sufficient to eliminate Corruption. The phenomenon of corruption has multiple causes, and is determined by more than just seeing people go unpunished for engaging in corrupt behavior.
- iv. That the leadership must demonstrate the willingness to track and punish corrupt officials and citizens as well as create a conducive economic climate that would raise the standard of living of the citizenry.

Finally, non-interference of government on the mandate given to the anti –corruption agencies so as to make them effective, became necessary as it is now practice by the Buhari administration.

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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NIGERIA'S BORDER CLOSURE ON NEIGHBOURING WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 2019 – 2021

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ABSTRACT

The study assesses the Impact of Nigeria's Border closure on Neighboring West African Countries 2019-2021. The objectives of the study were to ascertain the reasons for Nigerian border closure with Neighboring West African Countries, to find out the benefits of Nigeria's border closure with Neighboring West African Countries, to find out the implications of Nigerian border closure with Neighboring West African Countries, to find out how Nigeria border closure with Neighboring West African Countries affect Nigeria socio-economic relations. The medium used for collecting data was the used of secondary data using comparative advantage theory as basis for analysis. The result shows that, Nigeria which share boundaries with Benin, Niger and closed all of its land borders in order to ensure total control over what comes into the country. The result also shows that border closure boosted the government's revenue as more duties were collected on the increased volume of goods that entered the country legally through the ports, but the fall in supply of rice led to food price inflation that impacted strongly negatively on Nigerian consumers. The result of the study also shows that Nigerian border closure has impacted on trade and businesses in and outside the country. The result also shows that inflation rate has increase, unemployment among the border communities and rural farmers, small scale businesses are nowhere to be found. The study shows that in various nooks and crannies of Nigeria, the price of one (1) bag of 50 Kg of rice has skyrocketed from less than Ten thousand naira (N10, 000) to Thirty thousand naira (N30, 000) roughly more than the entire monthly salary of Nigerian who receives the minimum wage of N18, 000 and those living in extreme poverty in Nigeria were estimated to 87 million people. Form the data analyzed, it was also revealed that the general inflation especially on food stuff was recorded to be increased to 13.51 % following the land border closure through which majority of the food stuff, items and grains were being imported to Nigeria via Niger and Benin Republics. The study recommends that policy of border closure should always consider the poor people who are the majority in country and became subjects of hardship following the closure land border.

1.1 Introduction

Border closure has a significant impact on Nigeria economy and her immediate neighbors, Nigeria has remained one of the key importers for decades. Management of borders in Nigeria has changed from traditional perspectives to international (universal) with colonial acquisition of territories and independence of modern African states. Babatula (2014) asserts that Border relations, migration, inter-state relations and border trading in Africa however did not result into any major crisis until various Governments of independent African States began to deal with issues related to boundary management, claims and counterclaims over national territories in the determination of crossing lines or borderlines in frontiers of new African states.

Regional trade has played a significant role in the development of Nigeria economy and attracts domestic and foreign direct investment in the country. Therefore, the government recently closed Nigeria-Benin republic borders in order to boost her economy. On October 2019, the Comptroller-General of the Nigerian Customs Service, rtd Col Hameed Ali, told newsmen in Abuja that Nigeria had closed its land borders to all movement of goods, giving no timeline for re-opening them (Vanguard, 2019).

Nigeria's economy is unparalleled in Africa for its complexity and dynamism. It is potentially the engine of growth for an entire region, both as a centre of production and as a consumer of neighbouring countries' exports. On account of its size and its location between Central and West Africa, the country is at the core of the economic transformation of the sub-Saharan region. Nigeria is several times the size of Benin and even the other countries bordering her, which makes Nigeria the most likely destination for the rice imported by Benin. This, however, does not reflect in Nigeria's import figures which provide further credence to the fact that such import was mostly smuggled into the country from Benin.

A large volume of goods from around the world enters Nigeria across these borders. These volumes of goods are mostly unrecorded, untaxed, informal and difficult to regulate, as are the flows of money that finance them. One of the most vital border regions in West Africa is the frontier between Nigeria and Benin. Both economies depend to a large extent on their cross-border trade, illegal and legal. As an essential part of the Abidjan-Lagos transport and migration corridor, it also represents a key transport vein in the ECOWAS region.

The Seme border is named after the Nigerian border town that links Nigeria to other West African countries via Benin. It is seen as an important channel for better regional integration within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is because of the prominence of Nigeria, which, with its immense and steadily growing national consumer market, is becoming an attractive trade partner for neighbouring countries (Blum, 2014). Additionally, major road transit routes crossing this border provide the most direct (and in some cases the only) road transport connection between the capitals of countries in the ECOWAS region (Akpan, 2014). The Seme border also is the starting point for roads connecting some landlocked countries in the hinterland, such as Burkina Faso, to ports. Most of these countries generate the bulk of their foreign exchange through transit and re-export (Golub, 2012), thereby creating a large and lucrative market. For Nigerian traders, on the other hand, the Seme border provides access to regional markets to trade agricultural products and locally made fabrics, among other products (Njikam and Tchouassi, 2011).

Closing Border in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon as each regime will come along with its policy on Trade (Cross Border

Trade inclusive) and contraband which either led to Land Border Closure or classifying certain goods as contraband. Sometimes the government overlooked the consequences of such closure on the economy and the citizenry who engaged in the cross-border trading.

According to Emmanuel, (2020) indicated that the border closure was in breach of the protocol on the free movement of goods, services and people, established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to which Nigeria is a member and in which it wields significant political and economic weight. This action also came just two months after the country signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Unah, 2019) and one of the rationales for ECOWAS is trade, encourage regional integration and promote economic activities within member states.

Although it was not the first time that Nigeria moved to check the activities of smugglers at her borders, this time the Federal Government had deemed it necessary to act in order to boost local production of food items and manufactured goods (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2019). The recent border closure of Nigeria neighboring West African states according to CBN has boasted local rice production, rural communities are now

engaged in local rice production to support the economy. However, the government border closure is not a prolong one, but before the border can be reopen, there must be concrete engagement with Benin Republic that are involve in using their ports as landing port for bringing in goods that are smuggle into Nigeria. Therefore, the study seeks to investigate the impact of Nigeria's border closure on Neighboring West African Countries 2019-2021

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

It is undeniable fact that the recent Nigerian border closure was totally for economic reason in order to boost local agricultural production in the country. The continued closure of Nigeria's border with her closest Benin Republic neighbor has continued to generate reactions within and outside the country. From this policy of border closure by Nigerian government, it is a clear violation of ECOWAS treaty of gradual abolition of customs duties and free movement of goods and services among member states. According to Ghins and Heinrigs (2019) Nigeria authorities has justified the fundamental reasons upon which it closed the land borders of the country. The government need to support the domestic agricultural sector and to accelerate the

National Productivity Growth thereby reducing the smuggling rate for goods and to fundamentally curb illegal inflows of foreign products. However, the informal trading activities at the border communities have grossly undermined Nigeria economy. Nigeria close it border with Benin, extended the ban on land trade with the major objective of curbing smuggling of agricultural produce particularly rice in the country. Therefore, the study seeks to investigate impact of Nigeria's border closure on Neighboring West African Countries 2019-2021

1.3 The Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study is to investigate the impact of Nigeria's border closure on neighboring West African Countries 2019-2021

Specifically, this work has the following objectives;

- i. To ascertain the reasons for Nigerian border closure with neighbouring West African Countries.
- ii. To find out the benefits of Nigeria's border closure with neighbouring West African Countries.
- iii. To find out the implications of Nigerian border closure with neighbouring West African Countries.

- iv. To find out how Nigeria border closure with neighbouring West African Countries affect Nigeria socio-economic relations.

1.4 Nature of Land Borders in Nigeria

As earlier noted, a country's borders are internationally recognized demarcations that separate it from one another. Osimen (2017) opined that "international borders are a security issue for the government." Thus, this may explain why almost every authority of nation-states across the globe, and indeed Nigeria often take drastic measures around their international boundaries whenever they perceived security threat emanating from trans-border movements. Nation-states are recognized under international law by their capability to maintain their boundaries, secure their territories and protect their citizens. According to Maigari, A. M., Dantani, U., Yelwa, M. M., & Aliyu, A. (2020, p. 1-25), border represents the physical manifestation of a nation's sovereignty. States are responsible for managing their internal affairs, which implies that they exercise control over the flows of illicit drugs and people who migrate through illegal routes and contraband goods into and out of their countries. This means that in most cases, smugglers or migrants usually engage

in illegal activities (economic and security wise) which tend to undermine borders integrity and jeopardize the economy of a country.

For this reason, Omodunbi et al. (2022, p. 200-210) observed that Nigeria has porous borders and these routes keep increasing every day because of the clandestine illicit activities; while efforts to curtail these had witnessed the cropping up of new ones around the porous borders. These transnational crimes carried out across Nigeria borders have greatly affected the country's economic and national security. Nigeria's land borders with other countries cut across several local governments in the country. In other words, many States (16) in Nigeria share land borders with 4 African countries (Quadri, 2022 Aug. 26; Britannica, Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2017 Aug. 3; Babatola, 2015). Many studies have reported that Nigeria borders had been described as porous such that all kinds of trans-border criminal activities like human trafficking, drugs trafficking, arm robbery, illegal arms smuggling resulting to proliferation of SALW (Akinyemi, 2013; Olomu et al., 2019; Uche & Nwkorobia, 2021, p. 63-86; Omodunbi, 2022, 200-210). It is important to note that Nigeria as a sovereign state has a landmass of 923,768 km² and is bounded by

Republic of Benin (773 km), Cameroon (1690 km), Chad Republic (87 km) and Republic of Niger (1497 km) land borders from the west, east, northeast and northwest of Nigeria, respectively. Similarly, apart from Benin Republic and Cameroon, Nigeria also shares maritime boundaries with Equatorial Guinea, Ghana and São Tomé and Príncipe (Babatola, 2015; Osimen et al., 2017; Okoye, 2021; Quadri, 2022; Falola, Ajayi, Ade et al., 2022).

Nigeria lies between latitudes 4° and 14°N and longitudes 2° and 15°E. Nigeria is attributed as possessing a total area of 923,768 km² (356,669 sq mi) (Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1978), making it the world's 32nd-largest country. It shares a 4,047 kilometres (2,515 mi) border with Benin (773 km), Niger (1497 km), Chad (87 km), Cameroon (1690 km), and has a coastline of at least 853 km. Nigeria's claim to territorial sea (offshore space) rose from 3 miles of continental shelf and about 200 miles on exclusive fishing zones from 1958 to 1978 as a country signatory to conventions on continental shelf despite its inability to determine its extent of claim.

Nigeria's claim to a 200-mile-wide exclusive economic zone in October, 1978 is part of reaction to UNCLOS Conventions on jurisdictional zones and claims to the

territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive fishing zones (Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1978) (Asiwaju, 1989). Reference to Nigerian borders with her neighbours - Benin Republic, Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroons indicated the main bi-national links and official gateways to and from Nigeria through the sets of existing local authority areas (Asiwaju, 1989).

Border closure is a protectionist mechanism which nation-states deployed to prevent the movement of unwanted persons and goods from other territorial jurisdiction into its territory. Nation-states have adjudged several reasons for embarking on various border closures in the past, depending on the prevailing circumstances which have negative effects on national interest. Border closure can also be restrictions or ban on the importation and/or exportation of some "essential" goods or articles by the state of government. The history of border closure in Nigerian can be traced back to the era of military governance in 1979 where regulative measures were imposed on some items that found their way into the country (Adepoju, 1986, p. 21 -24; Afolayan, 1988, p. 4-27; Adebusaye, 1995, p. 435-467). According to Obi-Egbedi et al. (2013, p. 1-21), within the period which was sustained by Shagari's

regime, restrictive measures such as the use of import licenses and quotas were used to curb the influx of rice importation into Nigeria. Only a few individuals and government agencies were issued licenses at no tariff charge (Adepoju, 1983, 1986; Obi-Egbedi, 2013). In fact, the government of Shagari went as far as expelling many African migrants, especially Ghanaians, Chadians who had found haven in Nigeria. Similarly, during the military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari of 1985, borders were closed as a measure against acute smuggling of drugs, agricultural produce, human trafficking, prostitution, child labour, insurgency, etc. (Adepoju, 1984, 1986; Afolayan, 1988). Equally, the democratic government of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 ordered the partial closure of borders due to an alarming increase in crime rate along the nation's borders. It is pertinent to emphasize that border closures, basically, as justified consistently by various regimes in Nigeria was enforced on the interest of national security and socioeconomic challenges. This might be the *raison d'être* which prompted Aniukwu (2020, p. 1-18) to opine that "border closure in Nigeria has had similar reasons of economy and security development."

In the same vein, in the wake of the last quarter of 2019, the FGN closed all its land borders connecting it with other African neighbouring countries in an exercise codenamed Swift Response in furtherance of its aim to address the growing spade of insecurity in the country as well as to achieve the policy of diversification of the economy and to promote local contents (Olomu et al., 2019; Punch, 2020 Aug. 17; The Guardian, 2020 Dec. 31; The Cable, 2021 Sept. 22; Omodunbi et al., 2022, p. 1-32). It is another history making in attempt to establish control over the economy and curb concealment of arms and ammunition that has become a hallmark of West African states which is commonly associated with trans-border movement was relatively free due to ECOWAS protocol on free trade zone among member states. Ugwuja and Chukwukere (2021, p. 78-106) reported that on August 20, 2019, the federal government of Nigeria issued an executive order for the closure of its land borders against all imports, especially rice and cars as well as manage security situations associated with transborder movements. This singular pronouncement had generated international concerned and heated debates among public analyst on the impact of such policy on the economy of Nigeria and the vision for integration of the

region considering Nigeria posture in West African subregion and Africa in general as a whole. It is imperative to note that Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with an estimate of over 200 million people that cut across ages and sex (Falola et al., 2022). The country is unarguably endowed with so many economic potentials such as abundant natural resources, large population which translates into large market for almost all sorts economic exchanges that attracts both legitimate and illegitimate merchants, illegal migrants, criminal syndicates, including the “merchants of death”, etc. In addition, several Nigerians (skilled and unskilled) have also migrated out of the country for reasons associated with insecurity, economic uncertainty/hardship, etc. while others engage themselves in illicit transactions across the borders linking Nigeria with other states.

1.5 Conceptual Review

1.5.1 Concept of Border

Border generally refers to a marker or line indicating a boundary between separate communities, culture and administrative units. Definitions on border share similarities among scholars that have defined the term at various times. To Bradley J. Parker, borders

are "linear dividing lines, fixed in a particular space, meant to mark the division between political and/or administrative units"(Drek, 1991). Parker’s view, like many others, on border illustrates the demarcation of peoples, culture, even nations. For instance, border reveals the boundary line between Nigeria and Benin Republic, Germany and France, Turkey and Syria, USA and Mexico or Portugal and Spain. Borders as demarcating lines between two states are as old as the human civilization. However, it became prominent with the emergence of the modern state in 1648.

Since this year, borders all over the world became crucial elements in a new, increasingly global system of states. Thus, borders became sacred among states, especially, European states in which several wars were fought to either expand one's territory or annex that of a weaker state. Border relations among states all over the world have been either collaborative or conflictual. The experiences of Europe, until the second half of the twentieth century, and that of Africa in the post-independence era attest, to this fact. In Europe, the territorial adjustment that emerged after the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1713), Vienna (1815) and Versailles (1919) created border acrimony among neighboring states (Simon,

1994). A shift in European border relations emerged, after the devastating effect of World War II on the continent. European leaders rechanneled their efforts toward promoting collaborative and integrative agenda through cross border relations.

On the other hand, post-independence African states driven by their colonial experience, pursued the policy of irredentism, particularly in countries where ethnic nationalities sharing common ancestry, separated by boundary demarcation created by the colonial masters.

One of the major consequences of this development is that it has resulted in conflicting relations between some African countries, namely: Togo Ghana, Djibouti Somalia, Ethiopia Somalia and many others (Alan, 1982). In recent times, the discovery of mineral resources located between the borders of neighboring states in Africa has furthered heightened border relations in the continent. The Bakassi Crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon illustrates this fact (Bonchuk, 2014). Added to this is the Libya Chad and Burkina Faso Mali border conflict provoked by aggressive international litigations over stretches of shared boundaries suspected to be rich in solid minerals (Alan, 1982).

Scholars in border studies linked some of the causes of border dispute to the Westphalia state system. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 articulated the features of the modern state. Among other things, this Treaty considered the respect of the territorial boundary and integrity of sovereign states in the international system (Blum, 1966). This particular feature has become sacred and likewise, incorporated into the national interest of every sovereign state, in which they are ready to pay the supreme surprise at whatever cost, including a possible outbreak of war.

Ironically, a unique feature of borderlands is that despite the conflicting relations between states sharing border, the border communities in the opposite direction of the border maintained cordial relations. An understanding of the dynamics, nature and pattern of interactions among border communities –are better appreciated through interdisciplinary and comparative studies of borders of modern states, which are offshoots of the Westphalia system. This has led to their broad categorization into ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ border.

Traditional border studies focused on a state centric vision of the border that emphasis on defending the territorial integrity of state boundary, with little or no

recourse to cooperation with immediate neighbours. This was the state of European border relations until the post Second World War era. Again, traditional border studies explored the frameworks of such established disciplines as History, Geography, Political Science, Economics and Law (Asiwaju, 2011). Raimondo Strassoldo, a leading scholar and pioneer of border studies in Europe, comment on the interest of modern border studies. He avers that:

Modern border study focuses on the socioeconomic aspects of border communities as well as integrative rather than conflicting processes, and on problems of border people instead of the nation states; instigated by local authorities and European organisations rather than national governments... more than the traditional ones' policy oriented' (Asiwaju, 2011).

In the post1945 era, following the ugly experience of the European continent after two devastating World Wars that almost ruined her economically and politically, the leaders decided to channel their attention to cooperation by exploring cross border.

Relations (Urwin, 1991). Europe, after the Second World War, ceased to view border as an outlet for war through the defense of their territories. It began to see it as a bridge to promote socio-cultural and

economic cooperation, through cross border Relations (Asiwaju, 1999).

African states since the 1960s have tried to experiment with cross border relations through regional integration. However, their degree of success comparatively with Europe has been low. In Africa, the concept of border was institutionalized in the nineteenth century at the Berlin Conference of 1884/85. At the conference, contending European powers seeking territories in Africa agreed on the boundary or borders of their respective "sphere of influence," thereby separating one European colonial territory from another. As indicated already, the concept of border or boundary lines may sound strange to Africans during the colonial period. This, however, did not erase the fact that people were knowledgeable in demarcating the boundaries of their respective territories. In post-independence Africa, border relations within the continent have not been fruitful. Instead, it has followed the Westphalian model that has to do with defending the territorial boundary at any provocation, by neighboring states. This has resulted in several border disputes across the length and breadth of the continent, especially contiguous states. In Africa, as well as in Europe and other parts of the world where

border demarcation had taken place, it has succeeded in separating people with lived experiences spanning several centuries, through natural and manmade (artificial) borderlines (Asiwaju, 1999).

1.6 Empirical Review

1.6.1 Reasons for Nigeria Border Closure with West African Neighboring Countries

According to Ghins and Heinrigs (2019) the Nigeria Authorities has justified the fundamental reasons upon which it closed the land borders of the country. Basically, there is the need to support the domestic Agricultural sector and to accelerate the National Productivity Growth thereby reducing the smuggling rate for goods and to fundamentally curb illegal inflows of foreign rice. In addition to this, the government as part of her justification for the border closure include preventing the exporting the subsidised fuel to Niger Republic, Benin and Cameroon. Hence, the need for border closure as enforced by government of Nigeria.

Trade data from the International Monetary Fund show that Nigeria accounts for only about 5 per cent of Benin's recorded exports (i.e. formal trade). Most of this trade does not originate in Benin but consists of

imported goods that transit through the port of Cotonou and then the Seme border. However, Benin's informal exports to Nigeria are substantial. Data on informal trade do not exist, so we have to rely on indirect estimates. Geourjon, Chambas, and Laporte (2008) note that about half of formal imports via the port of Cotonou to Benin have the Nigerian market as their final destination. This provides an initial indication of the importance of informal trade. Golub (2012) uses a comparison between formal imports into Benin and Togo to make inferences about informal exports from Benin to Nigeria. The author starts by noting that the economies and populations of Togo and Benin are similar, so domestic demand in the two countries is therefore comparable. He then compares formal imports into Benin and Togo of commodities subject to either an import ban or high import tariffs in Nigeria. Until 2015, rice, the main food consumption item in Nigerian households, was among the items whose imports were banned. Despite the recent lifting of the ban, official rice traders still need to pay a 10 per cent import duty plus a 60 per cent levy for imports through a land border. Rice millers with a valid quota, who are a second type of official importers, pay a 10 per cent import duty and a 20 per cent levy. Treichel V, Hoppe M,

Cadot O, and Gourdon J (2012) noted the impact of these trade policy measures by calculating that Nigerian consumers pay 77 per cent more for the same products than consumers in African countries that do not impose bans.

The above trade policy measures aimed at preventing or restricting imports, together with institutional issues at the border such as informal payments to customs officers, explain why food and household items are frequently imported into Nigeria through informal channels and why informal trading and smuggling remain a lucrative venture for the Nigerian population, including women (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012). As a matter of fact, women constitute the majority (about 60 per cent) of the traders who trade across the Seme border, especially those involved in informal trading (Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012).

Nigeria which shares boundaries with Benin, Niger, and Cameroon closed all of its land borders in order to ensure total control over what comes into the country in October 2019 (Olatunji, 2019), though that was not the first instance. The cause of this action in the view of the government was the smuggling of rice and other illicit exports of cheaper, subsidised petrol from Nigeria to its neighbours, as 10 to 20 per cent of Nigerian

fuel was smuggled abroad. Statistics show that there is probably very little to worry about since the volume of intra-African trade is low and most of the trade by African countries is done with countries outside the continent. Intra- African trade was about 16.6 per cent of total African exports in 2017 which was low compared to 68.1 per cent with European countries and 59.4 per cent with Asian countries (UNCTAD, 2019) (Olatunji, 2019).

In the various discourse, it is becoming apparent that Nigeria's land border appears to be the pivot of international trade in West Africa and nay Africa. Furthermore, because of the vastness of her border, pervasive dumping of goods and illegal trade with her neighbors had become a norm, notwithstanding the detrimental effect on Nigerian Economy (Boulon, 2019).

Nigeria's recent announcement confirming that it is closing its borders to prevent movement of all goods has been met with harsh criticism from neighbors and regional integration advocates. The government has justified the decision as a tactic to curb smuggling of goods of which the country wants to internally increase production, such as rice. The border closure will have particularly negative consequences for trade especially informal ones, along the

Benin-Nigeria border, as the two economies are closely intertwining. Indeed, this informal trade generates substantial income and employment in Benin, and Benin's government collects substantial revenues on entrepôt trade—goods imported legally and either legally re-exported to Nigeria, or illegally diverted into Nigeria through smuggling.

The informal sector throughout West Africa, and particularly in Benin, represents approximately 50 percent of GDP (70 percent in Benin, in fact) and 90 percent of employment. Unsurprisingly, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is pervasive and has a long history given the region's artificial and often porous borders, a long history of regional trade, weak border enforcement, corruption, and, perhaps most importantly, lack of coordination of economic policies among neighbouring countries. Notably, ICBT takes several forms, not all of which are illegal: For example, trade in traditional agricultural products and livestock in bordering countries may involve little or no intent to deceive the authorities, as peasants and herders ignore artificial and un-policed borders (Abia, 2019).

The economic relationship between the two countries, both members of the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS), is already asymmetric, with Nigeria exerting much more influence on Benin than vice versa. Given Nigeria's larger population, economy, and natural resource wealth, Benin has adopted a strategy centered on being —entrepôt state i.e., serving as a trading hub, importing goods and re-exporting them legally but most often illegally to Nigeria, thus profiting from distortions in Nigeria's economy. Benin's dependence on Nigeria is not apparent from official trade statistics, as Benin's reported trade with Nigeria accounted for only about 6 percent of Benin's exports and 2 percent of Benin's imports in 2015-17. These official statistics are very misleading, however, as they do not reflect the vast informal trade along the border.

Nigeria's heavy dependence on oil and many dysfunctional economic policies have created an environment for ICBT between it and its neighbours, mainly Benin and Togo, to flourish. The wide gap between the official and black-market rates of the naira; Nigeria's subsidized fuel prices; import barriers, poor trade facilitation, and Benin's poor business climate have incentivized local traders to turn to the informal cross-border trade (Anjorin, 2019).

1.6.2 Impact of Nigeria Border Closure on West African Neighboring Countries

The closure of Nigeria border thus boosted the government's revenue as more duties were collected on the increased volume of goods that entered the country legally through the ports, but the fall in the supply of rice led to food price inflation, which impacted strongly negatively on Nigerian consumers (Abia, 2019). The closure also led to shortages of materials imported from Nigeria in neighbouring countries hence, the worry about its consequences for trade liberalisation in Africa. This closure was in breach of the protocol on the free movement of goods, services and people, established by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to which Nigeria is a member and in which it wields significant political and economic weight. This action also came just two months after the country signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (Unah, 2019) which aims to remove barriers to trade and promote the free flow of goods, services and people across the continent. Thus Nigeria border closure was inconsistent with the country's multilateral commitments, including ECOWAS and AfCFTA, and was seen as a major disruption to Nigeria and the entire Africa in terms of their international trade relations.

Evidence seen by AFP suggests that any benefits are at the macro level — and the country's many poor are likely to be among the losers. The two main commodities being smuggled were petrol and rice. Petrol was being sneaked out from Nigeria, where subsidies make the fuel half as cheap as in its neighbours, and resold. Rice, on the other hand, was being brought into Nigeria, where consumers favour imported Asian-grown varieties over the locally grown competitor, from Benin via its port in Cotonou (Emmanuel, Mamman, Asauten, 2020)

The most visible winner from the closure is the Nigerian treasury, which has benefited from the falling cost of petrol subsidies and from a rise in customs receipts. Sales of gasoline in Nigeria fell by 12.7% after the border closure, which indicates that millions of subsidised litres are being secretly taken abroad for resale. The reduction in consumption, if sustained, could lead to subsidy savings of around 13.5 billion naira (\$37 million) monthly and 162.1 billion naira annually (Emmanuel, Mamman, Asauten, 2020).

As for rice, the country's agriculture lobby is loudly supporting the border closure. Investment in Nigerian agriculture was being hamstrung by the rice trafficking, which is estimated to reach two million tonnes a year.

The biggest rice-growing business in Nigeria, owning 13 000 hectares (30 000 acres) of cultivable land of which only 4 500 hectares are being used because the sector is not profitable in the face of competition from Asian rice, but since the border closure, locally-milled rice has started selling, and the entire rice value chain has been positively impacted by the closure (Emmanuel, Mamman, Asauten, 2020).

But if the border closure is a boost for domestic growers, it has led to price increases for consumers. The price of a 50-kilo (110-pound) bag has more than doubled to 20 000 naira, roughly the entire monthly income of a Nigerian living in extreme poverty — of whom there are an estimated 87 million in the country. Traders in Lagos Island, a vast market of Made in China textiles and gadgets, say the closure of the borders had crimped supplies via Benin's Cotonou. Because of the situation, the annual inflation rate has edged up to 11.24 per cent, while inflation ran at 13.51 per cent in September, 2019 (Rasheed, 2020).

1.6.3 Challenges of Nigerian Border Closure on West African Neighboring Countries

The bulk of the non-food items that come through the border — such as clothing (especially second-hand) and household

goods — constitute the next highest expenditure for rural households, while for the urban households, clothing and other services (such as information technology, insurance, and personal goods) are among their next highest expenditures. Since Nigerian households spend a considerable share of their budget on items that flow through the border (e.g. cereals, clothing, fruits and vegetables), it is most likely that they will be affected by improved border access (Uchenna, 2016).

Thus, when a border is closed many individuals will lose their jobs. For instance, closing the Nigeria – Niger Border will cause about one Million people to lose their jobs. In addition to the above, Gordon, Moore, Park and Richardson (2009) observed that, the closure of border disrupts international trade with specific reference to Cross Border Trade and Travel across border. Thus, closing border is an extreme policy that might create threat to so many individuals especially the border communities. Not only that, the economy suffered and experiences backwardness.

On the other hand, Adeola and Oluyemi (2012) stressed that, in the interest of National security, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria embarked on the Policy of Border Closure. That, movement of

goods and people between Nigeria and her neighbours such as Niger Republic, Benin, Chad and Cameroon tends to be informal whereby temporary clandestine workers, traders, Cross Borders workers, Professionals and refugees are always moving from one country to another though intra-regional movement within West African sub region is permitted without Visa due to the existing principles and provision of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This made Cross Border Movement between Nigeria and her neighbours to be less monitored and did not attract the attention and intervention of governments. However, it is gradually becoming an issue now that needs state policy as modern mobility contributes to impact dangerously on the security of the Nation (Nigeria). This propels external aggression and criminality which grows across border. Hence, the Nigeria Government adopted the Policy of Border Closure.

In response to Nigerian border closure, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has started declining Nigerian products possibly in retaliation to the country's border closure. Nigeria has the largest economy on the African continent, and it became the latest

African nation to close its borders, following similar actions by Kenya, Rwanda and Sudan around the period of its action. For some experts, the border closures of Nigeria were a slap in the face for the continent's integration efforts. It is likely to damage the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AFCFTA), which has the potential to be the world's largest free trade zone, even surpassing the World Trade Organization, established in 1995.

Foreign exporters in the region experienced losses as countries within the ECOWAS sub-region started rejecting Nigerian goods. According to the exporters, the move gradually crippled their businesses. Consequently, Nigerian exports within the ECOWAS region decreased due to retaliation to its border closure by other countries both in the ECOWAS sub region and the continent of Africa at large. Such retaliatory measures definitely impacted negatively on the economy of both countries as the exports done within the ECOWAS region and other neighbouring countries in the continent are now in decrease. These countries that benefited from the open border, because of Nigeria border closure, no longer do so. Nigeria doesn't expect to get the level of cooperation that it was getting before, because it has been hit hard by these closed

borders in retaliation to its action (Ogunwusi et al, 2019).

As Nigeria closed its land borders, Ghanaians shut down Nigerian-owned businesses in their country and went as far as closing almost 70 businesses belonging to Nigerians. Ghanaians claim that foreign retailers (referring to Nigerians) violated section 27 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act 865, which stipulates that —the sale of goods or provision of services in a market, petty trading or hawking or selling of goods in a stall at any placel, must be reserved only for Ghanaian citizens. However, many believe that the action by the Ghana Union of Traders’ Associations (GUTA) was a response to the decision by the Nigerian government to close its borders. GUTA stated that the closure of Nigeria’s trade borders with its neighbours is against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaties (CNBC Africa, 2020).

1.7 Theoretical Framework: Comparative Advantage Theory

Theory is an assumption or set of assumptions, accepted principles, and rules of procedures based on limited information or knowledge, devices to analyze, predict or

otherwise explain the nature or behavior of specified set of phenomena; abstract reasoning (Encarta, 2009). Theories are sets of facts, propositions or principles analyzed in their relation to one another, and used especially in science and social sciences to explain phenomena. It is also the body of rules, ideas, principles and techniques that apply to a subject, especially when seen as distinct from usual practiced Thus, theory is used as a framework of analysis in this study within which context the justification for the review of existing knowledge is established. Theoretical frameworks help to provide answers to the unanswered questions and pointing to the gaps of the research.

For analytical purposes, the theory opted for this study is comparative advantage theory. Comparative advantage theory was first propounded by David Ricardo (1772-1823). Other proponents who immensely contributed to the development of the theory are James Mill (1773 - 1836) and Robert Torrens (1780 - 1864). For instance, Ricardo considered the example of two countries like Nigeria and Benin Republic, whereby Nigeria produces some certain goods and services or commodities at a cheaper rate using higher specialization and cost whereby Benin Republic may equally be specialised in the production of other goods and services

which Nigeria does not produce. This brings the two countries together for international trade probably Cross Border Trade since Nigeria and Benin Republic share boundary together. Therefore, the above description brings two countries together for trade agreement. These trade agreements thus, provide the background policies and programme that will promote and foster economic prosperity when it's been handled effectively without any breach. It is however, important to understand that international trade centered around comparative advantage.

However, when it is stated that, international trade depends on the differences in comparative advantage one may explore not absolute cost of production in the two countries. The theory posit that it is very important for countries to import goods or commodities from countries that produces those commodities with less cost and specialization than it would produce at home. When the cost of producing a particular commodity is high at home, it is better and more economic for that country to import such commodity from countries that produce it with less cost and at cheaper rate. Therefore, this will render the importation more profitable. For example, Benin Republic might be able to assemble

automobile at one-half of the price of labor and abstinence needed in Nigeria. Therefore, this will not render it profitable for Nigeria to supply automobile from Benin republic. On this note, it is good for a country to import commodities from another country where the cost of production of those commodities cost less than it would be at home. Therefore, by doing this pattern of trade, and relating with one country by another perhaps Nigeria and Niger Republic. Whereas closing the border between countries will disconnect one from the other. Ricardo cited an instance that;

Two men can both make shoes and hats and one is superior to the other in both employments but in making hats, he can only have exceeded his competitor by one-fifth or 20% and in making shoes he can excel him by one-third or 33%: will it not be in the interest of both that the superior man should employ himself exclusively in making shoes and the inferior man in making hats? (Ruffin, 2002).

1.7.1 Relevance of the theory

The study seeks to relate comparative advantage theory to Nigeria socio-economic relations with its immediate neighbors: A case study of Nigeria's border closure on Benin Republic. The theory can be applied between countries or among nation-states.

When such model was adopted between Nigeria and Benin republic, international trade or Cross Border Trade will benefit both countries, increases the revenue generation through tariffs and allow the import of commodities and other goods at a cheaper rate as well as provides employment to so many people in both countries. Consequently, the aforementioned benefits and advantages will be lost when a country like Nigeria closed its entire borderland with her neighbouring countries, in the sense that, whenever a border is closed, Government's revenue generation will drastically be reduced, cost of goods or commodities be very high, unemployment rate will persist as those involved in the Cross Border Trade will lost their jobs, farmers who cultivate vegetables other perishable fruits meant for Cross Border Trade will automatically incur serious loss and damages, drivers who carry goods on their vehicles across border will be jobless and the labourers who load goods and offload such commodities from trucks will also run out of jobs. The comparative advantage theory arose in order to encourage the international trade and integration of social institutions as collective means to meet states means. Border closure follows a functional process of analyzing issues, particular as they affect foreign trade, cost of

commodities, violations of ECOWAS trade agreement, and abolition of custom duties and free movement of goods and services. Arising from the above analyses, border closure has been captured in assessing Nigeria socio-economic relations with its immediate neighbors.

1.7.2 Criticisms of the Theory

As no theory is free from criticism comparative advantage theory has been criticized for being static and unable to account for change. By allowing the importation of cheap commodities from another country, this will pave way for the exportation of another commodity to pay for it. It makes a country to specialize in produce one commodity or the other and importation on another commodity. The theory is also criticized for being perfectly symmetrical. The theory has also been criticized for being in support of status quo. In any case, the theory has remained the best in explaining international trade and has become a building ground were social scientist theorize and frame their analysis.

1.8 Research Methodology

This explains the justification, method and materials used in data collection, presentation and analysis. The study utilized the

secondary source of data. Data is the bedrock of any research study. The researcher used secondary sources of data to obtain the requisite information for the study. Secondary data involves the use of books, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers, internet materials, speeches, periodicals and reports through the method of systematic content analysis. This is because data collection, analysis and interpretation will be based on the interpretation of statements, comments and observations and not based on quantitative variables. This reasons for the use of secondary method of data collection is save time and resources. The secondary method of data collection will derive ideas from history, economic, social interactions and demography. Descriptive method of data analysis will be used in this study, as data would be summarized from observations. This will involve the analysis of accumulated data collected from reports and reliable sources. Therefore, in analyzing the collected data, content analysis will be employed to analyze, categorize as well as interpret the information gathered from the secondary sources of this study.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

1.9 Reasons for Nigeria's Border Closure with Neighboring West African Countries

Recent data have shown that, Nigeria's economy is performing below expectation with high unemployment rate in the country. It is very clear data as a result of border closure, many jobs were lost and there is high rate of inflation for many commodities. According to NBS (2016) Nigeria's economy declined and shrank by 1.6 percent in 2015 compared to the previous year, according to the IMF. The worldwide drop in crude oil prices in 2014 massively affected the country as crude oil accounts for more than 95 percent of Nigeria's total exports and 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. Foreign direct investment inflows to Nigeria decreased significantly by 55 percent. Also Nigeria's currency, the naira, slumped 30 percent against the dollar triggering a shortage of foreign exchange. As the crude oil accounts revealed, it seemed Nigeria neglected other sectors of the economy forcing it to diversify and restructure. Attention to the agriculture sector increased, which had been neglected by Nigeria since the late 1960s.

In 2017, Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan revealed the aim

of deepening investments and increasing the sector's share in economic growth from 5 percent to 8.4 percent by 2020. The idea came to the fore in order to revive domestic farming and save on food imports which account for over \$22 billion a year. As a result, the plan accelerated the border closure process in which the Nigerian government wants to protect domestic farmers from the cheap importation of foodstuff. Nigerian rice farmers were happy about the decision, but there were genuine concerns about whether domestic production can meet with domestic demand.

In 2017 the demand for rice in Nigeria reached 6.7 million tons, nearly double the 3.7 million tons produced domestically. Since the border closure, the price of 50 kilograms of rice increased from 9,000 naira (\$24) to 22000 naira (\$61). So while the move may be welcomed by farmers, consumers will bear the brunt of the cost (NBS, 2017). Similar actions were taken by the country in 1984 and 2003 when it closed its border with Benin in order to prevent smuggling of goods into the country. Besides, in 1987, the Military government at the time banned importation of barley with the intention to arrest the value of the country's currency, reduce foreign exchange reserve depletion and spur economic growth.

1.10 Benefits of Nigeria's Border Closure with Neighboring West African Countries

The economic impact of the closure of Nigeria's borders is enormous and it is obvious that the loss overweigh the gain. It is argued that the trend of border closure globally is that each time a border is closed, the economy of the country is negatively impacted. According to This Day Newspaper, (2019) shows the fact available has it that Benin imports 1.2 million metric tons of rice annually, against its population of about 11 million people. Cameroon imported 728,443 metric tons of rice according to National Statistics Institute (INS) in 2017, against a population of about 24 million. That same year Niger imported rice worth \$53.9 million, about 135 metric tons of rice for a population of 21 million. Nigeria on the other hand imported 1.3 million metric tons in 2017 for a population of over 190 million people. It means massive loads of rice have found their way to Nigeria with paltry duty accruing to the federal government. This trend is threatening Nigeria's domestic rice production.

The agreement among the ECOWAS member states on goods coming into the country states that, the goods must be containerized and taken through the border where they can be assessed and attested that

they are not smuggled items. The border closure was therefore as a result of the failure of the neighboring countries to fulfill their obligations. Hameed Ali asserted that:

“what we have discovered is that most of those cargoes that used to go to Benin Republic, shipped to Benin, and then discharged and smuggled into Nigeria, now that we have closed the border they are forced to bring their goods to either Apapa or Tin Can Island and we have to collect duty on them... as a matter of fact, our revenue has not reduced , it is increasing as a result of closing the border." He added that the agency has been making between N4.7 billion to N5.8 billion daily more than the agency used to generate before the closure”(Hallmarknews.com. Aug 16, 2020).

According to a study by Emmanuel, Mamman, Andekujwo ., & Anderibom ,(2020) Evidence seen by AFP suggests that any benefits are at the macro level and the country’s many poor are likely to be among

the losers. The two main commodities being smuggled were petrol and rice. Petrol was being sneaked out from Nigeria, where subsidies make the fuel half as cheap as in its neighbours, and resold. Rice, on the other hand, was being brought into Nigeria, where consumers favour imported Asian-grown varieties over the locally grown competitor, from Benin via its port in Cotonou.

The most visible winner from the closure is the Nigerian treasury, which has benefited from the falling cost of petrol subsidies and from a rise in customs receipts. Sales of gasoline in Nigeria fell by 12.7% after the border closure, which indicates that millions of subsidised litres are being secretly taken abroad for resale. The reduction in consumption, if sustained, could lead to subsidy savings of around 13.5 billion naira (\$37 million) monthly and 162.1 billion naira annually (Emmanuel, 2020).

As for rice, the country’s agriculture lobby is loudly supporting the border closure. Investment in Nigerian agriculture was being hamstrung by the rice trafficking, which is estimated to reach two million tonnes a year. The biggest rice-growing business in Nigeria, owning 13 000 hectares (30 000 acres) of cultivable land of which only 4 500 hectares are being used because the sector is not profitable in the face of competition from

Asian rice, but since the border closure, locally milled rice has started selling, and the entire rice value chain has been positively impacted by the closure (Emmanuel, 2020). But if the border closure is a boost for domestic growers, it has led to price increases for consumers. The price of a 50-kilo (110-pound) bag has more than doubled to 20 000 naira, roughly the entire monthly income of a Nigerian living in extreme poverty — of whom there are an estimated 87 million in the country. Traders in Lagos Island, a vast market of Made in China textiles and gadgets, say the closure of the borders had crimped supplies via Benin's Cotonou. Because of the situation, the annual inflation rate has edged up to 11.24 per cent, while inflation ran at 13.51 per cent in September, 2019 (Rasheed, 2020).

Nigeria's industrial sector, which is already struggling with the country's notoriously poor transport system and electricity shortages, is equally affected by the border closure. Trade with neighbours is essential. The intention of stopping smuggling is praiseworthy but the point is that measures have an impact on the sector as the measure affects investors who specialise in the import and export of manufactured goods. Between 10 and 20% of Nigerian manufactured goods are sold to other

countries in West Africa, with many of these items, such as pasta and cosmetics, exported through informal routes, mainly through small sellers who travel around the region.

There is need for direct investments; there is need for industries to create jobs in this country. Just before the border closure, new measures were introduced by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) amongst which was the prohibition of some imported items for accessing the official foreign exchange market. Whilst this was ongoing the government closed the land borders with her neighbours, all of which are mostly members of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), except Cameroon who is not a member. The border closure has generated public discourse by all, the reason being that Nigeria is a major stakeholder in ECOWAS and also a strategic nation for the success of the African Continental Trade Agreement (Bouillon, 2019). In the various discourse, it is becoming apparent that Nigeria's land border appears to be the pivot of international trade in West Africa and nay Africa. Furthermore, because of the vastness of her border, pervasive dumping of goods and illegal trade with her neighbours had become a norm, notwithstanding the detrimental effect on Nigerian Economy (see Bouillon, 2019). Nigeria's recent

announcement confirming that it is closing its borders to prevent movement of all goods has been met with harsh criticism from neighbours and regional integration advocates. The government has justified the decision as a tactic to curb smuggling of goods of which the country wants to internally increase production, such as rice (Emmanuel et al., 2020)

The border closure will have particularly negative consequences for trade especially informal ones, along the Benin-Nigeria border, as the two economies are closely intertwining. Indeed, this informal trade generates substantial income and employment in Benin, and Benin's government collects substantial revenues on entrepôt trade—goods imported legally and either legally re-exported to Nigeria, or illegally diverted into Nigeria through smuggling. The informal sector throughout West Africa, and particularly in Benin, represents approximately 50 percent of GDP (70 percent in Benin, in fact) and 90 percent of employment.

Unsurprisingly, informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is pervasive and has a long history given the region's artificial and often porous borders, a long history of regional trade, weak border enforcement, corruption, and, perhaps most importantly,

lack of coordination of economic policies among neighbouring countries. Notably, ICBT takes several forms, not all of which are illegal: For example, trade in traditional agricultural products and livestock in bordering countries may involve little or no intent to deceive the authorities, as peasants and herders ignore artificial and un-policed borders (Abia, 2019).

The economic relationship between the two countries, both members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is already asymmetric, with Nigeria exerting much more influence on Benin than vice versa. Given Nigeria's larger population, economy, and natural resource wealth, Benin has adopted a strategy centered on being —entrepôt state, i.e., serving as a trading hub, importing goods and re-exporting them legally but most often illegally to Nigeria, thus profiting from distortions in Nigeria's economy. Benin's dependence on Nigeria is not apparent from official trade statistics, as Benin's reported trade with Nigeria accounted for only about 6 percent of Benin's exports and 2 percent of Benin's imports in 2015-17. These official statistics are very misleading, however, as they do not reflect the vast informal trade along the border.

1.11 Implication of Nigeria's Border Closure with Neighbouring West African Countries

Nigeria's heavy dependence on oil and many dysfunctional economic policies have created an environment for ICBT between it and its neighbours, mainly Benin and Togo, to flourish.

As Nigeria closed its land borders, Ghanaians shut down Nigerian-owned businesses in their country and went as far as closing almost 70 businesses belonging to Nigerians. Ghanaians claim that foreign retailers (referring to Nigerians) violated section 27 of the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) Act 865, which stipulates that —the sale of goods or provision of services in a market, petty trading or hawking or selling of goods in a stall at any placel, must be reserved only for Ghanaian citizens. However, many believe that the action by the Ghana Union of Traders' Associations (GUTA) was a response to the decision by the Nigerian government to close its borders. GUTA stated that the closure of Nigeria's trade borders with its neighbours is against the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaties (CNBC Africa, 2020).

For some experts, the border closures of Nigeria are a slap in the face for the

continent's integration efforts. It is likely to damage the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA), which has the potential to be the world's largest free trade zone, even surpassing the World Trade Organization, established in 1995. Foreign exporters in the region are counting their losses as countries within the ECOWAS sub-region have started rejecting Nigerian goods. According to the exporters, the move is gradually crippling their businesses. During an interview with Vanguard Maritime Report, Chief Executive Officer of Multi-mix Academy, an export-orientated institution, Dr Obiora Madu, disclosed that Nigerian exports within the ECOWAS region are decreasing due to the border closure. He said: "It is definitely impacting negatively on the economy as the exports done within the ECOWAS region and our neighboring countries are now in decrease. These countries that benefit from the open border, since we have closed it, even though we used to export to them before, you don't expect to get the level of cooperation that we are getting before because they are hit hard by these closed borders."

Nigeria's import barriers on selected products, import tax rates (%), and import bans, 2015-2020

Items	2015	2020

Beer	Banned	Banned (45%)
Poultry meat	Banned	Banned
Rice	(50%)	Banned
Sugar	(60%)	(70%)
Vegetable oil	Banned	Banned
Used cars	(70%)	Banned

Sources: Nigerian customs data provided by the World Bank, Nigerian import prohibition list <https://www.customs.gov.ng/ProhibitionList/import.php>, online reports, World Trade Organization Nigeria Trade Policy Review 2020.

The border closure has spiked food prices, causing inflation to increase to 11.24 percent, the highest level since June 2019, and it is expected to rise even higher if continued. Presently, Nigeria produces about 6.9 million metric tons of rice annually, but the country has to import rice worth \$4 billion USD to meet the rising consumer demand.

At the beginning of this government, one of its major goals was to improve the growth of the agricultural sector to decrease dependency on the oil sector, enacting a policy to restrict the Nigerian Central Bank from distributing funds to facilitate the importation of food, especially rice. Additionally, the border closure was expected to further decrease Nigeria's ability to attract foreign direct investment. The World Bank ranked Nigeria as one of the

worst countries in the world when it comes to ease of trading across borders, ranking 182 out of 190 countries. As expected, Benin was heavily hit by the closure because of its informal trade dependence on Nigeria, which accounted for 70 percent of Benin's GDP. However, it is important to note that apart from the formal importation of petroleum from Nigeria, Benin also imports poultry, rice and vegetable oil accounting for about \$100 million USD in revenue to Nigeria's GDP. Nigeria stands to lose this significant source of revenue should it continue to close its borders to Benin and other African countries. Most African countries are impatient with the border closure, due to the negative economic consequences on their economies, which could result in potential political tensions among them. Nigeria could stand to lose about \$300 million USD in export revenue from these countries. For instance, if Ghana retaliates by imposing similar trade restrictions on Nigeria. Ghana depends on the Abidjan-Lagos Highway for overland access to markets in West Africa, which was closed due to the Nigerian-Benin border closure. The Ghana Union Traders Association (GUTA) petitioned to the government of Ghana to also close its trade borders in retaliation to what they call, —unfair treatment from Nigeria.

Nigeria is a key regional player in the economic growth of West Africa and facilitates the growth of informal trade across the region. The border closure affected the informal sector which represents about 50 percent of West Africa's combined GDP. Nigeria during the period of border closure announced a list of strict conditions that all ECOWAS members must meet in order to be accepted as Nigeria's trade partners. This was vexing to other African countries. The border closure and the list of strict conditions sent a negative signal to the world and other African governments about Africa's commitment to boost intra-African trade activities by at least 53 percent through AfCFTA. The treaties intend to facilitate smooth intra-regional trade to ensure regional growth, but Nigeria's trade restrictions if not halted, constitute a stumbling block to achieve it. Indeed, Nigeria's policy of food import substitution, a form of industrial policy, is often at odds with the idea of regional integration...The AfCFTA will only succeed if member countries make the regional strategy part of their national policy and proactively address the tensions that arise between the two. Countries should find the sweet spot that reinforces national economic goals and ensures maximum gains from increased

integration, looking beyond a static assessment of their priorities.

1.12 How Nigeria Border Closure with Neighbouring West African Countries affect Nigeria Socio-Economic relations

From time immemorial, ingredients of humanity have always been separated and also connected by a network of borders at all territorial levels. Common interdependence among nation-states for socioeconomic, political and security interests have made border occupy a strategic place in global, continental and regional or sub-regional politics (Paul & Daniel, 2020).

Aniukwu (2020) observed that Nigeria's trans-border trade relations with its neighbouring friends within the West African sub-region has been mutually reinforced by the concept of international trade as expounded in the principle of comparative advantage attributed to the works of great economists like Adams Smith, John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo. Another challenging aspect of concern is the ECOWAS Protocols on free movement of persons and trades within its member countries as well as African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement which aimed at removing all barriers to trades and promote the free flow of persons, goods and services across the

continent and Nigeria is a signatory to both the ECOWAS Protocols and AfCFTA. This may explain why ECOWAS Countries Reject Nigerian Goods as in response to Nigeria's land border closure of 2019 (African Review, 2020; Kwarkye & Matongbada, 2021). The implication is that any [long-term] cross-border restriction on free movements contrary to these agreements may amount to unfavourable trade relations against Nigeria by other [African] countries. This argument corroborates that of Abdulrasheed Isah (2020) who asserts that the policy is prone to attract retaliation from Nigerian neighbouring countries in the future, in that they might erect trade barriers to thwart import from Nigeria and thus deny its producers the opportunity to access larger African markets. Furthermore, the negative impacts of the land border closure further exposed the country's extremely deficient number of productive industries and poor economic infrastructures which have very low capacity to feed the ever-increasing teeming population. Therefore, the sudden land border closure is tantamount to creating an environment of policy uncertainty among businesses as well as breeds or encouraging/condoning corruption among public officials who want to make profits from economic rents as a result of the border

closure. In another development, the border closure led to scarcity of materials exported from Nigeria to neighbouring countries hence, the concern for its consequences for trade liberation in Africa. The closure was in breach of protocol on the free movement of persons, goods and services established by the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) in which Nigeria is a signatory that wields significant political and economic weight. According to scholars, this action also came just two months after the country signed the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCTA), which aimed at removing barriers to trades and promote the free flow of persons, goods and services across the continent (Ogunwusi 2019).

1.13 Discussion of Findings

From the data presented and analyzed above, the following findings/deduction can be drawn.

Research objective 1: Reasons for Nigerian border closure with Neighboring West African Countries.

The study investigates the impact of Nigeria's border closure on Neighboring West African Countries 2019-2021. The findings of the research shows that Nigeria is

the fastest economy in Africa and performing much better than South Africa, but, however, Nigeria's economy is performing below expectation with high unemployment rate in the country. It is very clear data as a result of border closure, many jobs were lost and there is high rate of inflation for many commodities. The research also found out that, to revive domestic economic activities and farming to save food imports which account for billions of naira each year, border closure process was imitated by the Nigerian government to protect domestic trades and investment from cheap importation of food items.

Research objective 2: Benefits of Nigeria's border closure with Neighboring West African Countries

From the forgoing data analysis, the finding of the research shows that since the incident of border closure serious efforts were put in place by Nigerian government through several strategies. Border closure has boost domestic economic most especially in the agricultural sector which suffered years of importation of rice and other grains into the country. Domestic growers of agricultural produce have double their profit margin. Nigerian customs services have been performing in revenue generation to the

government. The study also found out that the biggest rice-growing business in Nigeria, owning 13 000 hectares (30 000 acres) of cultivable land of which only 4 500 hectares are being used because the sector is not profitable in the face of competition from Asian rice, but since the border closure, locally-milled rice has started selling, and the entire rice value chain has been positively impacted by the closure. This is in line with assumption two as posited in chapter one "Border closure with neighbouring West African Countries has significantly improved the economy of Nigeria".

Research objective 3: Implications of Nigerian border closure with Neighboring West African Countries

The findings of the research show that the border closure will have particularly negative consequences for trade especially informal ones, along the Benin-Nigeria border, as the two economies are closely intertwining. Indeed, this informal trade generates substantial income and employment in Benin, and Benin's government collects substantial revenues on entrepôt trade—goods imported legally and either legally re-exported to Nigeria, or illegally diverted into Nigeria through smuggling. The informal sector throughout

West Africa, and particularly in Benin, represents approximately 50 percent of GDP (70 percent in Benin, in fact) and 90 percent of employment.

It was found out in the data analyzed, that Nigerian border closure has impacted several trades and businesses in and outside the country. The continuous border closure and the recent corona virus pandemic has crippled Nigerian economy. Inflation rate has increased, unemployment among the border communities and rural farmers, small scale businesses are nowhere to be found. This is in line with assumption three as posited in chapter one “Nigerian border closure has negatively impacted on her socio-economic relations with Neighboring West African Countries”.

Research objective 4: How Nigeria’s border closure with Neighboring West African Countries affect Nigeria socio-economic relations.

The findings of the research show that, West African countries have been separated and also interconnected with several networks of land borders. Interdependence among nation-states for socioeconomic, political and security interests have remained very important. The study also found out that asserts that the

policy of border closure is prone to attract retaliation from Nigerian neighbouring countries in the future, in that they might erect trade barriers to thwart import from Nigeria and thus deny its producers the opportunity to access larger African markets. This is in line with assumption four as posited in chapter one “Nigeria border closure have affected trade with other countries in West Africa and raised the prices of imported products, especially basic necessities

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.14 Conclusion

Based on the findings of the study the following conclusion is made. The findings of this research discovered that, Nigeria is inconsistent with regards to the Policy of Import Regulations which dictates and determines the Border Closure. The present border closure has received several criticisms considering the impact it has on the economy. It is important to note that, the present administration has put all effort in order to increase local agricultural production through different programmes handled by central bank of Nigeria. However, this has not yielded any positive result. The border closure is primarily to increase and

encourage local manufacturers but the economy is still facing serious challenges ranging from high unemployment rate and inflation. Additionally, despite the intensified effort put in place to ban local rice and other essential commodities, corruption among customs and immigration authority is sabotaging the efforts. Imported goods are still coming into the country. Bribery and corruption is very common along the borders and major routes into the country. Unfortunately, Lagos Port became congested and operates very slow to clear imported goods. Therefore, one has to pay too many bribes to get his or her goods out in good time. However, it contradicts the effort of the government of the President Muhammadu Buhari, which claimed to be fighting corruption.

1.15 Recommendations

Based on the findings of research study, the following recommendations are hereby made by the researcher on ways to improve the situation:

- i. The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should engage the Policy Expert right from the inception of the Policy Formulation, Implementation analysis of the outcomes of the policy and

Evaluation before its adoption. This will prevent the enactment and implementation of the disruptive policy which repercussion affects both citizens and the economy.

- ii. The Policy of Border closure should always consider the poor people who are about 87 Million in Nigeria and became subjects of hardship following the closure of Cross Border Trade. Thus, such policy should be pro poor citizens.
- iii. The Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) should engage its officers and men of service rigorous Training, Seminars and workshop both domestically and internationally on the tricks of manning or handling border with modern gadgets and sophisticated equipment to the international best practice. This will drastically reduce the perennial smuggling across Nigeria's border.
- iv. That, whenever the government of the federation intends to close the borders, it should provide alternative jobs for over one Million people who earn their living through Cross Border Trading and related activities across borders.

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CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURS AND PERPETUATION OF TIV-JUKUN ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN WUKARI, TARABA STATE

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ABSTRACT

The end of every conflict begins with an adequate knowledge of its political economy. An overwhelming majority of scholars agreed that as long as there are beneficiaries of a crisis, the chances of such conflict coming to an end become prolonged or impossible. This is a result of the roles played by instigators, war profiteers, or conflict entrepreneurs. These sets of beneficiaries play mutually complementary roles in terms of war, which ultimately define and determine the dynamics and directions of most violent conflicts, at both their latent and manifest stages. Thus, this paper aims to investigate how war profiteers, and instigators - or, in one word, conflict entrepreneurs – contributed to the perpetuation of the Tiv-Jukun crisis in the Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria. The study employed the Greed and Grievance Theory as its theoretical framework for analysis. The study relied on mixed method of data collection and analyses. Both secondary and primary sources of data collection were utilized. The primary method involved the use of interviews and observation; while the secondary method comprised documentary sources such as books, journals, articles, etc. Findings showed that the seemingly irreconcilable nature of the Tiv-Jukun crisis in Wukari was contributed to by greed, which translates as the desire to acquire material resources; and pent-up accumulated grievances. To address such a conflict engendered by greed and grievance, the study recommends that a comprehensive approach be adopted, which should encompass addressing economic inequalities, promoting inclusive governance, and addressing historical grievances. By addressing both the economic motivations and underlying grievances, sustainable peace and development can be achieved.

Keywords: Conflict, Conflict Entrepreneur, Jukun, Perpetuation of Conflict, Tiv.

Introduction

The rise in recurring communal clashes in Nigeria may be attributed to various intrinsic factors which include: land disputes, ethnic rivalry, religious clashes, conflicts associated with the production of oil – as in the Niger Delta – and conflicts connected to boundary demarcation for administrative purposes and power. However, no serious ideological analysis of a conflict is possible without a minimal level of understanding of the facts of the conflict, its socio-political background, history, main actors, the basis of the conflict, leading positions, and arguments (Herman & Peterson, 2017). While some conflicts may be caused by a single factor like religion or ethnicity, the reality is often a myriad of complex activities (Moti, 2010). The Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis is among the many, seemingly intractable inter-ethnic crises that have stifled development and peace in the affected areas in Nigeria. It has been rightly labelled as the most violent clash in central Nigeria since the Nigerian Civil War (Moti, 2010).

The Jukun ethnic group in Taraba state forms the main group and the nexus of the ancient Kwararafa Kingdom. They achieved successes in war exploits in the days of territorial expansion, and have a long history of subjecting their opponents to

humiliating defeats though in most cases, without establishing any form of direct political control but extending lordship over them (Odigbo, 2016). They existed for many years without threats and major challenges due to their ability to achieve internal peace and security in their territories. Even before the advent of colonialism, Wukari occupied a strategic position for commercial purposes. It serves as a link in the Trans-Saharan trade between the Northern (Kano) market and the Bamenda in Cameroon through Ibi (another Jukun community along the river) (Adamu, 2002). This made Wukari (the main Jukun city and capital of the Kwararafa Kingdom) attractive for the settlement of the Hausa traders and other visitors in such an early period.

The Tiv form the majority in Benue, a border State to Taraba. The Tiv people are known for their rich cultural heritage, agricultural practices, and historic significance within Nigeria. They have a long and complex history, with origins dating back several centuries. According to oral traditions, the Tiv are thought to have migrated from the eastern regions of Nigeria, potentially originating from the Congo Basin area. Over time, they established themselves in the fertile lands of Benue State, where they built their communities and cultivated a

distinctive socio-cultural identity. Agriculture plays a vital role in the Tiv economy, serving as its fundamental pillar. The Tiv community excels in farming and demonstrates remarkable skills in cultivating a diverse range of crops like yams, sorghum, millet, maize, and rice. They actively participate in subsistence farming to ensure self-sufficiency, as well as engage in commercial farming for economic purposes (Akombo, 2005)

Wukari community and its environs are known for high land fertility thus making it irresistible for farming communities like the Tiv and Chamba to make their settlements. Members of the Tiv and Jukun communities had cordial relationships for centuries that preceded the colonial era (Avav, 2002) before socioeconomic and political arrangements in the Benue Valley in general and in Wukari in particular gradually turned the genial relationship resentful (Shut, 2007).

What is today known as the “Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Conflict” evolved at different stages over the past decades concerning its causes, actors, momentum, actual impact, and counteractive mechanisms geared toward peace. There have been recurring crises in 1991/1992; 2001/2002 and 2019/2020. The wreckage of the carnage left behind on

Wukari and other neighbouring Tiv villages years after the irreconcilable, recurring clashes speaks volumes of the impact and is now indelible in the minds of those who witnessed it, leaving behind grotesque images for younger generations to come. In 1991 alone an estimated 5000 thousand people were killed and houses and other valuables worth millions of naira were destroyed, while business activities were paralyzed (Hudgens and Grillo 1995, cited in Egwu 2013). The 2001/2002 and 2019/2020 resurgent crises were observed to be more impactful and destructive, perhaps due to the development of weapons technology and improved strategies of warfare.

Despite the recurring, violent clashes between the Tiv and Jukun communities, existing literature espouses views that the violent confrontations are the results of indigene/settler conundrum, disputes over land and identity politics. Thus, earlier studies such as Nnoli (1995), Jibo (2001), Egwu (2004) and Egwu (1998), understood the conflict as a mere ethnic rivalry or communal feud between the Tiv and the Jukun. For instance, in 1991/1992 and 2001/2002, there were bloody skirmishes between the two groups which led to the illegal blocking of major roads and the erection of unauthorised checkpoints by the

youths of both groups. Hundreds were killed and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003; cited in Odigbo, 2016).

Similarly, recent scholarly studies such as Otite, (1990); Cordell & Wolf, (2009); Ciboh, (2014); Odigbo, (2016); and Moti; (2010) viewed the causes of the Tiv-Jukun conflict from the perspective of indigene/settler dispute; identity politics and securing of land for farming. Ciboh (2014) posited that the feud over land ownership and occupation, the conundrum of indigene/settlers, political participation and privileges; and fear of domination, account for the causes of the Tiv-Jukun crisis. On their part, Cordell & Wolff (2009) itemised factors such as sentiments of superiority by one ethnic group (mostly the indigenes) over others; issues of land ownership, chieftaincy succession, scrimmage over land usage or location of institutions and services as reasons for inter-ethnic-crisis.

While the efforts of these scholars on unraveling the causes and nature of the Tiv-Jukun crisis in Wukari are highly commended, nevertheless, they approached the issue from viewpoints that are replete in the literature, such as indigene/settler conundrum; disputes over land; sentiments of supremacy and fear of domination and

marginalization; and identity concerns. There seems to be little or no literature exploring the issue from a political economy standpoint: that greed and grievance are strong, motivating factors for the perpetuation of the conflicts; thereby leaving a gap in literature. Therefore, this study intends to fill this gap by examining the dynamics of the occurrence, reoccurrence, and perpetuation of the Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis from the perspective that the prospects for economic gains (greed) by conflict entrepreneurs, within or outside the government, and underlying grievances have not only contributed to the conflict but also prolonged it.

In order to fill this gap in extant literature, the study is carefully guided by the following research questions:

1. Did the presence of and roles played by conflict entrepreneurs lead to the prolongation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state Nigeria?
2. Did economic motivators such as inequality, poverty, and the desire to acquire material gains result in the perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state, Nigeria.

3. Were unresolved, historical grievances part of the reasons for the occurrence, reoccurrence and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari, Taraba state, Nigeria?

Objectives of the Study

The study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective is to investigate whether the activities of beneficiaries of the Tiv/Jukun conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state, Nigeria led to the perpetuation of the conflicts.

Specifically, the study aims to:

1. Ascertain whether the presence of and roles played by conflict entrepreneurs led to the prolongation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state Nigeria.
2. Determine whether economic motivators such as inequality, poverty, and the desire to acquire material gains resulted in the perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state, Nigeria.
3. Investigate whether unresolved, historical grievances contributed to

the occurrence, reoccurrence and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari, Taraba state, Nigeria.

Research Hypotheses

The study is guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The presence of and roles played by conflict entrepreneurs led to the prolongation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state Nigeria.
2. Economic motivators such as inequality, poverty, and the desire to acquire material gains resulted in the perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari local government area of Taraba state, Nigeria.
3. Unresolved, historical grievances contributed to the occurrence, reoccurrence and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari, Taraba state, Nigeria.

Conceptual Explication of Conflict Entrepreneurs

According to Tukura *et al* (2020), a conflict entrepreneur is a group or individual who exists within or outside the government and stimulates violent conflict for personal

gains. This means a conflict entrepreneur usually indulges in or benefits directly or indirectly from illegal economic activities, geared towards the promotion of conflicts or that which undermines the government's efforts for good governance and economic development. Lyons (2002) posited that conflict entrepreneurs are economic and political actors who instigate and stir up violent conflict as a means of attaining economic and political power. He further postulated that conflict entrepreneurs often mobilize individuals through three general tactics, namely; appeal to ethnic, religious, and ideological solidarity; patronage; and positive or negative promises regarding security. For Berdal (2009), even after the cessation of hostilities, many individuals or groups of individuals, who instigated or made gains from conflicts still maintain positions that make them enjoy political economy privileges.

Tschirgi (2004) further distinguished between passive and active conflict entrepreneurs. While passive conflict entrepreneurs benefit from conflict situations, they generally do not directly influence the outcome, duration, or the way it is fought. Active conflict entrepreneurs are usually in a position to incite and perpetuate

a conflict to maximise their gains. This means conflict entrepreneurs are sometimes among the belligerents themselves and not necessarily outside players.

Other scholars like Collier & Hoeffler (2004) contend that where there are few opportunities because of the prevalence of unemployment, poverty, and reduced incomes – as is the case with Nigeria – the prospect of resorting to conflicts as a means to material ends is high, and the impacts and interval of the conflicts would probably be higher. They upheld the view that deliberately or otherwise, war profiteers at times contribute to instigating wars and prolonging conflicts. Furthermore, if the benefactors of the war are powerful individuals who have a direct stake in the war, it may become difficult to de-escalate or settle.

By this reasoning, prolongation or duration of conflicts can be explained in terms of what benefits the conflict offers to those involved, as groups that benefit from a conflict situation would prefer to continue the fight rather than win (Collier, 2000; Keen 1998). Other forms of conflict entrepreneurs include opportunistic actors, who may not be directly involved in the crisis, but who benefit immensely in the outbreak of conflicts through resource exploitation like

looting properties of deserted homes and business premises (Berdal, 2009).

Theoretical Framework

This study is predicated on a variant of the political economy theory of conflict known as the Greed and Grievance Theory. It is typically a Marxian perspective of the political economy theory of conflict, developed and made popular in recent times by Collier & Anke (2002); Collier & Anke (2004); and Collier (2003).

Like other Marxian political economy theories of conflict, which have the common tendency to accredit the prevalence of conflicts in society to unemployment, socioeconomic inequalities, poverty, greed, underdevelopment, and struggle for material resources, the Greed and Grievance theory postulates that the core of conflicts especially in developing countries (such as Nigeria) are greed and grievance. This theory suggests that conflicts can stem from two main sources: greed, which involves the desire for economic gain or resource control, and grievance, which pertains to perceived injustices within a society (Collier, 2004).

Political theorists like Collier & Hoeffler (2002) maintain views that where alternative opportunities are few, because of

low incomes poor education, and a high unemployment rate – as is the case with Nigeria – the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, and the incidence and duration of wars are likely to be greater and longer. They asserted that whether intentionally or unintentionally, conflict entrepreneurs help to instigate wars and make conflicts more protracted. Furthermore, in cases where there is a powerful group that stands to gain from continued war, conflicts may be more difficult to de-escalate. By this reasoning, the duration of conflicts can be explained in terms of what material benefits the conflict offers, as groups or individuals that benefit from a conflict would prefer to continue the fight rather than win it (Keen, 1998).

Basic Assumptions of the Greed and Grievance Theory

Several fundamental assumptions underpin the greed and grievance theory, as elucidated in the literature:

- i. A fundamental premise is that conflicts can emerge from two primary causes: greed, which involves the pursuit of economic benefits or control over resources, and grievance, which is connected to perceived injustices or grievances

within a society (Collier, 2004). This theory argues that both economic motivations and societal grievances play essential roles in conflict dynamics (Agyei, 2021).

- ii. Additionally, the theory posits that nations rich in natural resources are at a higher risk of experiencing violent conflicts in contrast to those lacking such resources (Khadiagala & Motsamai, 2014); and that economic interests and opportunities are often the driving force behind wars rather than past group grievances (Olanrewaju et al., 2020).
- iii. Furthermore, the theory recognises the presence of conflict entrepreneurs, such as warlords, militias, criminal networks, and other individuals in the society, who exploit the dynamics of greed and grievances for personal gain during conflicts, such as through looting, control over resources, or involvement in illicit activities (Collier, 2004; Keen, 2008; Berdal, 2009).
- iv. Where there is a prevalence of grievance especially in plural societies, conflict usually becomes a viable tool in the hands of conflict entrepreneurs for the pursuit of their

interests and goals (Collier & Anke, 2003).

- v. The theory assumes that underlying grievances and perceived injustices contribute to the emergence and perpetuation of conflicts. These grievances can stem from various sources, including socioeconomic disparities, political exclusion, ethnic or religious tensions, land disputes, or historical grievances (Collier, 2004).
- vi. The theory suggests that conflicts based on greed and grievance create a vicious cycle, where economic motivations and grievances reinforce each other, leading to the prolongation of the conflict. This cycle can be self-perpetuating, making it challenging to resolve conflicts without addressing both the economic and underlying grievances (Collier, 2004; Stewart, 2008).

Application

From the foregoing assumptions of the Greed and Grievance Theory, it is apt and quite relevant to explain the Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis in Wukari from the perspective that the presence of conflict entrepreneurs appears to have contributed to the perpetuation of the conflicts.

On the one hand, the greed factor underscores the massive lootings of properties by conflict entrepreneurs from deserted homes and shops, during and after each resurgent crisis. People can suddenly get rich overnight. Therefore, the desire for material acquisition and the prospect of becoming rich overnight became incentives for the perpetuation of the conflicts. On the other hand, unresolved, underlying grievances only catalyse another resurgent conflict, further fuelling the greed factor.

In addition, the assumption of the theory that conflicts can become prolonged when based on greed and grievance thereby creating a vicious cycle of conflicts, holds of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts in Wukari, which has been reoccurring for decades. For instance, between 1991 and 2020 Wukari experienced no less than three violent crises between the ethnic groups resulting in huge loss of lives and properties worth millions of naira.

Finally, the assumption of the theory that conflict entrepreneurs tend to hijack or foment crisis to promote their interests and this usually has serious implications for peace-building processes provide it with a powerful appeal. This assumption of the theory appears to appropriately describe the Tiv-Jukun ethnic crisis in Wukari, as vested

political economy interest by private individuals or groups of individuals has, now and again, seemingly led to the culmination and escalation of the crisis, making peace seemingly elusive.

Despite its analytical prowess to provide explanation on the prevalence of conflicts in developing societies due to greed and grievances, the greed and grievance theory is not without its limitations. For instance it has been argued that conflicts often arise from a combination of factors that cannot be simply categorized into these two distinct categories (Regan & Norton, 2005). Furthermore, the theory has been criticized for its lack of ability to address the dynamic and evolving characteristics of conflicts, as well as the interconnectedness of different causes of violence (Dixon, 2014). Additionally, certain academics have highlighted that the greed and grievance theory often gives more importance to economic incentives rather than political, social, or historical grievances, thus overlooking the diverse aspects of conflicts (Bensted, 2011). By primarily concentrating on material gains and competition for resources, the theory failed to recognize the importance of identity, ideology, and power struggles in driving violent conflicts (Shivamurthy, 2022). This narrow

perspective restricts the theory's explanatory power and fails to capture the complexity of civil wars in different contexts (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2008).

Methodology

The study utilized the documentary and survey methods of data collection. The documentary method relied on information gathered from books, journal articles, government documents, official and institutional documents such as government gazettes, and other relevant literature such as conference papers, periodicals, unpublished papers, and other related materials. The primary method includes: the study also relied on information obtained from interviews and non-participant observations. The population of the study comprises Wukari Local Government Area in Taraba State, Nigeria, and other affected communities like Tsukundi, Rafinkada, Kente, Donga, Takum, and Jootar.

a). Observation: The study adopted the non-participant observation technique by relying on study tours (ST) to select conflict sites and flash points. Affected areas such as Wukari, Tsukundi, Rafinkada, Kente, Donga, and Takum in Taraba state were visited; while Jootar in Benue state was also visited. The use of this observation technique enabled the

researchers to observe first-hand the nature of the communications and interaction between groups in the conflict areas, relationships in post-conflict situations, and the remaining physical evidence of the conflicts. By so doing, cross-match the documentary evidence to arrive at the facts of the study.

b). Interview: The second technique of survey method adopted for this study was the unstructured interview, with the fighters of both ethnic groups, residents of affected areas, and stakeholders. This choice was informed by the fact that it helped the researchers discover an in-depth view of the respondents and various circumstances associated with the topic. This was to investigate what led to the occurrence of the conflict; as well as to know their various positions on the reasons for its prolongation in the Wukari area.

Virtually all the stakeholders interviewed pleaded for anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, which might result in the compromising of their various positions. Only one figure, late Mr. Baso Terhemen, a prominent Tiv, who was at the forefront of peace talks, decided to reveal his identity.

Analysis of data collected was done using the qualitative descriptive method based on content analysis. According to Asika (2006), qualitative analysis essentially

borders on summarizing the information generated in the research. This method is mainly used in analysing qualitative data or data collected through qualitative methods. Qualitative methods of data analysis are qualitative descriptive analysis used in verbally summarizing the information generated in the research. Qualitative descriptive analysis is, therefore, a descriptive verbal analysis that involves interpretation, description, and explanation of not only qualitative data from unstructured observation, interviews, documents, and others but also quantitative data collected from documents.

Economic Interests and Perpetuation of Tiv/Jukun Ethnic Conflict

From the devastation of the Inca in Peru by Pizarro in his search for gold in the 1530s, to the 1960s when the Peruvian military bombed the Matsigenka indigenous peoples in the Amazon on behalf of Mobil; from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 to the subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the United States to secure the oil fields of the Middle East to the benefit of companies like Chevron, the mineral extraction industry has always profited enormously from violent political upheaval (cited in Tschirgi, 2004).

The above emphatic quotation captured by Tschirgi (2004) is an exemplar of a recurring thrust in the social sciences that the

likelihood of economic gains in wars drives groups of prospective benefactors to instigate conflicts. The famous anti-war slogan accredited to Socrates is: “All wars are fought for money”; in a book review, George Orwell wrote that “[War] against a foreign country only happens when the moneyed classes think they are going to profit from it” (Orwell, 1937/1998:75; Cited in Akombo, 2005). These assertions imply that economy and conflict are intimately linked and competition over access to material resources and the possibility of economic earnings (by a small group of individuals) are major motivating factors for the stimulation of wars and other forms of organised violence (Vernon, 2016), which results in the prolongation of conflicts (Collier, 2003). Peace seemingly becomes elusive more so, when the benefactors of such conflicts are actively involved in the peace-building processes.

The perpetuation and protracted sequence of the Tiv-Jukun crises and the seeming elusiveness of sustainable peace in Wukari may be understood in light of the above assertion. Even the then governor of Taraba state, Ishaku Darius Dickson, recognized this very fact when he remarked thus:

They will encourage you to fight and even provide

the incentive for you to continue but I want to assure you that there's nothing to gain from this fighting (Ishaku Darius, (2020), Governor of Taraba State; cited in Bolaji, 2020).

The above remark by the then Governor of Taraba State, Ishaku Darius was in direct reference to conflict entrepreneurs who, by the 2019/2020 Tiv-Jukun crisis, had proliferated to such a magnitude they could now determine the direction and duration of the crisis. The implication of this statement by the governor is that he acknowledged the existence of systematic roles played by conflict entrepreneurs in worsening the Tiv-Jukun crisis and making the achievement of sustainable peace in Wukari increasingly difficult. To emphatically drive home our point that the prospects for economic gains may have contributed to the occurrence, reoccurrence and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic crisis in Wukari, our discussion in this section will be anchored on two sub-themes namely: "Arms Procurement, Looting and Proliferation of Conflict Entrepreneurs in Tiv/Jukun Ethnic Crises"; and "Towards Politics of the Wukari Yam Market and Increasing Tiv Grievances". The purpose is to ensure clarity and coherence, as well as to reiterate the assumptions of the

greed and grievance theory employed in the study. Results from interviews will also be presented here in a non-judgmental way.

Arms Procurement, Looting, and Proliferation of Conflict Entrepreneurs in the Tiv-Jukun Ethnic Crisis

One issue that was uncovered from both sources was the fact that certain persons, both within and outside the government were benefitting immensely from the process of acquiring arms. For instance, records showed that in both communities, the youths mobilized themselves to meet people – including non-indigenes - doing business in the area to make compulsory contributions of specific amounts with which to procure arms.

A Jukun source remarked thus:

During the crisis, both Jukun youths from Wukari and Tiv youths in Jootar gathered themselves together to raise "bullet money" from traders in the area. Whether you are from the place or not, you have to pay your money when we come to you (Field Interview, 2020).

It is unclear whether the money so collected was used for the purpose for which it was raised, however, many believed that many youths used this opportunity as a means

to enrich themselves. This is a clear indication that with the resumption of hostilities in the area, interested parties in the conflict had proliferated. Sources agree that these gains accrued by the youths and the suppliers of weapons of warfare were a strong motive to perpetuate the crisis.

Another instance of conflict entrepreneurs making gains from the crisis was said to be some persons in government, who were benefiting from government allocation for security in the area. A prominent Tiv source, Mr Baso Terhemen (2020) remarked that,

I can assure you that some people in government are making gains from this crisis. They are making it big, especially through procuring weapons for the fighters. Do you know how much money is involved in security alone? A lot of money is involved and those sitting on it are making the money (Field Interview, 2020).

He went further to say that,

When you have such an opportunity to make money from the government you would not want the crisis to end. You can even instigate more crises to make more money. I can

categorically tell you that (names and positions withheld) are making so much money from this crisis (Field Interview, 2020).

Residents and the fighters were alleged to be looting properties from deserted houses after an attack. Both Tiv and Jukun sources agree that residents indeed used the crisis to loot properties from deserted houses and shops. Nevertheless, they disagree strongly that their frontline fighters engaged in such acts. Yet, each ethnic group accused the other of this criminal act. On this latter issue, however, Jukun sources condemned and refuted these accusations in very strong terms. A Jukun resident remarked thus:

Those guys eh, the spirit that they carry to fight a war is something else. All they go to do is fight and scatter everything. If they take anything from the area, Allah, I tell you the truth, their powers will not work again. In short, they fit no comeback alive. So anybody that tells you that they carry things from the area is a lie. Unless maybe, it's the people that are staying in the area that go and carry such things (Field Interview, 2020)

Reinforcing this view, some frontline Jukun Warriors said they have nothing to do with

such things. They implicated third-party conflict entrepreneurs when a spokesperson remarked,

It is against the Jukun tradition to carry anything on the war front. If you do, you might die there. What I can say is that in most cases, it is the [names withheld] that go and pack everything. They like to see us fight because they benefit from it a lot. Sometimes we think they go and set one group against another because when we start fighting, they benefit one way or another (Field Interview, 2020)

Buttressing this view, a prominent Jukun said that,

The Jukun warriors have no time for such criminal acts more so in the battlefield. Their concern is to attack and destroy the enemy. It is against our belief and practice to steal from the battlefield.

For the Tiv,

Tiv militia has something like a spiritual code. They don't take things when they go to fight. Anything you take is that you have agreed that you want to die in the fighting. It is they [Jukun] that take things. Even in their

attack on Jootar, they carried some things like generators and others (Field Interview, 2020).

In all of these, interviewees generally agree that the number of those benefiting from the crisis is steadily on the rise; and the prospect for increased material gains for war profiteers effectively undermined the cessation of hostilities.

Towards Politics of the Wukari Yam Market, Economic Interests and Increasing Tiv Grievances

It is not exactly clear why the Wukari Yam Market was relocated to its present location along Jalingo road, Wukari, Taraba state; nevertheless, its attribute to be easily accessible, large and affinity to attract high patronage gives it a comparative advantage over its previous locations in Wukari. As a yam hub, the market attracts farmers from far and wide, who bring their produce for better bargains and traders come from across the country and neighbouring Cameroun, Niger, and Ghana (Omanchi, 2018). Although yam is the primary commodity sold in the market, other products such as maize, guinea corn, millet, palm oil, garri, and fish are also sold.

In the Wukari Yam Market, as is with several other yam markets across Benue

state, the physical presence of the yam owners is not necessarily required for their yam to be sold; a *Dilalyis* all that is needed. A *Dilaly* is practically an intermediary between the owners of the yam brought to the market and the buyers. In essence, therefore, a *Dilaly* sells the yam for the owners in their ‘absence’ and returns the proceeds therefrom to the same. A *Dilaly* is more or less akin to a house agent, who brokers housing deals and gives out houses for rent to interested tenants without the tenants meeting physically with the property owner in most cases.

The Yam Market contributes to the socioeconomic development of the area in diverse ways such as revenue generation, attraction of additional functions due to the concentration of activities, and support in the sustainability of the society and livelihood within the area. Employment opportunities are many in diverse activities, connected with production and trade. This contributes

substantially to the economic development of the area. Among the socioeconomic benefits are specialization in production activities, population increase, expansion in the market, and increase in professional traders and intermediaries’ activities. Traders pay tolls in the form of tax (Omanchi, 2018).

On average, each truck/vehicle loaded with yam leaving the market pays what is known as “market expenses”, which range from around thirty-five to thirty-seven thousand naira to the market association; and no less than 80 trucks/vehicles of different types leave the market daily, before the outbreak of 2019/2020 crisis. Below is a tabular representation of the estimated revenue generated from the Yam market from the trucks/vehicles monthly before the 2019 crisis.

Table 1: Summary of the revenue generated from trucks/vehicles loading yam in Wukari Yam market before the crisis in 2019

(Estimated) No. of trucks/vehicles loading yam daily	Amount payable as “market expenses” per truck (N)	Average receivable amount daily (N) *except for Sundays	Average receivable amount monthly (N)
80-100	35,000 - 37,000	3,240,000	84,240,000

Source: Authors’ compilation with data from field research (2020)

The above statistics imply that millions of naira are generated from the yam market

daily. Not all the money goes to the local government, however. Part of it goes to the

federal and state governments, the Wukari Traditional Council, the market association, and other parties. Nevertheless, these increase tax revenues for the local government and contribute to local prosperity and the development of the community (interview with *Dilaly*, 2020).

With such a huge income-generating capacity, it is clear that the yam market plays a pivotal role not only in the socioeconomic development of the Wukari local government as a whole but also in the lives of individuals, who have come to rely on services of varying degrees in the yam market as a means of livelihood. Sources mutually agree that the Tiv traders from Benue state, Wukari, and elsewhere contribute about 80% of the yams sold in the yam market in Wukari despite the many yam markets in Benue state.

Ironically, the Tiv have no representation in the Wukari Traditional Authority, nor do they have in the local government council. More so, the Tiv are said to have been side-lined in the politics of the yam market considering that, the office of the Chairman of the yam market always goes to a Jukun. It is, therefore, on these bases that some Jukun and third-party sources believe that the Tiv may have reasons to stifle economic activities in the yam market in Wukari. They believe that the lack of Tiv

representation in the politics of the Yam market as well as the local government as a whole, despite their immense contributions to the growth and development of the market are strong motivations (group interview, 2020).

In addition, the sources contend that a disruption of the economic activities in the yam market in Wukari through stimulation of crisis would automatically translate to increased economic activities elsewhere in other Tiv yam markets in Benue state. They maintain that gains from the yam markets can drive the numerous Tiv yam merchants to sabotage the process of peacebuilding since they would be making it big elsewhere.

Discussion of Findings

In all of these issues relating to conflict entrepreneurs raised during the interviews, as well as from data gathered through secondary sources, the researchers were able to conclude that the greed and grievance factors were implicated in the occurrence, reoccurrence, and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic conflicts. What was also clear to the researchers was that each ethnic group made efforts to exonerate itself from the greed and grievance factor, while at the same time implicating the other.

For example, members of the Jukun group interviewed in the yam market believed that the Tiv yam merchants were complicit in the resurgent crisis in 2019 due to pent-up grievances and greed towards the revenue being accrued from the market. They maintained that the Tiv yam merchants have a lot to gain by disrupting economic activities in the Wukari yam market, where they felt they were being excluded from its politics, as this will see an increase in economic activities in the yam market at Zaki-Biam, Benue state, where they (the merchants) have a say. As far as the politics of the yam market in Wukari is concerned and how it might have contributed to the resurgent hostilities between the two groups in 2019/2020, members of the Jukun community denied any involvement. Similarly, in the aspect of looting properties during and after each conflict situation, both groups accused each other of the act, while at the same time denying any involvement in such practices.

Perhaps, the only point of agreement for all interviewees, both from the Tiv and Jukun camps is their admission that there are beneficiaries of the crises who sometimes instigate them to fight against each other. Surprisingly, interviewees from the Jukun camp admitted that they were convinced that there were conflict entrepreneurs not just in

the Tiv community but also in the Jukun camp. In the same vein, Tiv interviewees also admitted that they believed that there were beneficiaries of the conflict in both groups that at times instigated the crisis.

It should be recalled that in the wake of the military invasion of Zaki-Biam and consequent killings and razing of houses following the 2001/2002 Tiv/Jukun ethnic crisis, both the Tiv and Jukun made claims and counterclaims that elites on both sides of the camps sponsored and manipulated the crisis. Vaaseh (2013) captured it thus:

The Tiv accused General TY Danjuma, a retired chief of Army Staff and later minister of Defense of always enlisting the soldiers to fight on the side of the Jukun ethnic group and another Jukun man, Group Captain Ibrahim Kephass, a retired Air Force officer and former military administrator of Cross River State, was also accused. The Jukun similarly accused the former governor of Benue State, George Akume, and other military brass like General Victor Malu, a retired Chief of Army Staff, late General Inienger, rtd, and General Atom Kpera, rtd of sponsoring and abetting the crisis.

Even though these claims and counterclaims were not easily verified, the degree of confidence with which they were made perhaps provides them with a powerful appeal. In all of these, interviewees generally agree that the number of those benefiting from the crisis is steadily on the rise; and the prospects for increased material gains for war profiteers effectively undermined sustainable peace and perpetuated the crisis.

Conclusion

This study examined conflict entrepreneurs and the perpetuation of Tiv-Jukun ethnic crises in the Wukari local government area, Taraba state. More specifically, it explored how the presence of, and prospects for economic benefits contributed to the occurrence, reoccurrence, and prolongation of the conflicts. The study found that the desire for material gains (greed) by individuals or groups at all levels - within or outside the government - and underlying grievances are strong, motivating factors for the instigation and perpetuation of the Tiv/Jukun ethnic crisis in Wukri. The greed and grievance factors were highlighted in the practices of arms procurement and looting of properties

during and after a crisis; and the politics of the Wukari yam market.

Recommendations

From the foregoing conclusion, the study recommends as follows:

1. Strengthening of intelligence gathering at the border areas, which could provide the authorities with useful and credible information that could lead to the identification, apprehension and prosecution of conflict entrepreneurs, instigating and perpetuating the crisis.
2. The government at all levels should make efforts to address the economic motivations for instigating conflicts such as economic inequalities, poverty (which often leads to covetousness) unemployment, low income, low education. This will ensure a minimum level of sustainable living and drastically reduce the tendency to instigate conflicts for material gains.
3. All underlying, historical grievances arising from non-inclusion in governance must be addressed. This

will alleviate bitterness that often arise from exclusion. By strengthening intelligence gathering which could help in the identification and apprehension of conflict entrepreneurs; and addressing the economic instigators of conflicts and historical grievances, the roles and presence of conflict entrepreneurs will be drastically undermined and sustainable peace can be achieved.

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URBANISATION AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF ABDULSALAM ABUBAKAR GENERAL HOSPITAL, GULU/VATSA, NIGER STATE.

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ABSTRACT

Urbanization is rapidly changing the morphology of developing nations, including Nigeria, with Gulu/Vatsa exemplifying as a microcosm of this transformation. This study investigates the establishment and operation of the Abdulsalam Abubakar General Hospital from 2014 in Gulu/Vatsa and how it shapes the socio-cultural, economic and political activities of the area. Utilizing primary data from oral interviews, archival materials and secondary sources, the research analyzes the rural transformation and development of the area. Findings reveal that the hospital has significantly enhanced health consciousness, provided employment, and stimulated local economic activity. Additionally, it has reinforced the government's commitment to healthcare, bolstering political support and fostering community engagement. This study highlights the critical role of healthcare infrastructure in promoting urbanization, improving living standards, and strengthening community ties.

Keywords: *Urbanization, Rural, Infrastructure, Facilities, Hospital resilience*

INTRODUCTION

Urban infrastructure development is crucial for the well-being and sustainable growth of cities and their populations. It involves the improvement and expansion of physical structures, systems, and services that support urban life, such as transportation networks, healthcare facilities, educational institutions, water and sanitation systems, and more. Urbanization is rapidly changing the general

morphology of most developing nations of the world including Nigeria (Orekan, 2015). The physical or spatial manifestation of man's activities over space gives rise to settlements which exhibit certain differential characteristics to the extent that a distinction can be drawn between them. Cities grow from settlement areas which serve specific functions and people's activities in these

centers lead to the constant expansion of cities on the long run (Achi, 2004).

The development of urban infrastructural facilities in Gulu/Vatsa is a major focus of this study. The case study focuses on the development of the Abdulsalam Abubakar General Hospital during the period of Dr Muazu Babangida Aliyu Governor of Niger State in 2014. The expansion and enhancement of healthcare facilities within urban regions are essential to meet the increasing demands of a growing population. Urbanization has enormous consequences on infrastructures in Nigeria and other developing countries due to population increase involved in its process. Areas with infrastructure are more alive than non-serviced areas and also attract more people. There are numerous infrastructural facilities in Gulu/Vatsa which are in poor shape and bad condition which has become a major challenge faced by inhabitants in terms of their socio-economic and physical wellbeing (Julius, 1985).

The study explored and analyzed the development of urban infrastructural facilities in Gulu/Vatsa with a focus on Abdulsalam Abubakar General Hospital from 2014. It assessed existing urban infrastructural facilities including transportation, water supply, sanitation,

electricity, and telecommunications. The work evaluates the state of Abdulsalam Abubakar General Hospital in terms of its physical infrastructure, medical equipment, and capacity to provide healthcare services. It further analyzed the impact of urban development on quality and accessibility of healthcare services in Gulu/Vatsa. Finally, it identified challenges faced in developing urban infrastructural facilities in Gulu/Vatsa.

STUDY METHODS AND AREA

Methodology

This study involved a combination of primary and secondary data collection to examine the development of urban infrastructural facilities in Gulu/Vatsa, particularly focusing on the Abdulsalam Abubakar General Hospital from 2014. Primary data were collected through interviews with local residents, healthcare providers, and officials to gather firsthand insights into the hospital's development and the overall urban infrastructure, and complemented by archival sources. Secondary data were obtained from newspapers, and official records to complement and validate the primary data. The collected data were thematically analyzed to identify patterns and draw conclusions about the state of infrastructure,

the challenges faced, and the impact of urbanization on the healthcare services in Gulu/Vatsa. This approach allowed for an in-depth understanding of the interplay between urban development and healthcare accessibility in the area.

Historiography was employed to examine the different perspectives and approaches of the study over time. It provides understanding of the interpretations of history and assess the primary and secondary sources used to reconstruct events and understand their reliability and biases. It focuses on historical narratives, tracing how historical narratives and interpretations have changed over time, influenced by new evidence, changing societal values.

Land and People of Gulu/Vatsa

The region of Gulu/Vatsa is not only home to a vibrant development of diverse cultures and traditions but also a rich history that stretches back centuries.¹ Geographically significant area, the land and people of Gulu/Vatsa have shaped the socio-economic fabric of their communities through their origin, geographical location, and engagement in various economic activities.

The indigenous people of Gulu/Vatsa are the Nupe, with other ethnic groups such as Ganagana (Abawa/Gupa), Gbagyi, Egbira, Yoruba, among others. The first inhabitants of Gulu/Vatsa were the Gulu/Vatsa Narakpe who migrated from Nupe ko village to settle in the area as hunters and farmers. The second group to arrive was the Gulu/Vatsa Emiko who migrated from Gawu Babangida and settled in present-day Emiko. The third group were the Gulu/Vatsa Lukafu who migrated from Starami, a neighboring community of Gulu/Vatsa. The last group were the Gulu/Vatsa Anguwa who migrated from Hausa land shortly before Usman Dan Fodio Jihad of 1804 and settled in present-day Anguwa as traders. Gulu/Vatsa is dominated by different ethnic groups who speak different languages such as Hausa, Nupe, Ganagana, Gbagyi, Igbo, Mada, Tiv, Yoruba, Bassa etc (Jimada, 2005).

Geographical Location

Gulu/Vatsa is located in the southern part of Lapai headquarters of Lapai Local Government area of Niger State, positioned along latitude 90. It is situated in the southern Guinea Zone of the Savannah region and is surrounded by neighboring villages. The population of Gulu/Vatsa is about 168,000

¹ Interview with Etsu Muhammadu Sani, aged 48, Gulu,30/2/2023

and covers about 100 square miles. The village is blessed with good perennial streams. The northern part of Gulu/Vatsa is bordered by Fapo, Nassarawa, and Duma Village, while the south includes Ewugi, Gbedako, and Evuti. In the east are Lafiyan Kpakada, Zango, and Kpada Villages, whereas in the west it shares borders with Gulu/Vatsa Vasta, Vulegbo, and Atsu Village.²

Socio-Economic Activities of the People

The people engage in a variety of socio-economic activities that sustain their livelihoods. Agriculture is the backbone of the local economy, with farming practices ranging from subsistence to commercial agriculture. The region's fertile soils support the cultivation of crops such as maize, millet, sorghum, and vegetables. Apart from agriculture, the people have traditionally engaged in other economic activities such as livestock rearing, fishing, and trading. The region's abundant water resources provide ample opportunities for fishing, which has been a significant economic activity for generations. The vibrant local markets serve as hubs for trade.³

² Interview with Isah Adamu Yunusa, aged 42, Gulu, 30/2/2023

³ Interview with Mallam Kandi, aged 47, civil servant, Kandi, 30/2/2023.

Gulu/Vatsa is also home to skilled artisans and craftsmen who specialize in traditional crafts such as pottery, weaving, and woodwork. These skilled individuals not only preserve their cultural heritage but also contribute to the local economy through the production and sale of their handcrafted products. In recent years, the community has undergone a gradual transformation with the integration of modern industries and infrastructure. This has led to the emergence of sectors such as manufacturing, services, and tourism, offering new avenues for economic development and employment.⁴

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF GULU/VATSA GENERAL HOSPITAL

The General Hospital stands as a symbol of progress and development in the region, catering to the healthcare needs of the local population. Established with the aim of providing quality medical services, the hospital has played a vital role in improving the health and well-being of the community. Hence, focus is delved into the establishment of the General Hospital, exploring the factors responsible for its creation and the impact it has on the region

⁴Interview with Muhammed Saba Yakubu, aged 70, retired civil servant, Minna, 15/2/2023

The Hospital is a significant achievement in the healthcare infrastructure of the region, representing a commitment to the well-being of the local population. The hospital was established through the efforts of various stakeholders, including government authorities who recognized the increasing healthcare demands within the region. Healthcare professionals were instrumental in shaping the hospital's mission, advocating for accessible and high-quality medical services. The community members themselves played an integral role in making the hospital a reality, with their collective voice and support reflecting their long-standing aspirations for affordable and readily available healthcare. The hospital stands as a testament to the power of collaboration and symbolizes a brighter and healthier future for the community.⁵ (See Appendix 4).

The General Hospital was established to improve access to medical services in the region. Prior to its existence, residents faced challenges in accessing healthcare due to inadequate infrastructure and geographical barriers. The hospital's location allowed for prompt and convenient access to healthcare services, regardless of location. It offered a

wide range of medical specialties, simplifying the patient's healthcare journey by providing a one-stop destination for consultations, diagnostics, treatment, and emergency interventions. This comprehensive approach guaranteed timely access to critical medical care, enhancing the overall health outcomes of the community. The hospital's establishment was a success in improving access to healthcare by addressing geographical barriers and offering a comprehensive array of medical services.⁶ (See Appendix 2).

Improved Access to Healthcare

The establishment of a hospital has significantly improved healthcare accessibility in the community. Prior to the hospital's existence, residents faced challenges accessing essential medical services due to geographical barriers, particularly in rural and underserved areas. This resulted in delayed medical attention and financial burdens for individuals and their families. The hospital addressed these issues by offering a wide range of specialized medical services, including internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, surgery, and emergency care.

⁵ Interview with Muhammed Ibrahim, aged 47, Estu, Kandi, 30/2/2023.

⁶ Interview with Umar Abubakar, aged 52, farmer, Kandi, 26/2/2023.

This comprehensive approach made the hospital a one-stop destination for medical consultations, diagnostics, treatment, and emergency care. The hospital's establishment removed geographical barriers that had previously impeded healthcare accessibility and promoted the principle that quality healthcare is a basic human right accessible to all.

The hospital's role in enhancing healthcare accessibility extended beyond its location. It systematically addressed the range of medical services available to the community by offering not only basic care but also specialized medical specialties. The inclusion of internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, surgery, and a well-equipped emergency department ensured that a broad spectrum of healthcare needs could be met at a single institution. The establishment of the Hospital was a watershed moment in the region's healthcare landscape as it significantly enhanced healthcare accessibility by addressing long-standing geographical challenges and offering comprehensive medical services. It underscored the principle that healthcare should be within reach of all contributing to

improved health outcomes and an overall higher quality of life for the community.⁷

Enhanced Medical Services

The General Hospital was established to provide advanced and comprehensive medical services to the community. Prior to its existence, individuals requiring specialized care had to travel considerable distances, resulting in inconvenience and delays in accessing essential medical interventions. The hospital sought to address these challenges comprehensively by providing holistic healthcare services under one roof, encompassing a wide range of medical specialties. By centralizing this spectrum of services within the hospital, it offered the community a one-stop destination for their healthcare needs. This comprehensive service approach simplified the patient's healthcare journey and ensured timely access to critical medical care.⁸

The hospital's mission was to provide specialized medical services, advanced diagnostic facilities, and a well-equipped emergency department. Its medical specialties included internal medicine, pediatrics, obstetrics and gynecology, surgical services, and emergency care department. The availability of specialized

⁷Interview with Aliyu Yelwa, aged 57 Gulu, 22/2/2023

⁸Interview with Muhammed Saba Yakubu, aged 70, retired civil servant, Minna, 17/2/2023.

medical professionals and advanced diagnostic facilities meant that residents received care that was both efficient and effective. The centralization of services at the Hospital ultimately contributed to the enhancement of the community's overall health outcomes. It eliminated the barriers that had previously hindered timely access to specialized care and emergency interventions, leading to improved health management and ultimately better healthcare outcomes for the community. The establishment of the hospital was a remarkable achievement driven by the community's need for specialized, comprehensive, and efficient healthcare services (Jimada, 2005).

Human Resources Development

The Hospital prioritized the development and recruitment of a skilled and diverse healthcare workforce. This initiative aimed to assemble a team of healthcare professionals and support staff who could deliver a wide range of medical services efficiently and effectively. The recruitment process ensured that the hospital was adequately staffed with qualified and compassionate individuals who could provide the highest standard of care to the community. The hiring initiative

generated employment opportunities within the community, contributing to increased income and job security for many residents, consequently stimulating local economic growth and stability. The focus on local recruitment was instrumental in the development of a skilled healthcare workforce specific to the Gulu/Vatsa region. By hiring individuals from the community or neighboring areas, the hospital fostered the growth of a locally rooted healthcare team.⁹

The development of this local healthcare workforce was an essential investment in the sustainability of healthcare services within the community. It ensured that the Hospital could effectively meet the evolving healthcare needs of the region, both in present and future times. The establishment of this hospital went beyond providing healthcare services; it was a catalyst for local economic development, job creation, and the development of a skilled and locally rooted healthcare workforce. This multifaceted impact not only enhanced access to healthcare but also strengthened long-term healthcare sustainability.

HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS OF THE HOSPITAL TO THE COMMUNITY

Ambulance Services

⁹ Interview with Ibrahim Muhammed Vulegbo, aged 70, Hakimi, Gulu, 30/2/2023.

The hospital provides ambulance services as a crucial component of its offerings to ensure the well-being of the community, particularly in emergency healthcare situations. The ambulance services are designed to address the urgency of timely and efficient transportation during medical emergencies, equipped with necessary medical facilities and staffed by trained professionals. The improved emergency response facilitated by ambulance services has a profound impact on the overall health outcomes of individuals in the community, enhancing the chances of positive outcomes for patients and building trust and confidence within the community.

Beyond transportation, ambulance services contribute to a proactive approach to healthcare within the community by fostering a sense of security among residents and encouraging individuals to seek medical assistance promptly. In essence, the provision of ambulance services by the hospital is a manifestation of its dedication to the well-being of the community, reinforcing its role as a central healthcare institution committed to providing comprehensive and timely healthcare solutions to residents it serves.¹⁰

(See Appendix 1)

Special Clinical Services

The hospital offers special clinical services that go beyond standard medical care to address specific medical conditions and the unique needs of different demographic groups in the community. Specialized clinics for chronic diseases, such as diabetes and hypertension, provide continuous and personalized care, education, and support to improve health outcomes and quality of life. The hospital also establishes clinics that cater to the healthcare needs of distinct age groups, including pediatric clinics for children and geriatric clinics for the elderly. By tailoring clinical services to specific needs, the hospital ensures a targeted and effective approach to healthcare delivery that acknowledges the complexity of healthcare and addresses the importance of individualized care plans. These special clinical services foster a sense of community well-being by acknowledging and catering to unique health needs, enhancing health outcomes, contributing to a more inclusive and responsive healthcare system, and exemplifying a holistic approach to healthcare.¹¹ (See Appendix 3).

Surgical Services

The hospital's surgical services are a vital part of its healthcare solutions, providing a

¹⁰ Interview with Hamisu Musa aged 70, farmer, Gulu, 20/2/2023

¹¹ Interview with Abubakar Sadiq, aged 54, civil servant, Kandi, 21/2/2023.

comprehensive range of medical interventions to meet the diverse needs of the community. The hospital has invested in modern surgical facilities and assembled a skilled surgical team, enabling it to perform a wide array of procedures with precision, efficiency, and a focus on patient safety. The surgical team comprises highly trained and experienced professionals covering various specialties, allowing the hospital to address an extensive range of medical conditions.¹²

The hospital's state-of-the-art surgical facilities are equipped with advanced medical technologies that enable the surgical team to perform routine surgeries as well as more complex and specialized interventions. The availability of comprehensive surgical care contributes significantly to the overall health outcomes of the community by enhancing accessibility to critical healthcare services. Routine surgeries can prevent the escalation of certain medical conditions, promoting long-term health and well-being within the community.¹³

The provision of surgical services represents a pivotal aspect of its commitment to comprehensive healthcare. The combination of modern facilities, a skilled surgical team,

and a diverse range of services ensures that the community has access to essential medical interventions. This holistic approach emphasizes the importance of surgical care in addressing the health needs of the community and underscores the hospital's role as a central healthcare institution in the region.¹⁴

Onsite Pharmacy

The hospital's onsite pharmacy reflects a commitment to holistic healthcare by providing convenient access to medications and enhancing medication management. Patients can easily access prescribed medications immediately after medical consultations or upon discharge, eliminating the need for separate trips to external pharmacies. Trained pharmacists work closely with healthcare providers to ensure accurate and appropriate medications tailored to patients' specific needs, promoting adherence to treatment plans and improving health outcomes. The integration of an onsite pharmacy aligns with the hospital's broader commitment to providing comprehensive and patient-centered care, contributing to a more holistic and efficient healthcare experience for patients.¹⁵

Obstetrics and Gynecological Services

¹² Interview with Hamisu Musa aged 70, pharmacist, Gulu, 20/2/2023.

¹³ Interview with Aliyu Yelwa, aged 57, farmer, Gulu, 09/2/2023.

¹⁴ Interview with Samaila Yusuf aged 56, surgeon, Gulu, 20/2/2023.

¹⁵ Interview with Isah Adamu Yunusa, aged 45, civil servant, Gulu, 22/2/2023.

The hospital provides specialized obstetrics and gynecology services to support maternal and women's health. These services include antenatal care, childbirth support, routine gynecological check-ups, screenings, and preventive care. The hospital also offers educational programs and resources related to maternal and women's health to promote community health awareness. The hospital's commitment to providing specialized care reflects its dedication to addressing a critical aspect of community health.¹⁶

THE IMPACT OF GULU/VATSA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL

The establishment and operation of the hospital have undoubtedly left a lasting impact on the community. The work explored and analyzed the multifaceted impact of the hospital on various aspects of the community, including socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions.¹⁷

Socio-Cultural Impacts

The hospital has had a significant impact on the local community beyond just providing medical services. One of the most notable impacts is the positive shift in health consciousness among community members, with residents becoming more proactive in managing their well-being. The hospital has

also become a focal point for health education programs, including regular workshops and awareness campaigns covering a range of topics. By fostering a sense of community health responsibility, the hospital encourages individuals to take an active role in their health, contributing to the overall well-being of the community.

The hospital's engagement with local traditions and cultural practices has played a crucial role in building trust within the community. By incorporating culturally sensitive healthcare approaches, the hospital demonstrates a deep understanding of the community's values and beliefs. This approach not only facilitates better communication between healthcare providers and patients but also strengthens the bond of trust between the community and the hospital. In many cases, traditional healing practices have been integrated where appropriate, bridging conventional medicine and cultural beliefs (Bourne, 1986).

The socio-cultural impact of the hospital is profound, touching the lives of community members in ways that go beyond medical treatment. However, it also has economic impacts on the local area that cannot be ignored. The presence of a hospital can attract

¹⁶ Interview with Shehu Tukur aged 60, Gynaecologist, Gulu, 20/6/2023.

¹⁷ Interview with Isah Adamu Yunusa, aged 42, Teacher, Gulu, 30/2/2023.

businesses and investment to an area, creating jobs and boosting economic growth. Additionally, hospitals often purchase goods and services from local suppliers, further stimulating economic activity. However, while hospitals primarily exist to provide medical care to patients, they can have far-reaching impacts on their surrounding communities. The hospital discussed here has had both socio-cultural and economic impacts on its local area through its focus on health education programs, culturally sensitive approaches to healthcare, and contributions to local economic growth.¹⁸

Economic Impacts

The General Hospital has a significant economic impact on the community beyond healthcare services. The hospital is a major source of employment, providing stable jobs for healthcare professionals, administrative staff, and support personnel. This generates income for families and contributes to improved living standards. The hospital also acts as a catalyst for broader economic development in the area by creating demand for goods and services from local businesses such as pharmacies, clinics, and eateries. This symbiotic relationship between the hospital and local businesses contributes to the

creation of a vibrant economic ecosystem within the community.¹⁹

The hospital's reputation for providing quality healthcare services can have a positive impact on the community's overall economic standing. A well-equipped and professionally staffed hospital is an asset that can enhance the community's appeal to potential residents and businesses. This may attract further investments and contribute to the development of the local economy. Therefore, the Hospital plays a crucial role in fostering both health and prosperity within the community. Its positive influence on the local economy underscores its significance as a key institution in promoting economic growth and improving living standards (Achi, 2004).

Political Impacts

The hospital has a significant political impact within the region as it reflects the government's commitment to fulfilling the healthcare needs of its citizens. The provision of quality healthcare is a fundamental element of social welfare, and the hospital plays a central role in delivering on this aspect of governance. The hospital may also serve as a focal point for community engagement with political leaders, creating a

¹⁸ Interview with Muhammed Ibrahim, aged 47, Estu, Kandi, 30/2/2023.

¹⁹ Interview with Shehu Tukur aged 60, Gynaecologist, Gulu, 20/6/2023.

platform for meaningful dialogue on broader community development discussions (Mikail, 2016).

The hospital's presence may result in increased attention and prioritization of health-related policies and initiatives in local governance discussions. As a significant stakeholder in the community's health, the hospital may advocate for policies that address public health challenges, allocate resources for healthcare infrastructure, and promote preventive healthcare measures. This could lead to a more comprehensive and targeted approach to healthcare governance in the region.

The hospital's role in addressing health disparities within the community can have implications for political support and community satisfaction. A well-functioning hospital that caters to the diverse healthcare needs of the population demonstrates a commitment to inclusivity and equity. This commitment may enhance the political standing of local authorities, garnering support from a community that perceives tangible efforts to improve their well-being.²⁰ Thus, the establishment of the Gulu/Vatsa Community Hospital has significantly enhanced healthcare delivery through a range

of comprehensive services tailored to the community's needs. It has impacted the community in socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions. Socio-culturally, the hospital has elevated health consciousness among residents and fostered community health responsibility through education programs and culturally sensitive healthcare practices, bridging conventional medicine with local traditions. Economically, the hospital has become a major employment hub, boosting local businesses and contributing to the overall economic vibrancy of the area. Politically, the hospital stands as a testament to the government's commitment to healthcare, facilitating community engagement with political leaders and influencing health policy prioritization. By addressing health disparities and promoting inclusivity, the hospital has enhanced community satisfaction and political support for local authorities, underscoring its vital role in rural development.

CONCLUSION

The study demonstrates that the Gulu/Vatsa Community Hospital plays a pivotal role in enhancing healthcare and overall well-being in the community. By offering critical services such as ambulance support,

²⁰ Interview with Musa Muhammed, aged 52, farmer, Gulu, 24/3/2023.

specialized clinical care, advanced surgical procedures, an onsite pharmacy, and dedicated obstetrics and gynecology services, the hospital addresses the diverse health needs of the population effectively. These services not only improve health outcomes but also contribute to economic development and socio-cultural cohesion by fostering health awareness and integrating culturally sensitive practices. The hospital's impact extends to political dimensions by exemplifying governmental commitment to healthcare, thus enhancing community trust and political engagement. Overall, the Gulu/Vatsa Community Hospital stands as a central institution in promoting comprehensive healthcare and regional development. The study highlights the importance of infrastructural development in enhancing the overall well-being and trust of the population.

Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that the Gulu/Vatsa Community Hospital continues to expand its specialized healthcare services, particularly focusing on enhancing emergency response capabilities through ongoing training and investment in ambulance services. Additionally, efforts should be made to strengthen partnerships with local businesses and community stakeholders to sustain

economic benefits derived from hospital operations. Furthermore, continuous engagement with the community to ensure culturally sensitive healthcare practices and ongoing health education programs will further foster trust and improve health outcomes across diverse demographic groups.

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APPENDIXES




Appendix 1: The Frontage of Abdulsalami Abubakar General Hospital, Gulu.



Appendix 2: Picture of Abdulsalami Abubakar being registered as the first patient of the Hospital.



Appendix 3: The main structures of the Hospital.



Appendix 4: The entrance into the Hospital.

AN ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING DURING GENERAL SANI ABACHA REGIME IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Foreign policy decision-making process is a product of internal and external environment; and some of these are not static enough to predict the behavioural pattern of states within the global system. The unstable nature of both internal and external policy environment make it difficult for the would-be statesman to have a clear roadmap in foreign policy making and implementation. This occurs often during the turbulent times when state needs to dissect policy carefully towards external environment. This is the case of General Sani Abacha regime in Nigeria. The domestic environment within which Abacha formulated Nigeria's foreign policy was riddled in crisis and turbulence. How the regime maneuvered the turmoil internal and external environment in the formulation and execution of Nigeria's foreign policy is the focus of the current research agenda. Thus, the article explores the impact of the turbulent political atmosphere of Abacha regime and how such was managed in the process of formulating Nigeria's foreign policy. Thus, the research found that the personality of Abacha greatly affected the outcome of Nigeria's foreign policy. Again, the research recommends that the formulation and execution of foreign policy should be to promote the national interests of Nigeria as opposed to the personal aggrandizement of Abacha. In this research, personality factor and political climate provide the framework. The methods of data collection is qualitative in nature Thus, the Qualitative Content Analysis is employed in data collection and gathering.

Keyword: *Abacha regime; foreign policy; domestic environment, Nigeria*

INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy direction of a country is a reflection of the preference and perception of its leadership. This preference depends largely on domestic and external factors.

Whether a perception of foreign policy emanates from the individual decision makers or at the level of nation – state, it is strongly linked to the political leadership. That is why the foreign policy of states may

in large measure be explained by differences in their leadership perceptions. Hence, there is a relationship that exists between personality and foreign policy. Every leader attempts to further his “interest” in a foreign policy of the country, but the way and manner he or she goes about doing this depends largely on preferences. This seems to be true of all statesmen who are charged with the responsibility of formulating foreign policy. The leadership of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in Europe during the late 1930s plunged the global system into World War II. It needs to be said that the decisive political posture of Nelson Mandela between 1994 and 1999 improved the posture of South Africa as human rights promoter within the global system. In Nigeria, Abacha as Nigeria’s Head of State, came to political prominence between 1993 and 1998 and such period represented a drastic disconnection in the manner with which Nigerian foreign policy has been formulated since 1960

(Oladimeji, 2022). Abacha’s intransigence greatly reflected in the way and manner he responded to internal and external issues during his period in office. He was an astute and confident military leader but failed to apply some leniency and clemency in handling some delicate political and social issues at domestic level. Such mishandling of domestic issues resulted in international castigation which later rendered his regime unpopular at international level. According to Nwoke (1996), Abacha’s ascension to power was misunderstood by the West who embarked on a hostile mission against the government. The so-called nationalistic determination of the government to remove Nigeria from the shackles of western stooge also worsened relations with western powers who had become used to Nigeria serving their selfish interest. The reluctance of the West to accept the reality of the day made Abacha to shift his attention to Asia. This move brought Nigeria into closer relations with China,

North Korea, Turkey, Libya Iraq, etc. Abacha perceived western hostility as an affront and he shifted Nigeria's foreign policy in response to the demand of the time. Nigeria had been suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations where diplomatic ripples had been on since November 1995, when Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 others Ogoni kinsmen were hanged after international plea for clemency was turned down by Abacha. This was one occasion where he portrayed an unyielding attitude. Abacha is a rigid personality who refused to listen to the yearnings and complains of the masses and only occasionally did he listen to people if such complain went along with his plan and interests. Nigeria suffered isolation from the international community in particular from the western world, seeing that military rule as incompatible with the contemporary trend of democratization. Starting from the Babangida military regime (1985-1992) the president had to step down due to pressure

from the West. Generally, the nature and quality of leadership of a state as well as political structure have significant bearing on the formulation of state's foreign policy. This research therefore queries the personality of Abacha and the resultant political structure in the foreign policy making process in Nigeria. How did the regime navigate the difficult terrain of international system? And what are the policy implemented to survive the difficult domestic and international political climate of the time? These are the questions that serve as the bedrock of the research. Thus, the paper assesses the personality of Abacha as well as the role of reactionary posture in the foreign policy of Nigeria under the Abacha regime. In this case, the research draws a useful link between state's foreign policy and the leadership posture. Therefore, the research will contribute to intellectual debates on the role of personality and domestic politics in foreign policy analysis. The research is divided into sections; with

each section delving into separate topic. Again, the research employs the theoretical framework of personality in discerning the role of Abacha in the formulating of Nigerian foreign policy.

Methods of Data Collection

The adopted methodology in carrying out data collection for this study are two methods (primary and secondary sources). The primary source, which employs qualitative techniques such as textual mining of speeches and interviews while the other means is content analysis of secondary sources data. The secondary sources of data collection included magazines, Newspapers, government publications and other scholarly materials on the study.

CONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy as a concept may defy precise definitions just like other social science concepts. This does not suggest that there is no appropriate and standard way of

conceptualising it. Although it needs to be stressed that the definition, or better still conceptualisation, of foreign policy may reflect philosophical orientation of scholar, nevertheless the definition should be intelligible enough to convey a sense. From the general point of view, foreign policy can be explained as a response of nation-state to the external milieu with which it has little or no control (Ra'ees, 2010). This definition is a signpost to the fact that international system is not predictable unlike domestic arena and, therefore, any policy being formulated by a state may prove to be irrational by the response from external environment. This implies that formulating rational foreign policy by national policy makers does not guarantee that the policy will be successful at international level. This is because it is very difficult to predict the response of external actors with which the policy is directed (Kegley and Blanton. 2012:215). In addition, the state actors are human beings and not

robots and in this case, it is very difficult to predict anything that has to do with human reaction. So, human beings is rational in thinking and conduct which is why they are prone to bad and good conduct according to Hobbes. In this way, foreign policy depends entirely on the rationality of human being and some other factors within the geographical confine of a state (Jackson and Sorenson, 2013:259). Many scholars including Carlsnaes (2008), Holsti (1995), Bull (1972) and Jackson and Sorenson (2013) have defined foreign policy based on their scholarly orientations. Notwithstanding the diverse opinions, there needs to be unanimity about what the definition should be. The only problem here, therefore, is how to identify basic constituents of foreign policy. How can one define a boundary from what is internal and external given the present stage of globalisation process? Is it possible to separate Malaysian water from Indonesia's? Can a state define its space boundary without

allying with other state actors? These are questions that have been generating controversy about foreign policy, which is rooted in the principle of sovereignty. Despite these seeming unanswered questions, it is necessary to define what foreign policy means within the purview of international relations.

Throughout the modern era, the issues, means and ends of foreign policy making for nation-states, have proliferated and significantly changed (Carlsnaes, 2013:300). Foreign policy as a field of academic study is a child of the 1960s and James Rosenau can be regarded as its pioneer (Rosenau, 1997:143). Rosenau defines foreign policy as an adaptive behaviour which is interpreted to involve ultimate goals or what is better known as national interest. Foreign policy as a sub-unit of international relations, which tries to explain the total of decisions made on behalf of a given political unit that entails the implementation of goals

with reference to its external environment (Holsti, 1995:20). In addition, Ra'ees asserts that "foreign policy inputs are those many factors that influence foreign policy decision-making, whilst the observable outputs of foreign policy are a feature of states behaviour within the international system" (Ra'ees, 2010:2). Going by Holsti's definition, foreign policy is the ideas designed by policy personnel to solve a problem or provide some changes in the external environment, that is, in the policies, activities, or actions of another state (Holsti, 1995:14). This definition implies that foreign policy formulation and implementation is implemented to achieve specific goals and objectives, which state cannot ordinarily attain within its solitary confinement. For Ra'ees (2010), foreign policy is the sum total of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations. This definition seems to be narrowly defined given its sole

reference to governmental circle in the execution and implementation of foreign policy of a state. If foreign policy of a state can be defined in terms of official relations then it suggests that only governmental circle constitute the basic element of foreign policy of a state. This explanation, if at all acceptable, seems to suggest that other domestic actors are sidelined in this narrow definition. Rosenau (1997:146) therefore opines that the study of foreign policy defies any concrete theoretical lens, which is why it is expedient to consider all external and internal variables in dissecting the foreign policy of a state or a particular administration. Despite the divergences in the approach of scholars to the foreign policy definition, the point of convergence it is being made in response to external environment political terrain.

LEADERSHIP AND FOREIGN POLICY

The choices made by individual leaders are important in shaping international events

(Rouke and Boyer, 2004:64). This emphasizes the idiosyncratic characteristics also known as operational code or cognitive schema of political leaders who make foreign policy of a state. This analysis assumes that individuals make foreign policy decisions and that different individuals are likely to make different decisions. This level of foreign policy analysis, therefore, considers personality, health, ambition, personal experiences, educational background, worldview and perceptions of leaders. When studying personality and the impact on policy Rouke and Boyer (2004) examine leader's basic orientations toward self and toward others, behavioural patterns, and attitude about such politically relevant concepts as authority. Both scholars opine that active leaders are policy innovators; passive leaders are reactors. The more active a leader, the more criticism he or she encounters. In buttressing their claim, they concurred that Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin, and Richard Nixon

were all active-negative personalities who showed symptoms of delusion, struck out their enemies, and generally developed bunker mentalities. The Adolf Hitler's mentality about the superiority of German race (Aryan Race in particular) in this case may well provide reason for nationalistic foreign policy that spurred the growth of hatred towards other nationalities in Europe. The result of Adolf Hitler's policy was the horrendous occurrence of Second World War. Such is the impact of leader on foreign policy making. According to Jackson and Sorenson (2013:267, the decision made by President George Walker Bush by ousting Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq dictated to the extent to which some states, most especially the Arab states, bend on castigating the subsequent US decisions in global affairs. Bush, as a leader was apprehensive of the capability of Saddam in making the US unpopular in the Middle East. Bush, unconvincing of the support of the US

Congress went ahead to engage in threat inflation and campaign of calumny against Saddam in order to win the support of the congress to invade Iraq. Most political observers like Barry Buzan (2013) and John Mearsheimer (2013) are of the view that such could not have happened under the leadership of Bill Clinton. In this case, the leadership of the US in 2003 dictated the decision that was to be made in foreign policy in relation to Iraqi issue. Mearsheimer and Buzan might be right on this thesis but some state leaders naturally are paranoid and when this happens it is an unavoidable psychological error. It needs to be stressed here that it is not only state leader that suffer from paranoia; ordinary individuals who do not have stake in governance also have such fear of being attacked. Besides, at the time President Bush took the step in attacking the Saddam regime, there had already widespread discontentment among various groups i.e. Kurds, Christians, Shiites of imminent use of chemical and

biological weapons by Saddam. This is because of previous history of wanting execution and killings by Saddam. Such heinous act might have played role in the decision taken by President Bush administration to dislodge the regime knowing full well the internal contradictions in Iraqi society would support his invasion. Another scholar, James Laura (2005), while explaining the nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956, Maintains that the influence and dauntless character of President Gamel Nasser is the most important factor that dictated the outcome of the event. The decision to nationalize the Suez Canal was promptly declared by the Egyptian president at the height of political tension among Israel, France, Britain and Egypt. Nasser was said to take advantage of the existing Cold War to nationalize the canal that has been previously dominated by France and Britain. The Nasser regime was well assured of USSR's support. As soon as France and Britain began their

military assault in Egypt the USSR and the US immediately intervened to avert another world war. Such was the leadership proficiency of President Nasser and the action was deemed timely. If the president refused to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, it might be presently under the control of both France and Britain. There are other internal and external variables that can influence the decision of a leader in foreign policy direction and the manipulation of such internal and external variable depends largely on the capability of a state leader. This is the case of Abacha regime.

John Mearsheimer (2013) and James Laura (2005). In foreign policy, decision making process is a complex one. The policy making environment makes it difficult for statesmen who are in charge of formulation and implementation of foreign policy to do so in a concise manner (Stein, 2008:103). The decision making process greatly depends on the external and internal environment and the

control is not within the reach of any decision maker. It is possible to mitigate the effect of domestic environment; this at times depends on the nature of political climate. In democracies, the chance of a President/Prime Minister to have an overbearing influence of foreign policy decision making process is very low (Renshon, & Renshon, 2008: 512). And in this case, all domestic actors i.e. Congress, bureaucrats, and relevant ministries have significant input in the decision making process. The decision making process could be different in authoritarian regimes where the Head of Government has complete control over the foreign decision making process as it happened under the Abacha regime.

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ABACHA REGIME

On 17th November, 1993 Abacha took over power from an Interim National Government led by Chief Ernest Shonekan, he took a number of measures: he dissolved the

democratic structures and institutions by sacking all State and Federal Legislatures including the governors as well as adoption of full martial laws. The Abacha administration itself was not only a child of circumstance, but was also the main beneficiary of Nigeria's protracted political logjam following the annulment of the popularly acclaimed free and fair presidential elections that had produced Moshood Abiola as the winner. The gross human rights abuse under Abacha regime fuelled the collective western condemnation of the regime. The highpoint of the regime's blunders was the negligence of global plea for clemency in the death sentence passed on the Ogoni leaders including outspoken author and playwright "Ken Saro-Wiwa, Nordu Eawo, Saturday Dobe, Paul Levera, Daniel Gbooko, Barinem Kiobel, Felix Nuate, Baribor Bera, and John Kpuine who were executed by hanging in 1995" (Phillips, 2013).

In response to the execution of the Ogoni activists, Western leaders deliberately isolated Nigeria as punishment. For instance, the Canadian government took a drastic decision by closing its High Commission in Nigeria. In the same manner, South Africa cut diplomatic relations with Abacha's regime, while the American government imposed full military and economic sanctions purposely to frustrate as well as to compel the Federal military government to change its rigid unpopular style of administration. Under the leadership of Abacha government, security forces are accused of committing extrajudicial killings, used excessive force to stop anti-government protests. All these actions resulted in massive death and serious injury of many individuals, including innocent civilians. Security personnel's beat and tortured detainees, there were reports of female sexual abuse of suspects and prisoners by security personnel

and many prisoners died in police custody (Meredith, 2005).

It should be reiterated that the security services routinely harassed human rights and prodemocracy groups, including labour leaders, journalists, and student activists. The Government denied citizens the right to change their government; it continued to suspend the Constitution and did not hold and implement the results of free and fair elections. Domestic violence against women remained widespread and permitted by law. Ethnic and regional discrimination remained widespread and interethnic and regional tensions often became violent; a number of persons were killed in various local ethnic conflicts (Meredith, 2005).” The Government continued to suppress harshly demands for greater local autonomy by members of ethnic minorities in the oil-producing Niger-delta region, including the Ogoni minority (Meredith, 2005). The Government severely restricted the right of

workers to associate in independent labour unions and to strike. Child labour remained a problem. Some children, including children trafficked from nearby countries, were subjected to forced labour. Of these abuses, those that were largely societal rather than governmental in origin generally persisted throughout the year without significant improvement (Meredith, 2005).

The Abacha regime, however, was not totally blind to what happened within the country. For instance, he supported the Economic Community of West African States and sent Nigerian troops to Liberia and Sierra Leone to assist in restoration of peace and democracy to those countries in the region. Despite being condemned by the US State Department, Abacha still developed personal relationship with some American politicians. Senator James Inhofe travelled to Nigeria in 1997 to meet with Abacha as a form of strengthening their friendship. He also developed strong ties with other

American political figures such as Rev. Jesse Jackson, Senator Carol Mosley Braun, and Minister Louis Farrakhan and other several African American political leaders visited Nigeria during his regime (Albert, 2010).

In this regard, attention is drawn to the strategies adopted by General Sani Abacha to legitimize his reign both at home and abroad. These strategies were more of a display of personal aggrandizement of the leader than what could be considered as foreign policy objectives as conceived since Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa period. According to Dadzie (1999), Abacha's ascension to power was misunderstood by the west who embarked on a hostile mission against the government. The nationalistic determination of the government to remove Nigeria from the shackles of western imperialism also worsened relations with western powers who had become used to Nigeria serving their selfish interest. Their reluctance to accept the reality of the day

made Abacha to shift his attention to Asia. This move brought Nigeria into closer relations with China, North Korea, Turkey, Libya and Iraq. Abacha perceived western hostility as an affront and he shifted Nigeria's foreign policy in response to the demand of the time. Nigeria had been suspended from the Commonwealth of Nations where diplomatic ripples had been on since November 1995, when Ken Saro Wiwa and 8 others Ogoni kinsmen were hanged after international plea for clemency was turned down by Abacha. This was one occasion where he portrayed an adamant attitude.

The Arrest of Abiola

Perhaps the first major domestic action by which the regime drew serious international criticism was the arrest and detention of Abiola. Abiola was the undeclared winner of the presidential election of June 12, 1993, an election annulled by the then military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida and whose consequences brought Abacha himself

to power. He won the election as the presidential candidate of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which was organised to ease the military out of governance and restore democracy after ten years of military dictatorship. Even though the election proceeded peacefully, the results from several states had already been released when the announcement was suspended midway without explanation, and the entire election later voided by the Babangida regime who gave unconvincing reasons for doing so. The unilateral abortion of an election adjudged the most peaceful, orderly, and fairest in the nation's political history angered the generality of Nigerians who were already tired of the military's authoritarian excesses (Jackson, 2007:590). Protests broke out all over the country against the Interim National Government headed by Shonekan that Babangida established to replace him. Notable Nigerians, pro-democracy and human rights advocates openly canvassed for

General Abacha to help remove the illegal Interim National Government because it was not the democratic government that millions of Nigerians had voted for on June 12, 1993 (Kasali, 2007:129). The outcomes of the violence, riots and strike eventually led to the ouster of that illegitimate government headed by Shonekan by Abacha. Abacha came to power on 17th November 1993 on a promise that his stay in power would be brief. Rumours were rife that Abiola was probably privy to Abacha's take-over, especially with some of his loyalists joining the new junta as ministers such as Kingibe, Babatope, and Jakande (Fawole, 2004:25).

It was also conjectured erroneously that Abacha would only stay a short while in office and then hand over to the acclaimed winner of the annulled presidential election. Having waited in vain for the military authorities to re-validate his electoral mandate as he had been promised at the inception of the Abacha regime, Chief Abiola

at a public ceremony on June 11, 1994, proclaimed himself president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and subsequently went underground for a few days (Kolawole, 2005:875). At the public declaration in Epetedo area of Lagos, Abiola confessed to his exasperation after waiting for months for those who had stolen the popular mandate to relinquish it. Appeals to their honours as officers and gentlemen of the gallant Nigerian armed forces have fallen on deaf ears. Instead, they have resorted to the tactics of divide and rule, bribery and political perfidy, disinformation and vile propaganda. He was thus eventually arrested, charged for treason and detained. In weeks and months that followed, Nigeria literally ground to a halt by violent demonstration, nation-wide strikes by workers in the petroleum, banking, education and transportation sectors.

While the business of government and the economy were at a standstill, the regime unleashed a reign of terror of almost

unprecedented scale on the populace. The arrest and detention of the politician, admittedly a domestic exercise of authority, instantly elicited unfavourable reactions from the international community that had earlier on frowned at the scuttling of Nigeria's democratisation process (Kolawole, 2005:874). The news of the inhuman treatment being deliberately meted out to Chief Abiola, and in clear violation of his right to decent and humane treatment in detention, did further damage the junta's image and correctly portrayed it as a gross abuser of human rights. The international scepticism that greeted Abacha on coming to power was therefore further reinforced by this ugly episode.

The Mismanaged Coup Accusation

While the regime's mismanagement of the diplomatic fall-outs of Abiola's detention persisted, the world was stunned early in March 1995 by the announcement of the detection of a coup plot to overthrow General

Abacha. The regime accused the former Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo and his deputy, General Shehu Musa Yar`Adua, as well as a host of other military officers, civilian activists and journalists (Kraxberger, 2004:416). The accusation against Obasanjo and Yar`Adua were quite easy to fathom. It will be recalled that General Obasanjo relentlessly campaigned against Babangida`s political, economic and social engineering. His boldness and trenchant criticisms of the previous regimes obviously made General Abacha uncomfortable. He was a presidential contender during Babangida`s unfinished transition process. He still nursed the same ambitions under Abacha and, as a result, effectively used the platform of Abacha`s own National Constitutional Conference to campaign for the early exit of the junta (Kraxberger, 2004:417). His ambition to become Nigeria`s democratically elected president obviously clashed with General Abacha`s own designs for a longer stay in

power, and this marked him as an obstacle that had to be removed. Initially there was widespread disbelief of the coup story. Several officers, including the two retired Generals, and a host of civilian activists and radical journalist, were arrested and detained (Meierding, 2010:27). No matter how much the regime tried to convince Nigerians about the reliability of the coup story, the general scepticism was further compounded by the secret trail before a military tribunal to prompt confession and to implicate Obasanjo, Yar`Adua and others. General Obasanjo later claimed that the conviction of the accused coup plotters was actually dictated by Abacha and “he was parcelled out like wrapped presents on July 14, 1995 to some Citizens of this country who were seen as vocally too dangerous or uncompromising for the comfort of a deceitful, godless, corrupt, soul-less, oppressive, murderous, obstinate and wicked regime” (Kraxberger, 2004:425). The arrest, trial and sentencing of

mostly democracy activists and radical journalists on ludicrous trumped up charges of being “accessories after the fact” of coup making, succeeded in damaging the regime’s fragile credibility at home and abroad (Fawole, 2004:21). The stories of the way the trial was conducted indicated that the charade was designed to put the junta’s opponents out of circulation. Obasanjo remarks further that

The whole exercise was a charade and a cover-up to arrive at predetermined objective of eliminating and silencing those who refused to be compromised. It was the most iniquitous political Act by any government since Nigeria’s independence (Kraxberger, 2004:425).

The absurdity of the entire farce did not escape the attention of the international community, which pleaded with the Dictator for Clemency, a plea he reluctantly yielded to by commuting the sentences of death to long years of imprisonment (Fawole, 2004:22). With the stage-managed conviction of General Obasanjo, a widely respected international statesman, and his former deputy, Yar’Adua, as well as several

civilians, the junta had, at least, succeeded in putting its most vociferous critics out of circulation. It used that to send a powerful message that no one was sacrosanct and that he was ready to deal mercilessly and perhaps illegally with anyone trying to castigate the regime. Nonetheless, the framing, arrest and conviction of the alleged plotters of the phantom coup, created a bad image for the regime which, almost two years into its existence, was yet to establish even a modicum of credibility at home and abroad (Nwanolue and Iwuoha, 2012:79).

Condemnations poured in from world leaders and international organisations. In swift reaction, the Washington-based African-American lobby group, Trans Africa, sent an open letter signed by 56 prominent African-American leaders-Congressmen, Mayors, political activists, entertainers, etc-urging Abacha to “expedite restoration of democracy to Nigeria’s 100 million people”

because “to do less will result in incalculable damage to Africa’s most populous nation and lead to the eventual global economic and political isolation” of the country (Fawole, 2004:23). Even FIFA, the world soccer governing body, had to hurriedly cancel the 8th World Youth Football Championship scheduled for Nigeria in 1995 on the grounds of political instability in the country and the concomitant security problems (Nwoke, 1996:125). Nigeria had thus begun its inexorable descent from being the formidable African giant of the 1970s and 1980s to a mere pariah in the mid-1990s. The country was yet to emerge from that when the story of another imaginary coup allegedly involving Abacha’s deputy, General Oladipo Diya, was broken by the regime. This further compounded the isolation of the regime and robbed it of the much-needed sympathy of the global community.

Abacha foreign Policy

Abacha devised all methods to ensure that international outburst did not affect the disintegration of Nigeria. Besides, all international issues that borders on security was the main foreign policy focus of the regime. In his lecture at Nigerian Institute of International Affairs in Lagos in 1996, he responded to the way some security threats have been removed from international system through the signing in August 1996 of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). He opined,

It is an historic event which brought an end to further qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Negotiations for this treaty had been a priority item on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations for several decades. Its adoption therefore marks a significant reduction in the overall level of threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. It is in our view that the most remarkable achievement in recent times in the efforts to rid the world of scourge of nuclear armament (Abacha, 1996).

Abacha also responded to the way in which Pelindaba Treaty was signed in Cairo in April

1996 to make Africa a nuclear weapons free zone. This treaty, apart from being a collateral disarmament measure, also represents an important contribution to confidence building in Africa. It complements the principled position which Africans have consistently pursued in the interest of peace, stability and security in Africa and the world at large. Abacha in his lecture said,

Let me seize this opportunity therefore to commend those nuclear weapon states which have signed the protocol to do so without further delay in order that the full objectives of this treaty would be realised. The threat to global peace and security does not only derive from existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the world dominant powers. Since the end of the cold war, many nations of the world have been preoccupied with the struggle to contain the forces of fragmentation and micro-nationalism. Indeed, some political units have already fragmented while others are threatened by instability and possible disintegration. Unfortunately, our continent, Africa has not been immune from this precarious situation. In Nigeria, our efforts have been to resist these forces in order to ensure that our country, the most populous black nation on earth, remains strong, united and indivisible (Abacha, 1996).

The quote signifies that Abacha was mindful of the fact that Nigerian security was being threatened from outside. In order to prevent such spillover, he therefore recognised the Pelindaba Treaty as one of the numerous ways to curb inflow of nuclear weapons into Africa and to destroy the existing ones. This may sound moralistic from a regime that was bent on dealing militarily with anyone who went against his regime overtly or covertly. Nevertheless, Abacha realised that it was of importance to attend and yield to issues that might affect the territorial integrity of Nigeria.

Therefore, it was the national interest that propelled the regime to intervene in regional conflicts, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone. One would have expected that a regime with pariah status in international system should maintain its isolationist stance in such case. The need to keep the regional peace and stability at all

cost impelled the regime to intervene either overtly or covertly in regional conflict. The more reason for such intervention was to ensure that the spillover effects of the conflict could be sustained given the presence of internal political imbroglio in Nigeria (Abubakar, 2009:179). Thus, the Abacha regime was of the conviction that the refugee exodus from such warring states might complicate more the tension in the domestic political landscape. Equally, the intervention, according some scholars, was to prevent the existence of foreign troops which included national armies and mercenaries from the region (Albert, 2007:168; Ali, 2009:22). Because of the paranoid nature of the regime, Abacha was very keen at keeping all foreign elements at bay both from Nigeria and from West African sub region. It needs to be recalled that the regime had been declared pariah, with various countries severed bilateral and multilateral relations with it. But such pariah status was not effective when

Nigeria entered Sierra Leone and Liberia to enforce peace and stability through ECOMOG force (Inamete, 2001:120). One would have expected that the international actors responded to halt the intervention of Nigeria in such instance. But because of the nature of international political system, which does not always respond swiftly to African issue, Nigerian intervention in that wise was seen as welcoming, not only in Africa but also in the global space. Such conclusion was buttressed by the alliance of UN and ECOMOG forces under the leadership of Nigeria in Mano River region. This is buttressed by Prof. Munzali Jibrin, Secretary General of Nigerian University Commission, 1996 to 2001,

Africa has the bad reputation of being neglected by international partners during conflicts and war. The time Africa needed international intervention in Burundi and Rwanda was not forthcoming and also in places like Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic and many more. So, intervention of Nigeria in both Liberia and Sierra Leone would definitely be implicitly welcomed by the West as they did not have total commitment to maintaining peace and order in the region. One

may therefore see Nigeria's intervention as welcoming in this regard. Abacha spent heavily on this and according to an estimate, Nigeria lost 1,000 soldiers and spent over \$1 billion in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Interview, November 29, 2015).

Thus, if Nigeria did not swiftly prevent the seeming political imbroglio in Sierra Leone, such might have degenerated to genocidal war as it happened in Rwanda and Burundi. The lesson of slow response to the Somalia and Rwanda wars from the international community compelled Abacha regime to respond immediately to the regional conflict in order to prevent spillover effect (Laro, 2002). It thus safe to say that the stability in the region, prevention of refugee exodus from conflicts, and keeping foreign troops out of the region could adequately serve as national interest of Nigeria to intervene in regional conflicts under Abacha regime.

Abacha Regime and West Africa

The Nigerian foreign policy formulation towards the West African states has its political precedence. This is most especially

true during the Nigerian civil war, 1967-1970. Such war has assisted keen observers of Nigerian foreign policy to discern the constituents of national interest in the intervention and interference in the West African states affairs. The lesson of the civil war of 1967 to 1970, where apartheid regimes in Southern Africa supported the dismembering of Nigeria, prompted the Head of State at the time, General Gowon, to realize the danger inherent in all these regimes in the southern part of Africa. He also initiated the policy of good neighbourliness especially towards the immediate neighbours like Chad, Niger, Benin, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea (Adebajo, 2002:23). It must be remembered that during the Nigerian civil war, some of these neighbouring countries acted as a transit point for smuggling ammunitions into the war front against the federal government. For example, France used Benin and Togo territories as a

transit point for ammunition in order to help the Biafran secessionists. Only Cameroon, as Nigeria's immediate neighbor, did not allow its territory to be used by the external powers (Oladimeji and Kirmanj, 2015:689).

After the war, therefore, these neighbours were considered by Gowon as constituting an important element in safeguarding Nigeria's territorial integrity. In stimulating the confidence of its neighbours, Nigeria under Gowon entered into bilateral agreements with some neighbouring countries. In 1973, for example, Nigeria-Benin and Nigeria-Niger joint commission were established (Okon, 1978:56). Border patrol mechanism was also instituted with close neighbours to ensure that no external forces, militants, and rebels are allowed into the country. It should also be noted that it was in the spirit of national interest that Gowon called for the establishment of a regional economic group in 1968. But because of the ongoing civil war in Nigeria, the community

became a farce. It was the conviction of Gowon that if the community could be established it would serve Nigerian interests. One, Nigeria is the largest market in the region and by this Nigeria stands a better chance of sourcing for markets for its industries in the region. The community would also act as a check on the external powers' relation, especially France, in the region. With the diplomatic efforts of Gowon and Eyadema of Togo, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was founded in 1975 (Oladimeji and Kirmanj, 2015:689). The narratives therefore suggest that the interests of Nigeria are intertwined with that of West African states of which Nigeria is a hegemony. As the Nigerian civil war experience has shown, Abacha regime was also trying to ensure that no external powers used the region to launch attack on the regime. It thus needs to be reiterated that Nigerian national interests concern in West Africa are four-fold under

Abacha regime. (1) Stability in the region and the promotion of greater regional cooperation; (2) Prevention of refugee exodus from conflicts; (3) Keeping foreign troops (national armies and mercenaries) out of the region; and (4) Developing markets for investments, goods, services and labour (Bobbyi, 2010:231). Looking at the four factors mentioned above, it is clear that they involve both political and economic dimensions to actualising Nigeria's national interest. The regime therefore was right to intervene in the region to stem the tides of war.

Research Findings

The purpose of this paper has been to investigate Nigerian foreign policy under General Abacha in relation to his leadership style and domestic polity. Mainly, the aim has been to explore the personality actor in the formulation of foreign policy and to discuss those interests that affected the outcome of Nigerian foreign policy under Abacha. Thus, the research has found that the unwillingness of Abacha regime to surrender power to the duly-elected president impinged

negatively on the regime posture in the international political arena. Again, the gross human rights violation against the Nine Ogonis and other Nigerians was the last straw that made the West to declare Nigeria as pariah state with its attendant implications.

Discussions of Research Findings

The Abacha regime displayed a typical example of foreign policy complications wherein it was difficult to isolate the interest of the regime from that of state. Abacha looted public treasury to satisfy his personal interest and sponsored state mission to various parts of the world for image laundering. The image crisis Nigeria suffered during Abacha impelled the regime to sponsor state missions to some parts of the world to convince the international community of the legitimacy of the regime at home. It was not the interest of Nigeria that was so paramount in the mind of the sponsor but that of the regime. After defied international plea to release MKO Abiola, the

winner of the June 12 Presidential Election, Abacha promised Nigerians that he would organise a transition programme. Such transition programme later revealed to be in the interest of the regime as Abacha wanted to contest for the post of President. Such personal interest forced the regime to loot the state treasury to appeal to some internal and external parties to actualise its ambition. As mentioned earlier, it was in an attempt to satisfy and convince the West of its transition programme that made the regime organised international tours. When Abacha discovered that the West did not yield to its campaign he turned to the East and some other African countries to promote its regime.

It needs to be addressed here that the West did not oppose the candidature of Abacha as one of the contestants for the presidential position, but it was the high-handedness of the regime coupled with continuous incarceration of the winner of June 12 General election as well as extra-

judicial killings and incarcerations of innocent Nigerians that made the West declared the regime as pariah. In such an instance, Abacha turned to countries like Iraq, South Korea, Malaysia, China, Russia, Iran etc to bolster the image of the regime within the international system. In addition, Abacha also befriended some individuals in the U.S., UK and other western countries to bolster the image of regime in its bid to transmute to democratic government. Abacha's regime was an enigma as he continually kept changing its promise to Nigerians which eventually led to internal turmoil and instability.

Recommendations

Foreign policy is not all about personal aggrandisement and showcase of might alone. The country is expected to devise other means of dealing with external pressures, which will be in consonance with the goals and objectives of its national interest. Again, foreign policy is a response of state towards

external environment which of necessity needs to take into cognizance the domestic and external imperatives. The Nigeria's foreign policy under Abacha failed to give proper attention to the needs and aspirations of Nigerians. Many Nigerians were denied visa and entry to some western countries as a result of Nigeria's pariah status and such policy standing resulted in loss of business and trade activities by Nigerians. Commercial activities were almost paralysed internally as a result of constant institutionalisation of state of emergency by the regime. All these scenarios should have been avoided by the regime. The priority of state's foreign policy is to advance the interests of the citizens and not otherwise.

Conclusion

Nigeria under Abacha experienced the worst governance ever existed in the history of Nigeria. In this case, the poor governance at domestic level as rendered the domestic structure inept. Foreign Affairs Ministry,

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies which are responsible for the upward formulation and execution of the country's foreign policy were grounded to a halt. Most of these foreign policy apparatuses did not have life of their own and most of their policies conformed to the dictates of Abacha regime. In this manner, foreign policy direction reflected the domestic governance under Abacha regime. In addition, dictatorship and gross human rights abuses was the primary cause of the poor image of Nigeria within the international system during this period. Such can be linked to the execution of Ogoni activists who demanded for fair use of their land for the purpose of preventing collateral damage to the environment. Abacha was intransigent to the global plead and went ahead to execute nine of them popularly called "Ogoni Nine". It was this domestic execution that alerted the international community to the atrocities

being perpetrated by Abacha against Nigerians. The response of the international community was the withdrawal of Nigeria's membership from the Commonwealth. The situation led to drastic political and economic move from countries like Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. It needs to be stated here that the response of Abacha to domestic and international issues were a product of its intention to perpetuate his rule in Nigeria. He was intransigent about international sanction and domestic outcry. Abacha shunned international criticism and ignored the need to release the acclaimed winner of June 12, 1993 election. All these domestic troubles made formulation of foreign policy deficient as some countries reluctantly related to Nigeria. Abacha refused to travel out of the country and unwilling to attend any meeting of international organisation. This he did in order to avoid any criticism from external environment. Notwithstanding his negative

traits in the understanding of Nigerian foreign policy,

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THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON VOTER'S BEHAVIOUR: A STUDY OF THE 2023 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF GIWA LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF KADUNA STATE

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ABSTRACT

Religion has emerged as a significant factor shaping political activities since the return of democratic governance in Nigeria. The 2023 presidential election witnessed the utilization of religious affiliations to mobilize voters, notably with the adoption of a Muslim-Muslim ticket by the APC. This strategy aimed to align with religious inclinations, contrasting with other candidates who chose running mates from different religious backgrounds to demonstrate inclusivity. This phenomenon extended to the 2023 gubernatorial election in Kaduna State, particularly in Giwa Local Government Area, where religion played a pivotal role in shaping voter behaviour. This study examines the influence of religion on electoral outcomes, the role of religious leaders in voter mobilization, and the indicators used by these leaders to sway voters based on religious inclinations. Drawing on the pluralist theory of democracy, the research explores how societal pluralism is leveraged to mobilize voters during political events. Through a multistage sampling approach and surveying 150 respondents, the study found that religion significantly influenced voter behaviour in the 2023 gubernatorial election of Kaduna State. In conclusion, religion has become a pervasive factor influencing elections in Kaduna State, emphasizing the need for a nuanced understanding of its implications on democracy. The research recommends comprehensive voter education programs to promote informed decision-making beyond religious affiliations. Additionally, fostering interfaith dialogue, ensuring transparency in political campaigning, addressing socio-economic grievances, and strengthening electoral regulations are proposed to mitigate the exploitation of religious sentiments for political gain. Implementing these recommendations can foster a more inclusive and democratic electoral environment in Giwa Local Government Area, prioritizing informed decision-making and collective socio-political interests over narrow religious affiliations.

Keywords: Religion, Mobilization, Voter, Voters' behaviour and Election

1.1 Introduction

Understanding the factors that influence voter behaviour is crucial for comprehending the dynamics of elections worldwide. From global trends to specific regional contexts, various factors shape how individuals cast their votes, ultimately impacting the outcomes of elections. In many instances, religion emerges as a significant influence on voter behaviour, a phenomenon particularly pronounced in third-world countries like Nigeria.

Nigeria, since its independence, has been deeply influenced by religion in its electoral processes. While regionalism and ethnicity initially dominated the electoral landscape in the country's early years, religion gradually asserted its influence, especially within the framework of political party compositions. The Nigerian political scene during the first Republic saw parties like the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which primarily represented the northern Muslim populace, and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which aligned with the predominantly Christian Igbo population. Additionally, the Action Group (AG) initially rooted in ethnic identity, transitioned into a political entity representing the western part of Nigeria (Umar, 2003).

Efforts were made to mitigate the influence of religion on electoral outcomes in subsequent republics, notably during the second and third Republics. While these endeavors showed some success, it was the third Republic that witnessed a consensus among scholars that religion played a negligible role in shaping voters' choices. This was evident in the election of 1993, where the absence of religious considerations was notably observed. Additionally, the third republic stood out as the only one in Nigerian government and politics where scholars unanimously agreed that religion did not significantly influence voters' behaviour. During the election, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Social Democratic Party (SDP) emerged as the primary contenders, with their presidential candidates hailing from diverse regions and religious backgrounds. Notably, Bashir Tofa, representing Kano State, lost his own state to his running mate, Chief M.K.O. Abiola. This outcome underscored to many scholars that religion played no decisive role in the annulled June 12, 1993 election (Oju, 2003).

However, as Nigeria transitioned into its fourth Republic in 1999, the landscape shifted once again. While religion did not significantly influence the election that

brought Olusegun Obasanjo to power, subsequent elections in 2011, 2015, and 2019 were marred by religious bigotry. The post-election violence following the 2011 election, particularly, underscored how religion had begun to shape voter behaviour in significant ways, leading to tensions and conflicts. The eruption of violence took on a distinctly religious character, as some individuals from northern regions targeted Christians residing in the North.

Zooming out from Nigeria and looking at other African countries like South Africa and Rwanda, similar patterns emerge. While factors such as historical legacies, socioeconomic conditions, and ethnic affiliations play significant roles, religion often asserts its influence, albeit to varying degrees, in shaping voter behaviour.

Despite the extensive research on the influence of religion on voter behaviour in Nigeria and some other African countries, there remains a gap in the literature regarding a comprehensive understanding of how global trends in voter behaviour interact with local contexts. This study seeks to bridge this gap by examining the multifaceted influences on voter behaviour, particularly focusing on the role of religion, in both a Nigerian and broader African context. Through this

exploration, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the complexities surrounding electoral dynamics in the region.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Religion plays a pivotal role in shaping the dynamics of political engagement within Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State, Nigeria. The intersection of religion and politics has become increasingly significant, particularly evident during the 2023 gubernatorial election. Various actors strategically leveraged religious affiliations to influence voter behaviour, thereby altering traditional voting patterns within the Local Government Area. This study aims to investigate the following:

1. What factors influenced voter behaviour during the 2023 gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State?
2. Who were the primary actors responsible for mobilizing electorates to vote based on religious inclination in the 2023 gubernatorial election within Giwa Local Government Area?
3. What specific channels or avenues were utilized to mobilize voters to align with religious considerations during the 2023 gubernatorial

election in Giwa Local Government Area?

4. What were the perceived benefits of mobilizing electorates to vote in accordance with religious affiliations during the 2023 gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area, Kaduna State?

Hence, this study seeks to examine the intricacies of religious influence on electoral processes within the microcosm of Giwa Local Government Area, Kaduna State, shedding light on the mechanisms and implications of such mobilization efforts.

1.3 Literature Review

1.3.1 Religion

According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), religion refers to “the belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods.” While **from Merriam-Webster Dictionary**, religion “is the service and worship of God or the supernatural.” Religion in Nigeria is characterized by its diverse and dynamic nature, with Christianity and Islam standing as the predominant faiths (Adesina, 2018). Christianity, introduced during the colonial period, has since evolved into a multifaceted religious landscape comprising various

denominations, including Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Pentecostalism (Onyishi et al., 2019). These Christian denominations exert significant influence not only in spiritual matters but also in education, healthcare, and social welfare (Okafor, 2017). Conversely, Islam holds deep historical roots in Nigeria, particularly in the northern region, where it shapes cultural norms, legal systems, and political ideologies (Yakubu, 2016). The presence of indigenous African religions further enriches Nigeria's religious tapestry, emphasizing communal harmony and connection with the environment (Isike & Onyishi, 2019). Despite the dominance of Christianity and Islam, elements of indigenous beliefs persist, particularly in rural areas, contributing to the country's religious diversity (Adebanwi, 2020).

Religion is a complex factor that exerts a profound impact on voting patterns in Nigeria. Prior literature has explored the intricate relationship between religion and politics, highlighting the intricate ways in which faith shapes political identities, mobilizes voters, and influences electoral dynamics. In Nigeria, religion is a fundamental aspect of societal identity and plays a significant role in shaping individuals'

beliefs, values, and behaviours. With a diverse population comprising primarily of Christians and Muslims, the interplay between religion and politics has been a subject of scholarly inquiry, particularly concerning its influence on voting behaviour.

1.3.2 Voter's Behaviour

Voting is one of the most commonly used terms in contemporary democratic process for recruitment of leadership and election of representatives. However, voting behaviour is a form of electoral behaviour, which indicates the way different people tend to vote. Understanding voters' behaviour can explain how and why decisions are made to vote or not to vote (Ogundiran O. J., 2020).

Voting is a form of political participation and is regarded as the main form of political participation in liberal democratic societies, while the patterns of the votes can be described as the voting behaviour. The analysis of these patterns of behaviour helps to explain the reasons why people vote and how they reach the decisions they make. (Ezedikachi N. E., 2021).

Voting behaviour is an act of aggregating individual preferences into collective decision in an election (Linberg and Morrison, 2007). When studying voting behaviour, the focus is to find out who votes

and how they vote. Being able to understand voter's behaviour would help to explain why electorates make their decisions the way they do and enable the prediction of the outcomes of elections.

According to Bartel (2008), people vote according to their original political disposition, while some others vote because of the candidates' personal characteristics, qualities and abilities.

Studies in political behaviour have found out largely the importance of political participation in democratic polity. Powell (1992) recognizes that participation by citizens in competitive elections is a distinctive characteristic of democratic politics, putting in mind that substantial citizens' involvement in meaningful elections both reflects and encourages a sense of democratic legitimacy that will help to curtail violence and encourage regular competition. Political participation is therefore a tool for managing political conflict. It is a critical activity that may help to play the essential role in enforcing elites to respond to other forms of citizens' involvement (Diamond, 2018).

According to Shambers, (2008), a number of different approaches to the explanation of voting behaviour can be distinguished in the literature. Structural or

sociological approaches concentrate on the relationship between individual and social structure, placing the vote in a social context, and examine the effects on voting of such variables as social class, language, nationalism, religion, and rural-urban contrasts. Ecological or aggregate statistical approaches relate voting patterns to the characteristic features of a geographical area (ward, constituency, state, or whatever). Social psychological approaches relate voting decisions to the voter's psychological predispositions or attitudes, for example his or her party identification, attitudes to candidates, and such like. Finally, Shambers, (2008) rational-choice approaches attempt to explain voting behaviour as the outcome of a series of instrumental cost-benefit calculations by the individual, assessing the relative desirability of specific electoral outcomes in terms of the issues addressed and policies espoused by the different parties or candidates.

In essence, voting behaviour is a form of political behaviour. It entails actions and choices individuals make when casting their votes in an election. It encompasses various factors such as political preferences, candidate evaluation, party affiliation, and demographic characteristics that influence how individuals decide to vote.

1.4 Empirical Review

1.4.1 Factors that Influence Voters' Behaviour in an Election in Nigeria

There exists a multitude of factors shaping voters' behaviour in Nigerian elections, with historical trends indicating the pervasive influence of religion, regionalism, ethnicity, the power of incumbency, and candidates' personalities on electoral outcomes. Empirical studies underscore the prevalence of these influences, as elucidated by Okpalike and Chika (2015), who assert that voters often align their choices with leaders sharing their religious, ethnic, or regional affiliations.

The trajectory of Nigeria's Presidential Elections, spanning ten occurrences from the First Republic to the present Fourth Republic, has been fraught with challenges such as impunity, religious bias, ethnicity, regionalism, tribalism, and electoral malpractice. This pattern underscores a departure from issue-based campaigns towards a focus on divisive factors, as highlighted by Oju (2012), who observes that voters frequently prioritize identity markers over candidates' performance records.

The 2015 elections exemplified the enduring impact of religion and ethnicity on voter choices, as noted by Sule et al. (2017),

although with diminishing significance. Additionally, media and social media played pivotal roles in shaping voter perceptions, signaling shifts in political, economic, and social contexts. Socialization mechanisms, as articulated by Sheriff and Abdullahi (2015), introduced new dynamics, including fears, insecurity, and economic expectations, which influenced voting patterns. Moreover, the 2019 Presidential Election witnessed a departure from traditional voting behaviour, with campaigns emphasizing substantive issues rather than exploiting religious, ethnic, or regional sentiments, as suggested by Rufa'i (2011).

This empirical review underscores the multifaceted nature of voter behaviour in Nigerian elections, emphasizing the dynamic interplay between identity-based affiliations, socio-economic factors, and evolving political landscapes.

1.5 Religion and People's Interest in Nigeria

Religious dynamics intersect profoundly with power politics in Nigeria, where various stakeholders leverage religion to bolster their political influence. The country's elite, drawn from diverse occupational and identity-based affiliations, derive legitimacy from their positions of authority within the military,

political, traditional, and bureaucratic spheres. These elites wield significant control over government resources, often establishing patron-client relationships based on ethnic, religious, or regional affinities, both through legal and illicit means.

During pivotal electoral moments, religious affiliations can sway political allegiances significantly. For instance, in the 1999 Presidential election, Pentecostal groups threw their support behind Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party (PDP), viewing him as a symbol of Christian resurgence in governance. Obasanjo's public embrace of his 'born again' status while in prison and subsequent calls for national prayers underscored the entanglement of religion and politics in Nigerian governance (Ojo, 2012).

Similarly, the 2011 Presidential election witnessed intense religious rhetoric, with incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan's strategic appeal to Northern Christian voters, epitomized by a highly publicized photograph of him kneeling before a prominent Pentecostal preacher. However, this move exacerbated tensions with the Northern Muslim community, highlighting the divisive potential of religious symbolism in Nigerian politics (Ojo, 2012).

Religion remains a potent force shaping political dynamics in Nigeria, as evidenced by contemporary scholarship. The country's elite, spanning military, political, traditional, and bureaucratic spheres, leverage religious affiliations to consolidate power and distribute resources along ethnic, religious, or regional lines (Adegbola, 2021). Recent elections have witnessed strategic appeals to religious sentiments, such as the 2019 Presidential election, where incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari's outreach to Muslim communities underscored the enduring entanglement of religion and politics (Osaghae & Suberu, 2019). Notably, the rise of Pentecostalism has added a new dimension to Nigeria's political landscape, with scholars highlighting its role in shaping voter behaviour and influencing electoral outcomes (Omotola, 2018). However, this fusion of religion and politics has also exacerbated societal divisions, as seen in the increasing polarization along religious lines (Onapajo & Olayiwola, 2020). Consequently, contemporary discourse emphasizes the imperative of understanding and addressing the complex interplay between religion and politics to foster national cohesion and stability (Afolabi, 2022).

Today, Nigeria stands more divided along sectarian and religious fault lines than ever before. The government and ruling party have demonstrated a willingness to exploit religious divisions to consolidate power, exacerbating societal cleavages for political gain.

This contemporary analysis underscores the enduring entanglement of religion and politics in Nigeria's socio-political landscape, emphasizing the need for nuanced understanding and constructive dialogue to mitigate polarization and promote national cohesion.

1.6 Campaign's Avenues in Nigeria

The landscape of election campaigns in Nigeria has undergone significant transformations since the transition from military rule to democracy, marked by a notable evolution in campaign methodologies and media utilization. Traditionally, electioneering efforts primarily relied on personal contact and political rallies, but the advent of democratic governance has witnessed a surge in the popularity of political advertising, reflecting a heightened awareness of its efficacy among political actors (Oju, 2012). This shift is exemplified by the increasing prominence of political advertisements as a means to shape

public perception and convey candidates' platforms and qualities (Olujide, 2010). In the past, resources were predominantly allocated to traditional campaign activities like rallies, speeches, and direct outreach in key demographic hubs such as schools, religious centers, and markets.

However, the role of mass media in shaping political awareness and discourse has become increasingly significant. Zaller (1996) elucidates the intricate relationship between mass media exposure and political awareness, suggesting that exposure to diverse messages can lead to varying levels of awareness among the electorate. Moreover, the mass media, encompassing radio, television, newspapers, and magazines, are acknowledged as pivotal ideological apparatuses of the state (Oso, 2002). Oso emphasizes the indispensable role of the mass media in informing, educating, and mobilizing citizens, highlighting the potential repercussions of a dysfunctional media landscape, including arbitrary exercise of power, citizen disengagement from the political process, and limited mobilization efforts.

In essence, the evolution of election campaign strategies in Nigeria underscores the dynamic interplay between traditional

and modern approaches, with an increasing reliance on political advertising and mass media engagement shaping contemporary electoral dynamics.

1.7 Understanding Political Participation in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects

Political participation is indispensable for the stability and progress of any democratic system, demanding active engagement from citizens in civic and political affairs. Appadorai (2004) underscores the essentiality of rational conduct and participation in governance for the sustenance of democracy, a sentiment particularly pertinent in the context of Nigeria's tumultuous political history marked by turbulence, violence, and electoral malpractices since the First Republic. Despite the imperative of citizen involvement in political processes, Nigeria grapples with widespread disillusionment towards politics, often perceived as a corrupt and volatile arena to be avoided.

Awolowo and Aluko (2010) elucidate the fundamental objectives of political participation, emphasizing its role in seeking power, influencing decision-making, and contributing to national development. Adelekan (2010) reinforces the significance of individual participation in democratic

governance, stressing the importance of citizens' engagement in decision-making processes that impact their lives.

However, political participation in Nigeria is influenced by myriad factors, including cultural, economic, religious, and educational backgrounds, as well as levels of political awareness and confidence in the political process. Ethnic and religious considerations further exacerbate political dynamics, with elections often characterized by divisive rhetoric and polarization along regional and religious lines (Adeyemo, 2011).

Noticeably, the dichotomy between the North and South, as highlighted by former Deputy Senate President Albert Legogie, underscores the deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions that permeate Nigerian politics, posing significant challenges to the realization of inclusive and participatory governance.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

This study adopts the theoretical framework known as “A Theory of Democracy in Africa,” synthesized from the works of several scholars including Joseph (1981), Jackson (1984), Bretton (1994), Ross (2001), Salih (2003), and Tenuche (2009). This framework elucidates the challenges faced by African states in transitioning to democratic

governance within the context of post-colonial legacies and ongoing socio-political complexities.

African nations, particularly those of larger size, contend with the enduring legacies of arbitrary colonial borders and multicultural diversities (Joseph, 1981; Jackson, 1984). These historical imprints have resulted in the inheritance of fragile state structures lacking the necessary institutions and mechanisms for effective democratic governance. The absence of robust democratization processes is compounded by the prevalence of primordial sentiments such as ethnic affiliations, religious ties, and regional loyalties among emerging political elites (Bretton, 1994; Ross, 2001).

The theory posits that democracy in Africa faces inherent challenges due to its historical context, characterized by prolonged colonial subjugation and subsequent state formation (Salih, 2003). The absence of essential prerequisites for democratic consolidation, including political mobilization, socioeconomic development, and institutional capacity, hinders the effective operation of democratic principles. Socioeconomic disparities such as poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment further exacerbate the obstacles to democratization,

perpetuating a cycle of fragile governance structures (Tenuche, 2009).

African states, constrained by historical legacies and external influences, often operate within a framework of “failed democracy,” characterized by the manipulation of primordial sentiments by ruling elites to attain and maintain power (Joseph, 1981; Ross, 2001). Elections, ostensibly a hallmark of democratic governance, frequently serve as platforms for the reinforcement of ethnic, religious, and regional identities, rather than as forums for substantive policy debate. Consequently, electoral outcomes are often determined by patrimonial affiliations rather than considerations of good governance or developmental agendas.

The Nigerian democratic process exemplifies the pervasiveness of primordial attachments in shaping political behaviour and voting patterns (Jackson, 1984). Electorates often prioritize patrimonial and primordial considerations over the evaluation of candidates based on their ability to address pressing socio-economic challenges and foster national development through effective governance. The case of the 2023 gubernatorial election underscores the persistence of these dynamics, with voters

exhibiting allegiance to religious affiliations in certain regions, rather than engaging in issue-based selection.

In essence, the theoretical framework of “A Theory of Democracy in Africa” provides insights into the complex interplay between historical legacies, socio-political dynamics, and democratization processes on the continent. By elucidating the challenges inherent in the transition to democratic governance, particularly within the Nigerian context, this framework offers a nuanced understanding of the enduring influence of primordial sentiments on political behaviour and electoral outcomes in Africa.

1.8.2 The weaknesses of the theory

The theoretical framework of “A Theory of Democracy in Africa” provides a comprehensive lens through which to understand the challenges inherent in the democratization processes across the continent. Drawing upon the synthesis of various scholarly works spanning several decades, the framework elucidates the complex interplay between historical legacies, socio-political dynamics, and the quest for democratic governance in African states. It highlights how the enduring effects of colonialism, compounded by multicultural diversities and fragile state structures, have

posed significant obstacles to the establishment of robust democratic institutions and mechanisms.

However, despite its analytical depth, the theory is not without its weaknesses. One notable limitation lies in its tendency to generalize the democratization experiences of diverse African nations. By treating Africa as a monolithic entity, the framework overlooks the distinct historical, cultural, and socio-political contexts that shape democratization trajectories in individual countries. This oversimplification risks masking important nuances and variations in the democratization processes across different regions of the continent.

Moreover, while the theory offers valuable theoretical insights, its empirical foundations may be somewhat limited. While it references the works of various scholars, there may be a dearth of comprehensive empirical studies to substantiate its claims empirically across diverse African contexts. This reliance on theoretical synthesis rather than robust empirical evidence could undermine the credibility and applicability of the framework in informing evidence-based policymaking and scholarly discourse.

Another weakness of the theory lies in its somewhat static analysis of democratization in Africa. While it adeptly identifies structural constraints such as historical legacies and socio-economic disparities, it may not fully account for the dynamic nature of democratization processes. Democracies are inherently fluid systems shaped by evolving political, social, and economic dynamics. Failing to account for these dynamic changes may limit the theory's capacity to accurately capture and explain shifting democratization trends over time.

Furthermore, the framework could be critiqued for potentially perpetuating ethnocentric biases by framing African democratization within Western theoretical paradigms. While not explicitly stated, this framing may inadvertently marginalize indigenous perspectives and experiences, thereby limiting the theory's relevance and applicability to African contexts. A more inclusive approach that incorporates diverse voices and perspectives could enhance the theory's comprehensiveness and utility.

Lastly, while the theory adeptly identifies challenges to democratization, it may offer limited guidance on effective policy interventions or strategies for fostering democratic consolidation in African states.

Without actionable recommendations, its utility for policymakers and practitioners seeking to promote democratic governance may be diminished. Enhancing the theory's policy relevance by offering concrete prescriptions for addressing democratization challenges could enhance its practical utility and impact on governance reform efforts in Africa.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

The paper adopted a descriptive survey research design. Descriptive survey research is an approach of descriptive research that blends quantitative and qualitative data to provide the researcher with relevant and accurate information. This design makes the researcher to understand the research problem by looking at what and how the problem has occurred. It also helped the researchers of understanding the nature of the problem and how it has remain a reoccurring issue. The researchers observed the phenomenon before investing on how it has shaped the 2023 governorship election of Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State.

1.9.2. Method of Data Collection

Secondary and primary method of data were employed for data as the two main sources of data collection. The secondary source was achieved by the used of available text books, journals, both published and unpublished articles. Most of the information that were used to study the nature of the problem were generated from the secondary sources. While the data that was used in analyzing the result that was gotten from the field was generated from the primary sources. The primary data is the first hand information that the researchers got from the fieldwork.

1.9.3. Instrument of Data Collection

Two instruments of data collection were used. These instruments are questionnaire and in-depth interview. The questionnaire consists of number of ended questions, which are the main indicators that are used to check the voters' activities. The in-depth interview was also employed to help the researchers to corroborate the data to ensure validity of the two instruments there were used.

1.10. Result and Discussion of Findings

Table 1: What is Factor that Influence Voters to Vote in Line of Religious Inclination in 2023 Gubernatorial Election of Giwa local government area of Kaduna State?

Factors	Frequency	Percentage %
Religion	69	46
Ethnicity	5	3.3
Incumbency	50	33.3
Personality	26	17.3
Total	150	100

Source: Field work, 2023

Table 1 outlines factors influencing voter behaviour in an empirical review. Religion had the highest influence at 46%, followed by incumbency at 33.3%, personality at 17.3%, and ethnicity at 3.3%. The data indicates that religion predominantly influenced voter behaviour in the recent gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area, with incumbency also significantly impacting voter choice. However, candidate personality and ethnicity had comparatively lesser influence. This suggests that religious considerations, followed by the advantage of incumbency, were pivotal factors shaping electoral outcomes in the region.

This corroborates the interview conducted with one of the respondents as he opines that:

Yes, religion is the dominant factor that

influence voters' behaviour in the gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area. The Muslim-Muslim ticket was one of the main reason why some voters in Giwa voted for APC because we have to protect our religious interest. You cannot vote for someone who picked a Christian as his running mate and leave the one that picked a Muslim as his running, even God will not be happy with you. It is added that, there are some PDP members who voted for an APC gubernatorial candidate because of the Muslim-Muslim ticket. Emphasis was made by most respondent that religion played a vital role above all other factors that influence voters' behaviour in the election (Field work, 2023).

Table 2: Who Mobilizes the Voters to Vote in line with Religious Inclination in the 2023 Gubernatorial Election of Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Mobilizers	Frequency	Percentage %
Politicians	59	39.3
Religious Leaders	55	36.7
Individuals/Electorates	30	20
Traditional Leaders	6	4

Total	150	100	entirely discounted, albeit it may be less pronounced compared to other actors.
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Source: Field work, 2023

Table 2 illustrates that politicians received the highest percentage at 39.3%, followed closely by religious leaders at 36.7%, individuals at 20%, and traditional leaders at 4%. This data suggests that politicians are primarily responsible for introducing the use of religion to influence voter behaviour along religious lines. Religious leaders, possessing a deep understanding of religious sentiments, play a significant role in mobilizing voters based on religious inclinations. They leverage their knowledge to interpret religious texts and persuade voters accordingly. Consequently, religious leaders have become contentious figures in modern society due to their perceived manipulation of religious beliefs for political ends. Additionally, individuals play diverse roles during elections, including as voters and campaign directors, affording them opportunities to influence voters along religious lines. This underscores the multifaceted nature of individual influence during electoral processes. While traditional leaders received fewer responses, indicating a less overt role, their influence cannot be

In an interview with another respondent, he puts that:

The notion of bringing religion into politics is engineered by the politicians because the politicians often choose their running mate along religious line in most of the pluralist state, where there are ethnic and religious differences. If the politicians did not consider religion as a main factor of winning election; therefore, no electorate would also think of voting along religious line or any cleavages. The religious leaders involve themselves because the politicians are the ones that sold the ideas to them. Today, we live in a capitalist society where nobody wants to be poor, so the politicians sometimes give the religious leaders and other people money to mobilize the electorate to vote for them at any cost, whether religiously or any other means (Field work, 2023). A series of meeting was held between the politicians and the members of the council of Ulama and councils of Imams. This is because local government has a concern with the council of Ulama, and they listen to all their advices and request.

Table 3: What are the Avenues where Voters were mobilized to Vote in Line of Religious Inclination of the 2023 Gubernatorial Election of Giwa Local Government Area of Kaduna State?

Avenues	Frequency	Percentage %
At Worship Centers	39	26
At Religious Schools	27	18
At Formal Schools	4	2.6
At Market Places	21	14
At People's Residence/Streets	30	20
On the Media	9	6
At Polling Unit	20	13.3
Total	150	100

Source: Field work, 2023

Table 3 outlines the various avenues through which voters are mobilized to vote in alignment with religious inclinations. According to the responses, 26% of mobilization occurred at worship centers, 18% at religious schools, 2.6% at formal schools, 14% at market centers, 20% at people's residences, 6% through media, and 13.3% at polling units. The data suggests that worship centers serve as the primary mobilization points, uniting religious believers on political matters. Additionally, religious schools have emerged as forums for

political discourse rather than solely for religious education. Some formal schools were also utilized for political campaigns. Market centers were identified as significant sites for influencing voters along religious lines. Moreover, political campaigns and rallies predominantly occur at people's residences, facilitating easy mobilization of voters based on religious sentiments. While the media played a minor role in political campaigning, it still contributed to influencing voter behaviour. Lastly, polling units were also used by individuals to

influence voters along religious lines, albeit to a lesser extent compared to other avenues.

In an interview with some respondents, they shade more light that:

The main epicenter of influencing voters' behaviour along religious line are the worship centers and some religious places. Most of the meetings that were held between the religious bodies and politicians were done in either mosques or religious centers. When the council of Ulama and Imams met with the party aspirant, they did all their meeting at Giwa Juma't mosque and at the office of the council of Ulamas. Some people, especially religious teachers were sent to people's residencies to preach for then to vote for Muslim-Muslim ticket. However, in some Islamic schools, students were also informed to vote along religious line to safeguard their religious interest (Field work, 2023).

Table 4: What Benefits do People Drive when they are mobilized to Vote in Line with Religious Inclination?

Benefits	Frequency	Percentage %
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Socio-economic	50	33.3
Political	57	38
To ease Religious Tension	20	13.3
It has no Benefits	23	15.3
Total	150	100

Source: Field work, 2023

Table 4 reveals the benefits associated with voting along religious lines: 50% cite socio-economic development, 57% cite political advantages, 20% mention easing religious tensions, and 23% believe there are no benefits. These findings suggest that a significant portion of respondents' view voting for candidates of the same religious background as a means to safeguard their political interests and expect socio-economic dividends from leaders sharing their religious affiliation. However, a minority express skepticism, possibly due to past experiences where perceived benefits were not realized under similar religious alignments.

An interview conducted in the same area explains that:

A meeting was held between religious leaders and politicians. The religious leaders have a cordial relationship with the local government and in most case, it influences some of the stakeholders' decision. The council of Ulama discussed with some party aspirants for socio-economic benefit before the cast their vote in line with religious inclination. The body demanded for the rehabilitation of their primary and secondary schools and other infrastructural development before the buy the idea of the Muslim-Muslim ticket.

1.11 Summary of Research Findings

The research findings shed light on the intricate web of factors that sway voter behaviour, particularly within the context of the recent gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area. Table 1 encapsulates these influences succinctly, with religion emerging as the most potent force at 46%. This dominance is underscored by the significant sway of incumbency at 33.3%, highlighting the interplay between political power and religious affiliation in voter decision-making. Conversely, factors like personality and ethnicity exerted comparatively lesser influence on electoral outcomes, accentuating the overarching role

of religious considerations in shaping voter choices.

Table 2 delves into the key actors involved in steering voter behaviour. Politicians emerge as primary influencers, leveraging religious sentiments strategically by aligning themselves with specific religious affiliations. This strategic maneuvering is evident in their choice of running mates along religious lines, as highlighted by the close involvement of religious leaders in the electoral process. Religious leaders, with their profound understanding of religious sentiments, collaborate with politicians to mobilize voters based on shared religious inclinations, thereby amplifying the influence of religion on voter behaviour.

Table 3 elucidates the various avenues through which voter mobilization occurs, with worship centers serving as pivotal hubs for political discourse and mobilization. The prominence of religious schools, market centers, and people's residences further underscores the multifaceted nature of voter mobilization along religious lines. Political campaigning in these diverse settings blurs the lines between religious and political spheres, highlighting the entanglement of religious beliefs with electoral processes.

Table 4 delves into the perceived benefits associated with voting along religious lines, revealing a nuanced perspective among respondents. While socio-economic development and political advantages are cited as primary benefits, there exists a segment of respondents skeptical of such benefits. This skepticism may stem from past experiences where perceived benefits failed to materialize under similar religious alignments, indicating a degree of disillusionment among voters.

In sum, the research findings underscore the pervasive influence of religion in shaping voter behaviour in the context of the recent gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area. The interplay between religious considerations, political dynamics, and socio-economic interests highlights the complexity of electoral processes and their implications for socio-political dynamics in the region. As such, understanding these factors is crucial for policymakers and electoral stakeholders in navigating the intricacies of voter behaviour and fostering inclusive and equitable electoral processes.

1.12 Discussions of Research Findings

The research findings reveal a nuanced understanding of the factors influencing voter behaviour in the recent gubernatorial election

in Giwa Local Government Area. Religion emerges as a dominant force, exerting a significant sway over electoral outcomes, with 46% of respondents citing it as the primary influencer. This dominance underscores the intricate interplay between religious affiliations and political decisions, shaping voter choices in profound ways.

Moreover, the findings highlight the strategic role of incumbency, with 33.3% of respondents indicating its influence on voter behaviour. This suggests a convergence of political power and religious sentiments, wherein incumbents leverage their position to align with specific religious groups, thereby consolidating their electoral base.

Interestingly, factors like personality and ethnicity, though present, exert comparatively lesser influence on electoral outcomes. This disparity accentuates the overarching significance of religious considerations in guiding voter decisions, underscoring the complexity of the socio-political landscape within Giwa Local Government Area.

1.13 Conclusion

In conclusion, the research elucidates the pervasive influence of religion on voter behaviour within the context of the recent

gubernatorial election in Giwa Local Government Area. The findings underscore the intricate web of factors, including religious affiliations, political dynamics, and socio-economic interests, which collectively shape electoral outcomes.

The close alignment between political power and religious sentiments highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of the interplay between these forces. Moreover, the findings emphasize the multifaceted nature of voter mobilization, with religious institutions serving as pivotal hubs for political discourse and engagement.

Overall, the research underscores the importance of recognizing and addressing the role of religion in electoral processes to foster inclusive and equitable democracy in the region.

1.14 Recommendations:

Based on the research findings, several recommendations can be proposed to enhance electoral processes and promote inclusivity within Giwa Local Government Area:

1. Develop comprehensive voter education programs that highlight the importance of informed decision-making beyond religious affiliations.

2. Encourage interfaith dialogue and collaboration to mitigate potential religious tensions during electoral campaigns.
3. Implement measures to ensure transparency and accountability in political campaigning, particularly regarding the strategic alignment of incumbents with specific religious groups.
4. Foster socio-economic development initiatives that address the underlying grievances of marginalized communities, thereby reducing reliance on religious affiliations as determinants of voter behaviour.
5. Strengthen electoral regulations to prevent the exploitation of religious sentiments for political gain, thereby promoting fair and equitable electoral competition.

By implementing these recommendations, stakeholders can work towards fostering a more inclusive and democratic electoral environment within Giwa Local Government Area, where voter choices are guided by informed decision-making and collective socio-political interests rather than narrow religious affiliations.

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CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS, MILITARY REGIMES, POLITICAL PARTIES AND TRANSITION TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC IN NIGERIA (1993-1999)

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ABSTRACT

The article explores the role of modern civil society groups in Nigeria between 1993 and 1999. Globally, there is an interface between the civil society groups and democratization. The focus of the research is to examine the political efforts of the modern civil society groups in the transition to democracy in Nigeria. Part of the political effort was the struggle against the military regimes for the actualization of the June 12, 1993 elections. The National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), Pro-democracy Group, and Campaign for Democracy (CD) across the country stood up against the military junta led by General Babangida and General Sanni Abacha to return to civil rule. The introduction of the Interim National Government (ING) and the killings of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight human rights activists from Ogoni community in 1993 resulted in the global condemnation of General Abacha government. The eventual collapse of military regime in Nigeria therefore reinforces the efficacy of civil society groups in promoting democracy. This is the focus of the current research paper. Thus, the research found that within this period the civil society groups confronted the military junta through public protests, public enlightenment, consultations and media advocacy. The research also found the efficacy of civil society's employment of public protests and enlightenment in dismantling Abacha regime. Thus, the overall assessment of the role of civil society and the transition to civil rule in Nigeria underscores the efficacy of civil society in democracies. In conducting the research, the theory of Democratic Peace is employed to discern the reason for civil society's insistence on democracy in Nigeria. The research employs qualitative content analysis and textual mining as data collection process.

Keywords: *Civil Society Groups, Democracy, Military Regimes, NADECO, Political Party*

Introduction

Modern civil society groups have become instrumental to democratic governance with multifaceted functions in delivering social services to humanity Keane (2013). The civil society groups are significant agents for entrenching democratic governance through the promotion of tolerance, transparency and accountability in all ramifications. Modern civil society groups are self-generating, self-supporting, and autonomous associations different from the state, business and family and bound by a legal backing which are open to the public Woods (1992). Therefore, civil society groups in Nigeria in particular is a recent phenomenon with active responsibilities under the military regimes Cross Road (2011). In this sense, inauguration of democracy in Nigeria interfaced with collective struggle of the civil society groups fighting the military regimes in all circumstances Ikelegbe (2007). The restless struggle of pro-democracy groups attained its feverish pitch after the inauguration of the Interim National Government (ING) in the country following inconclusive 1993 presidential elections. The civil society groups such as NADECO fought the military junta to hand over power to the winner of the June 12 election. The Afenifere group from the South West also

fought for the restoration of the June 12 1993 election. The death of the pre-summed winner in 1998 chief M.K.O Abiola added to the struggle of the pressure groups in the country.

The need to interface the civil society groups with good governance is germane to entrenching democracy, especially in emerging democracies such as Nigeria. The civil society groups are operating from the public space aligned with the reinforcing principle that emphasis effective governance in the overall interest of the majority of the people. Civil society groups therefore, becomes fully manifested when it is allowed to consolidate the gains of democratic governance in Nigeria in line with what Momoh (2006) referred to as a transitional process with mission and vision of falling the authoritarian regimes of the military between 1980s and 1990s respectively in Nigeria. Hence, the inauguration of democratic government in Nigeria on May 29, 1999 level no one in doubt that civil society groups have been at the forefront of the struggling for democratic rule in Nigeria. Akinrinade (2004) aptly noted that

today, civil society faces greater challenges and more onerous responsibility in helping to

consolidate democracy and make it sustainable as well as irreversible than it did in the struggle to enthrone it in the past

The activeness of the civil society groups promote democracy as well as reflects leadership performance on efficient representation and delivery of the dividends of good governance to the people Diamond (1999). The civil society groups are parameters that guides democratic governance in a way that maintains its principles such as advocating for economic opportunities, rule of law, freedom of the press, provision of basic infrastructural facilities, guarantee of oppositions, and a regular free and fair election etc. In a real sense, civil society groups are representing the interest of the people irrespective of the religion and culture affiliation especially in emerging democracies such as Nigeria Ikelegbe (2007), Hearn (2001). In view of the constitutional backing of the civil society groups, democracy is safe in Nigeria as civil society groups organized activities through protest and educating the people on leadership selection. A real example in Nigeria and even recently joined active politics, the Labour Union in Nigeria

metamorphosed into party which contest almost all electoral posts during the 2023 elections.

As Nigeria return to democracy governance in the Fourth Republic, political analysts, the academics and civil society groups have paid serious attention to the practice of democracy in Nigeria and are much more concerned about the consolidation of power among competing political parties. Consequently, on this development, there have been several challenges that confronted democratic practice especially during election. These include, human rights abuses, corruption, political thuggery, anti-party activities, god-fatherism, violence, ethnic and religious conflicts all of which have continued unabated. These challenges frequently emerged from the political elites who want power at all costs in the country. Therefore, democratic consolidation cannot be restored until sanity is restored in polity by reducing to the barest minimum or total elimination of the aforementioned challenges.

Democratic consolidation literally refers to the deliberate political process in a polity by which democracy is broadly legitimized among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down Ouyang (2009). It means a democratic process that cannot come to an

end suddenly or abruptly through unconstitutional acts such as military coups or dictatorships. It implies established stability in governance. A consolidated democratic system would mean the existence of an enhanced economic development, developed democratic culture, stable party system and a well refined political process that ensures continuous democratic practices. Thus, consolidating democracy reflects improvement of the practice in order to avoid democratic breakdown. This research focuses on the role of civil societies in Nigeria during the transition to civil rule between 1993 and 1999. The questions that arises from this stated objective is: how did the civil societies assist in the transition to civil rule in Nigeria during the period under study? What was the efficacy of the methods being used by some of the civil societies in Nigeria? These two questions thus establish the focus of the current research. In this way, the article is divided into sections to respond to the states objective. In conducting the research, we employ the use of Democratic Peace Theory which establishes the correlation between societal stability and democracy. It is the assumption of the theory that country that practices democracy stands a better chance of embracing peace than authoritarian regime.

Methods of Data Collection

The adopted methodology in carrying out data collection for this study are two methods (primary and secondary sources). The primary source, which employs qualitative techniques such as textual mining of speeches and interviews while the other means is content analysis of secondary sources data. The secondary sources of data collection included magazines, Newspapers, government publications and other scholarly materials on the study.

Concept of Modern Civil Society Groups

Modern civil society operate the realm of organised social life that are voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from the society in general that involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passion, preference, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on state, to improve the structure and

functioning of the state, and to hold state officials accountable Diamond (1997). Similarly, civil society represents one of the conditions that is widely agreed to be an essential and integral part of a functioning democracy in a democratic space such as Nigeria. Additionally, civil society is an amalgam of a substantial network of actively autonomous, organised groups pursuing a multiplicity of diverse individual interests outside the sphere of the state authority. Group participation is voluntary, and groups are free to be formed around any set of socio-economic or cultural interests. There is widespread participation in group activity, and individuals have multiple group memberships reflecting aspects of their individuality Perlin (2008).

However, the concept of civil society according to Whitehead (2002: 73) means a lot, which includes: (a) civil societies are relatively independent of both public authorities and private unit of production and reproduction of firms and formulation, (b) civil societies are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in promotion of their interests or passion, (c) civil societies do not seek to replace other state agents or private producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a

whole,(d) civil societies do agree to act within pro-established rules of a civil or legal nature,(e) civil societies, therefore, is not a simple but a compound property which rests on three conditions or norms, which includes: dual autonomy, interrelated actions, and civility. The concept of civility is a form of voluntary association or organizations distributed evenly across the geographical and social terrain covered by the modern territorial state. These view are supported by Uadiale (2011), who notes that civil society is an inherent pluralistic realm distinct from, yet interacting with the state and processes of production, consisting of numerous associations and organized around specific interest with the following in common, communally organized, independent, voluntary autonomy, able to firm links with other interest groups and do not in any way seek to set themselves up as an alternative to the state.

In a similar vein, Diamond (1997) observes that civil society is the realm of organized social life that opens, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous state, and bound by a legal order or set of share rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their

interests, passion, preference, and ideas, to exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state, and to hold state official accountable. Perlin (2008) opens that civil society represents one of the conditions that is widely agreed to be an essential and integral part of a functioning democracy in a democratic space such as Nigeria. Additionally, civil society is an existence of a substantial network of active autonomous, organise groups pursuing a multiplicity of diverse individual interests outside the sphere of the state authority, group participation is voluntary, groups are free to form around any set of socio-economic, or cultural interests, there is widespread of citizens' participation in group activity, and individuals have multiple group memberships reflecting aspects of their individual.

Jessop et al (2008) describe civil society as possible peace building functions, including the protection of citizens, monitoring for accountability, advocacy and public communication, community building, and facilitation between citizens and state. Afterward, civil society is also an organisation that involves in peace negotiation at local and international level to

assist in bridging the gap between the antagonist and protagonist groups. St. John and Kew (2008) support with the views that civil society groups can help bring greater public representation into negotiation during peace process. Civil society, however, speaks with many voices and stands in the shadow of domination by political elites. Civil society is not uniform; it comes in many organisational forms, it can have varying degree of autonomy from the state, and sometimes, it can even serve as a substitute for the state when government fail to serve their population needs. Orvis (2001) notes that the civil society as a public sphere of formal or informal, collective activity autonomous from recognizing the legitimate existence of the state. This definition allows the inclusion of a wide array of political activity, whether long-established or quite recent. It also consists with the broad range of the use of the concept.

Political Party, Party System, and Political Representation

The ultimate objective of political party is to capture power of the state which forms the basis of political representation be in the legislative, and the executive. What is political party? Political party is political group who work together to influence the

government. They try to get members of their party elected to political offices, such as, the presidency, the governorship, and the legislative assemblies. The concept is also an assembly of socio-political interaction. These members select party leaders depending on the size of the country. Thus, there is party identification by which they are known to the electorate (party logo). Therefore, a political party serves four interests to its members and the electorate. They are: (1) Recognition of the members and the public especially the electorate. (2) Recruitment of its members for representation through campaigns and selection of electoral candidates into public offices. (3) A political party which paves the way for leadership either in the legislative or executive arm. (4) A political party maintains alternative power under a presidential system of government Egwemi (2009).

Political party is defined by a central function of political office. The broad function of the political party starts from filling the political office and wielding of governmental power. The main functions are as follows: first, representation refers to political parties responding to and articulating the view of party members and the electorate. Secondly, the elites' formation and recruitment recognise the parties of all kinds and are

responsible for providing democratic states with their political leaders. Thirdly, goal formation is the responsibility of the political parties to capture power through viable manifestoes with open campaign promises. Fourthly, interest articulation and aggregation are mechanisms for the parties to develop nationally without any preferential treatment. Lastly, socialisation and mobilisation through internal debate and discussion as well as campaigns and electoral competition, whereby parties engage in political education and socialisation Anifowose and Enemuo (2005).

Party system is a network of relationships through which parties interact and influence democratisation process and condition for consolidation of the political system. The most popular way of distinguishing party system is the reference to number of parties competing for power. In these views, there are one party, two party and multi-party systems which are designed for participation and competition in a federal state. Thus, in one-party system, a ruling party effectively functions as a permanent government. In two-party system, power alternates between two major parties. In multi-party system, no party is large enough to rule alone, leading to a system of coalition government. The

significance of political party allows smooth running of a representative government by party system. Therefore, the total number of political parties in a democratic state constitutes the party system. The pattern of relationship among parties only constitutes a system it is characterised by stability and degree of orderliness. Furthermore, party system shapes the political process in various ways. It influences the range and nature of choice available to the electorate and affects the cohesion and stability of government. It also determines the relationships between the legislature and the executive as well as the general character of the political behaviour in this state Egwemi (2009).

The concept of democracy implies the ultimate authority of governance should rest on the people themselves. When this idea is sought to be implemented through the mechanism of representative democracy, it is possible that the people may become inactive after choosing their representatives for the next general elections. Moreover, when the size of a democratic society expands geographically and it includes a large population with a variety of characteristics in terms of race, religion, language and culture, the distance between the people and their representatives is likely to widen.

Modern democracy largely works through its representatives' institutions. The selection of electoral candidates from the experience he/she possesses in the community. The problem of selection occurs because to select a talents and good character take serious procedure at the constituency level. However, the proportional representation is guaranteed system, be it to elect persons or parties, citizens elect representatives who will literally represent their views in the legislative assembly. In voting for a particular party or persons under a proportional representation system, voters cannot make good predictions as to the effect of their votes on the final policy choices that will be made by the legislature. Policy outcomes will depend on the relative strengths of the parties holding seats and on voting rule aggregating their preferences. In a two-party system, voters know that the party they vote for will be able to implement campaign promises, if it wins elections Mueller (2000).

The practice of democracy has attained an ideological position and this attitude continues to wave authoritarian regime for democratic rule. Therefore, several features of democratic representation, such as, delegated political institutions, admission of

justice, basic human rights, credible elections, good governance, freedom of media, and civil society participation, democracy will flourish. It would also prevent, and help resolves social, ethnic, and regional conflicts. Indeed, the new democracies have fostered freedom, elections, and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation, and participation despite positive experiments at the beginning of democratisation. Tornquist *et al* (2009).

Representative democracy requires democratic transformation with reference to relationships between delegated members and the citizen. Representative democracy is placed on account of some elements, such as, nature, welfare, interest, and wants. Representative democracy also recognises adequate consultation of the constituencies by the constituent members. Representative democracy simply improves the statutory responsibility of members in the parliament when they are delegated to various committees in the state Pitkin (1967). Representative democracy was a powerful tool of legitimation of the actions of government that is in power, even if they have just lost an election, the alternation of power continues to deepen democracy. In this

construction, representative guarantees that legislature expresses the will of the people, who cannot wish to harm themselves, and the doctrine of the answerability of the executive to the legislature ensures that the delegated power is not abused, but an instrument of the checks and balances of democratic government Omotola (2009). Representative government reflects public interest from where legitimacy was established. The constituent units are represented as the parliamentarians are acting on behalf of the people that established democratic institutions by the votes. In this sense, the various constituencies of a state should relate with the legislative members in a way of changing the public opinions and this reflects political representation of Nigeria Civil Society in 2015.

Struggle of NADECO and Pro-Democracy Groups

Beforehand, Nigeria's socio-political interaction oscillated between democratic rules or military regimes until after the transition to the democratic regime of 1999. During this transitional period a lot of political issues manifested as a result of wishing to install democracy in the country at all costs. This era took different dimensions for the liberalisation of democracy in the

country. It is on record that Nigeria had hitherto established three democratic regimes; First Republic (1960-1966), Second Republic (1979-1983), and the Third Republic (1993-1998), which were aborted by the military regimes through coup d'état. The extension of the third democratic regime was a political proposal of General Babangida who annulled the June 12 general elections. The annulment was a fundamental issue that affected the corporate affair of the country in 1993. This annulment would eventually be the turning point in the transition to democracy in Nigeria because the country was not only tired of the military rule, but also the political groups of the six geopolitical zones wanted to rotate the power of the country in accordance with democratic principles (Omotoso and Oyeranmi (2014) .

The heads of military dictators, General Babangida and Lieutenant General Abacha established a political proposal that accommodated the transition to a democratic regime between 1990 and 1993. The idea of transition filled the political environment with the hope that civilian rule would become a real agenda in the country because the local government and gubernatorial elections were conducted in the federation of Nigeria. These elections were conducted by the Independent

National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1991. Three years after, a presidential election was also conducted under the military regime. The two contestants, Chief Moshood Abiola and Alhaji Bashir Tofa both accepted the results, as well as the international observers who claimed the outcome was free and fair in 1993 Ogbogbo (2009). The electoral mandate of the two political aspirants who won the 1993 presidential election (Chief Abiola and Basir Tofa) was free and fair in the country. Unsurprisingly, the military cabal established unending democratic projects because the presidential election was annulled without any reason Igbokwe (2013).

The political artistry of the two Army Generals in dealing with the transition project started from the registration of political parties which failed the electoral system in Nigeria. The failure of the political proposal was constraint by various predicaments, such as the non-readiness of the civilian population to actualise promises of the manifestos, non-commitment of the military to withdraw to the barracks, and the judiciary was a weak institution and it is not independent to challenge political atrocities of the military regimes then Agbase (1999). All of these characters dispelled the

democratisation process between 1990 and 1993.

The annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election by General Babangida and the establishment of the Interim National Government (ING) for six months made Nigerians vulnerable. Thus, the democratisation process in Nigeria involved active civil society groups together with electoral action that would engender democracy. This strategy of liberalisation towards democratisation also witnessed the activities of civil society movements which condemned the military regime at all quarters in the country. Therefore, this action translated to protests for the democratic government that would attend to the needs and demands of the people. The *modus operandi* for the liberalisation to democratisation in the country was motivated by both internal and external factors. One of the internal forces which heightened the quest for liberalisation in the political environment was the driving force of the pro-democracy activities in designing strong strategies as well as aspiration to organise democracy with the hope of electoral representation, such as a National Assembly, a governorship, local and presidential elections, which all respectively manifested a

full democratic wheel between 1991 and 1993. The effort of civil society group was to fall and lead the country to democracy by the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO); this anti-Abacha group was established in 1994 from the South-West geopolitical axis Adegbabiri and Chuks, (2015). The general objectives of the civil group was that the 1993, June 12 election must be actualised for Chief Moshood Abiola, and it would be a political forum for the Yoruba community to address other issues that bothered the country Omotoso and Oyeranmi, (2015).

The political strategy of the Campaign for Democracy (CD) jointly influenced the struggle against the military regime after the overthrowing of the interim national government (ING) by General Abacha in 1993. The political activities of the (CD) civil society in mobilising the people against the autocratic movement of the military regime and compiling the June 12 electoral results from the database of the National Electoral Commission (NEC). As a result of this struggle, massive protests from the South-West were organised. Correspondingly, other civil society groups, such as the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), the National Association

of Nigerian Students (NANS), the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASSU), and the National Association of Lawyers (NAL) all took a stand in the promotion of democracy Ihonvebere, (1996).

General Abacha's military policy obviously worked against the transition to democracy between 1993 and 1998. Among the external factors which added to the struggle in the campaign against Abacha was the arrest of Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader of Ogoni ethnic minority group from the South-South of Nigeria. President Bill Clinton of the United States of America delegated Jesse Jackson as a special envoy to negotiate with General Abacha to rescind the death penalty passed against the detainees of civil protest Westra, (1998). The execution of human rights fighters and eight others took place successfully in 1995. This reflected on the Commonwealth after pleading for a non-violation of the international charter. The action of the military in the violation of human rights obviously resulted in the removal of Nigeria from the international organisation in 1995 Adebani, (2004). The motion was raised by President Mandela at the meeting on the ground that General Abacha had violated the international rule for publicly hanging Ken Saro Wiwa and eight

others after a military tribunal turned a deaf ear to the Commonwealth of Nations Mngomezulu, (2015).

The military regime was independent of its policies on socio-economic and political issues in the country. Evidently, Abacha's government was condemned both internally and externally because of the increase in the number of political detainees and the mismanagement of the economy. The three decades of military dictatorship was filled with corruption, abuse of human rights, and a decayed economy. Nevertheless, Abacha's government was terminated by the sudden death of the dictator in 1998 Mai-Lafia, (2015). The aftermath of General Abacha's death contributed to the growth of the democratisation in Nigeria. His second in command, General Abubakar Abdulsalam took over the government, and released all political detainees from prisons Maier (2002). The political agenda of General Abdulsalam was to lead the military back to the barracks in 1998. Based on this promise, elections were conducted in the federation of Nigeria for the posts of governorship, local government, National Assembly, and the presidency in 1999. The military regime handed over power to Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999. The transition to democracy was

engaged by government through consent and this paves the way for democratic norms that would lead the character of democratisation and democratic consolidation. The pattern of transition to democracy in Nigeria accommodated the joint effort of the military, the people, and civil society groups, and each of these performed their tasks to achieve the same goals Lewis (1999).

The general obstacles to democratisation of the new democracies are as follows; first, it foresees the political inexperience of the new democratic governments. Second, the new political leaders that emerged established democracy in line with undemocratic ideologies that worked against the principles and mechanisms of democratisation. Political leaders may not want to leave power, and thus create authoritarian regimes, and those who remain long in power in such regimes usually become adamant, opposing democratisation. Third, the anti-democratic culture would impede the spread of democratic norms in the society, deny the legitimacy to the democratic institutions, and thus greatly complicate, if not prevent, the emergence and effective functioning of the institutions, e.g., Islam, traditional philosophy, and undemocratic movements. Lastly, high levels of poverty and inequality

impede the growth of democratisation. In this construction, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Sudan are mentioned as countries that witnessed these challenges between 1974 and 1983 Huntington (1991).

Socio-economic Issues in Nigeria and Democratic Struggle

The fluctuation of oil price in the Nigerian economy was a major challenge in economic sector between 1999 and 2015. This is because the country runs her socio-political and economic mainly on oil as the mono-product. At the tune of the 21st Century, the oil price dropped at the international market. This immediately affects democratic government in Nigeria with a process of manipulation of oil prices (hike) for the sustainability of democratisation process. The focus on the governmental policy is consistent in the country after re-democratisation of the Fourth Republic as the oil price is skyrocketed because successive governments increased the oil price from twenty naira to uncertainty price after the

initiation of democracy. Although, President Goodluck Jonathan increased the oil price to ninety-seven naira in 2012 from sixty-five naira after the death of President Umar Yar'Adua in 2009, his regime was down in political legitimacy in 2015 and this forced the price of oil to eighty-seven naira on the basis of his re-election Usman and Ibrahim (2012). Against this backdrop, the expectation of the Nigerian people remains the socio-economic development which could reflect reasonable on oil price in the country. Therefore, oil plays a significant role in democratisation process in Nigeria

since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1999. The resumption of President Muhammadu Buhari in 2015 was not a surprise to Nigerians. The oil price was hiked to one hundred and forty-five naira per litre. Comparatively, the magnitude in the oil price after the initiation of democracy in 1999 was skyrocketing as compare to the military regime of the past which maintained stable price in the country. Before the transition to democracy in 1999, the price of oil under General Abacha/General Abdusalam's regime was twenty naira in 1998.

Table 1: Petroleum Price Adjustment in Nigeria 2000-2015

S/N	Date	Administration	Price	% Change
1	2000	Obasanjo	#20	–
2	2000	Obasanjo	#22	+10%
3	2001	Obasanjo	#26	+18%
4	2003	Obasanjo	#40	+54%
5	2004	Obasanjo	#45	+13%

6	2007	Obasanjo	#70	+56%
7	2007-2009	Yar-Adua	#65	-7%
8	2010-2012	Jonathan	#65	–
9	2012	Jonathan	#97	+49%
10	2014	Jonathan	#87	-10%
11	2016	Buhari	#145	+67%

Source: [Bello-Imam 2012, 184]

Table 1 reflects the history of pump price fluctuation in Nigeria. Fluctuation of oil prices in the country from the administration of President Obasanjo who inherited the pump price from the military regime in 1999 was chequered. It has been shown in the table above that between 2000 and 2007, the percentage changes in the price of oil was unstable after the inauguration of democratic rule. Therefore, seven years of governance in Nigeria witnessed continuous changes in the oil price. Furthermore, President Yar'Adua's administration adjusted the price of oil down in the country and it favourably dropped to -7 per cent between 2007 and 2009. The trend in oil hikes manifested between 2012 and 2016 as elected president Jonathan and Buhari pronounced publicly after their official resumption to the office. Thus, one of the implications of oil hikes in the country is

that the economic livelihood of the common people is considerably affected as a result of inflation.

The implication is that Nigerians would spend more of their meagre income and that there may be inflation on some consumable goods in the country. However, the work of Huntington on the notion that oil hikes in some countries remained the major transition to democratic rule is refuted in the Nigerian case, particularly on the fluctuation of oil prices between 2000 and 2015. This position is quite different because every successive democratic government in Nigeria suggested the oil hikes as the only surviving means of sustaining the economy between 1999 and 2015.

Challenges to Civil Society Groups

Nigeria as a nation state is charged with the energy of civil society groups that operate for various developments, part of these developments is a quick transformation from the authoritarian government to a democratic rule in 1999. These achievements are in varying degrees, which include the successful elections that took place in the political space as well as the people hope of and aspirations that their rights would be protected. Dramatically, the civil society groups in Nigeria are exclusive associations that perform civic responsibility towards engendering and empowering the state and its people in all ramifications. The synergy that evolved these constitutional responsibilities are germane to vibrant and effective civic groups.

Some of these civic groups are: Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), Constitutional Right Project (CRP), Campaign for Democracy (CD), National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), United Democratic Front (UDF), Nigerian Union of Journalism (NUJ), Academic Senior Staff of Nigerian University (ASSU), Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), Nigerian Student Union (NSU), Nigerian Association of Teachers

(NAT) etc. In the same sense, Imode (2002) mentioned further that: Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Ijaw Youth Movement (IYM), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), and Arewa People's Congress (APC) altogether are part of civic groups, as well as they have participated in various struggles and democratic programmes in the state with regard to human right movement against the military rules particularly after the annulment of June 12 general elections and the brutal way of killing Ken Saro Wiwa by Sani Abacha in 1995, are manifestation that evolved with pressure to transform the country into an egalitarian system.

In view of these facts, Nigerians' dreams were actualized in 1999 with the hope and fortunes that the principle and values of democracy would be entrenched in the system for future without any authoritarian interception. Therefore, the elections that declared Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the winners are living examples for the emergence of Fourth Republic and several elections that succeeded rekindled the image good of Nigeria. But the inherent challenge is that the civic activity declines after the transition into democratic rule. This is the rationale why the study is relevant to explain

the dilemma, as there is no smoke without fire. Diamond (1997) explicitly states that the social society movement and other civic society actors inevitably declines after the transition, as the authoritarian state disappears, political parties and more established interest groups dominate stage, and more people turn to more private concern. For example, in Africa (Nigeria) has not been adapting so much as retreat and dissipation of energy. The broad forms of religious, professional, student, labour, and other associations broke up once their common goal of bringing down a despised regime had been achieved. Class and ethnic divisions once again fragmented society, and the relationship ranks of civil society rapidly depleted as activists were drawn into politics, government and business.

As part of the challenge, the ethnic militias movement in each geopolitical political zone of Nigeria has weakened the corporate existence which came on board through democratic processes. In view of these findings, the Nigerian civil society groups can be categorised into two parallel opposite, one creating, and the other destroying. This has characterized Nigerian democracy as de-democratising. The concept of de-democratising was highlighted by Momoh

(2006) from the experience of Nigerian political system where the expectation of democracy is not forthcoming on the people but on the few elites that improve their material condition with their entourage. Adebani (2004) argues that the problem which impedes Nigerian civil society is of threefold, firstly, structural factors as connected to the government-civil society relations can be determined by the extent of division, inequality, and conflict between the rulers and the rest of the society as well as the extent to which every member of the society have sense of belonging and well-being. Secondly, institutional factors which maintain the administrative practices and law that enthrone secrecy in governance. Lastly, individual factors also contribute to this because the authority in various states and local government use the instrument of hegemony to control the people of their environment to ignore any social relations that may affect them, so, the civil society would not have access to these people for any discussion that are required.

It is no doubt that civil society organizations in Nigeria have had considerable influence on democracy and electoral practices in Nigeria. However, certain issues militate against the effective operation of civil society

organization in Nigeria, one of which according to Ogu (2011) is the issue of insufficient funds. Most civil society organizations rely on government funding for their various operations, which is not a healthy phenomenon as it breeds loyalty of civil society to government in power. Similarly, the appointment of civil society leaders into offices has also affected the character and ideology of such society. In the same connection, Adebani (2004) incorporates an enigma attitude of top officials toward corruption which is an internal problem that arises out of the civil society organization. The sincerity and transparency of civil society organization in the area of handling funds and support given to them by the donor agencies, politicians, corporate organizations, and government agencies for anti-corruption crusade is doubtful. Substantial amounts of the money given to some of them are frittered into private pockets of some Executive Directors and other senior members of the organization. Only little is spent on anti-graft programmes.

Furthermore, civil society groups in Nigeria failed to transcend ethno-religious and regional cleavages and some undermined the struggle to eradicate corruption in the country. Attempts by some sections of civil

society to check the activities of the state official from particular ethnic, religion, or region are usually interpreted by other sections of the civil society as ethnic and religious bias. A typical example was the case of former speaker of the Federal House of Representatives, Alhaji Salisu Buhari, who was removed from office for falsifying his age and educational qualifications. The immediate response of Buhari's constituency in Northern Nigeria to the allegation was to describe it as a fabrication aimed at destroying the political career of a budding politician. From the foregoing, it is observed that the civil society in Nigeria lacks strategy of tackling the problems. Similarly, much of the challenges that civil society face in Nigeria are self-inflicted as they have not been found to effectively utilize the strategy of mass mobilization and mass support from across the country.

Research Findings and Discussion

The overall assessment of the role of civil society and other entities within the national political space reinforces the importance of having resilient institutions that can sustain the tempo of political tension in Nigeria. In an attempt to mobilize the public against the

authoritarian regime of Abacha by civil societies, the study found the complicit role of security agents in victimizing the populace. Such victimization, the research found, led to the mass exodus of political and social activists to the western world, most importantly the United States and Britain. The collapse of military regime in 1999 and eventual transition to the civil rule has revealed that the general public in Nigeria was tired of military regimes of Babangida and Abacha. In addition, the research found that the ethnic tension within the national polity collapsed towards the tail end of the Abacha regime as Nigerians unanimously wanted Moshood Abiola to be declared winner of the annulled election. The tribal and ethnical tension that hitherto dictated the political landscape of Nigeria collapsed considerably as Nigerians wanted transition to civil rule. It needs to be stressed further here that between 1999 and 2023, Nigeria has not enjoined, in substantial term, the dividend

of democracy they all suffered to promote under the military regime.

Conclusion

Liberal democracy is charged with the energy of modern civil society groups that operate for various developments, part of these developments is a quick transformation from the authoritarian government to a democratic rule in 1999. These achievements are -in varying degrees, which include the successful elections that took place in the political space as well as the people aspirations that their rights would be protected. Dramatically, the modern civil society groups in the country are exclusive associations that perform civic responsibility towards engendering and empowering the state and its people in all ramifications.

The modern civil society is akin to democratic development in recent time. The concept of democratic development involves the political institutions as realms in the state, which accommodates several political demands from the people, especially in a fragmented environment political space like Nigeria. Democratic development is connected to the collective enterprise of the people in the political environment. Thus, people are the agents and means of achieving

democratic values in socio-economic development. Remarkably, if people are the end result of democratic development, their well-being is the supreme law of development. But the well-being of the people will only be supreme law of development if they have some decisions-making power. Additionally, public opinion is the only value that is principally essential in the democratic space of Nigeria. Therefore, the functions of the modern civil society groups are to channel these elements in a manner that will entrench people's general well-being.

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AN EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MEDIA ON CREATING AWARENESS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN KADUNA NORTH, KADUNA STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Domestic violence is a global public health concern with detrimental effects on women physical, mental and social wellbeing. However, there is a lack of community based studies assessing the effect of social media on domestic violence in Kaduna North of Kaduna State, Nigeria. The study assessed the role of social media in creating awareness of domestic violence in Kaduna North of Kaduna State. The objectives of the study were to: determine the role of social media coverage of domestic violence related issues in Kaduna North of Kaduna State Nigeria and examine the level of social media awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence related issues in Kaduna North. To achieve these objectives, two research questions were asked. The study employed a Survey research design with a sample size of 252 using Krejcie and Morgan statistical sampling formula. Descriptive analysis was adopted for the study; this involves the use of a percentage and a mean score. The study concluded that the social media has a special role to play in stemming the tide of domestic violence through frequent coverage and proper awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence-related issues. The study recommended among others that to address effectively the issue of domestic violence in Kaduna North of Kaduna State, Nigeria, social media organizations should always be involved by the security agencies when any domestic violence-related cases are being treated to create more awareness of domestic violence to deter the existing and future intended domestic violence in society.

Keywords: *Domestic Violence, Krejcie and Morgan, Social Media*

Introduction

Social media has become a prominent activity in the lives of many individuals facing the challenges of domestic violence. Social media refers broadly to web and

mobile platforms that allow individuals to connect with others within a virtual network (such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, or LinkedIn), where they can share, co-create, or exchange various forms of digital content, including information,

messages, photos, or videos (Ahmed et al. 2019). It is an indispensable agent of development in any nation given their invaluable contribution to raising the consciousness of society. The metaphor of the media as a watchdog is an indication of its watchful role in any society. Interestingly, the media not only serve as a watchdog but also guides the public toward change. Information is the basis for effecting change as well as tackling the consequence of change (Agudosy & Ikegbunam, 2020). The information needed to run an open and successful society is, to a large extent, provided by the social media. The information-disseminating role of this “estate” is a veritable tool for change. Adeyemi (2006) says that "throughout the history of mankind, the press has always occupied the forefront of sociopolitical and economic changes". From the foregoing, we can safely say that the media's role in the running of the affairs of a society is that which cannot be relegated. To this effect, the media is believed to be the most powerful instrument that can influence our values beliefs, attitudes, thoughts, and behaviours; sometimes consciously and at other times unconsciously, reinforce negatively personal, societal, and cultural precepts regarding any

form of violence (Didiugwu & Akinyemi, 2023).

For some time now in Nigerian society, there have been shocking news of domestic violence in every nook and cranny of the country. It is becoming routine for one to wake up and hear or read the news of domestic violence. Wives are murdered by their husbands, unmarried ladies are daily murdered by a rejected lover, and other forms of inhuman treatment are meted out mostly to the female and unsafe abortion (Donohoe 2006, Onoh et al. 2013). In recent times the media is filled with highprofile cases of domestic violence cases mostly where a man is suspected to murder his spouse (Abdul, 2014). The author reports that an outpouring of anger, shock, and grief has accompanied the death of a popular gospel singer, Osinachi Nwachukwu. Who is believed to have been a victim of domestic violence, allegedly at the hands of her husband, Peter Nwachukwu? Though the suspect denies it and he remains innocent unless a competent court decides otherwise, Osinachi’s demise and the allegations however draw attention to the rising incidence of domestic violence in the country. Osinachi, reportedly suffered prolonged abuse, ultimately dying due to the social and criminal malaise, leaving behind

her traumatized children and aged mother. Though reportedly bedridden for a while, friends, family members, colleagues and acquaintances insist that the 'golden voiced' singer was a victim of domestic battery. In Nigeria, most victimized women fail to report violent cases, thereby, suffering in silence as a result of shameful stigma, protection of their children and avoidance of divorce.

We can say that domestic violence is the intentional and persistent abuse of anyone in the home in a way that causes pain, distress, or injury (Animasaun, 2016). It is an abusive treatment (physically or psychologically) of a family member by another, therefore violating the law of basic human rights. It includes battering of intimate partners and others, sexual abuse of children, marital rape, and traditional practices that are harmful to women. Domestic violence occurs universally (Lennard, 2020.). Families from all walks of life and as well from social, racial economic, educational and religious backgrounds experience domestic violence in one way or the other. In the United States of America, according to a report by Tjaden and Thoennes (2008), each year, women experience about 4.8 million intimate partner related physical assaults and rapes while men are victims of about 2.9 million intimate

partner-related physical assaults. In West Africa, domestic violence is prevalent and reportedly justified and to an extent allowed in some cultures. The National Human Rights Commission received over 1.7 million sexual and gender-based violence complaints in 2021. Many more are never reported. It said 900,000 of the complaints were from women and children. A Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey 2018 report disclosed that on average, 14 per cent of women who were surveyed have experienced physical violence.

In Kaduna State, domestic violence is perpetuated among other factors, by harmful traditional practices. In Kaduna State also, acts of violence are not necessarily physical. They include all forms of cruelty, for example, denigration and refusal of affection or sexual satisfaction. They include forcing a woman (married or not) to have sex, lack of moral support for a woman, and the effects of sharing a husband (National Domestic Violence Hotline NDVH, 2020). They also include attempting to control a woman's relationships with the wider community, friends, colleagues, or relatives. Furthermore, they include the use of derogatory words and purposeful attempts to make a woman feel incompetent, worthless, or inferior. Domestic

violence is widespread and shows no signs of lessening in society. It can equally be observed that solutions seem not to be insightful. However, the prevention of domestic violent violence rests on the shoulder of broadcast media to inform and create awareness of domestic violence (Raji, 2019).

For the foregoing reasons, social media coverage of the activities associated with practices of domestic violence in Kaduna State becomes an important issue. News content can create the necessary awareness needed by society to promote development including in the areas that concern any form of domestic violence. To do this, it is also pertinent that such coverage comes with framed reports (Mead & Kelty, 2018). Framing, thus, would direct the perception of the audience such as taking condemnatory stances against such practices that demean people in society. Because social media influence large numbers of people, they also have the potential to play a positive role in the struggle against violence at home. The vital role played by the social media in society is of pivotal importance in confronting domestic violence. One of the roles is creating awareness, in this case, issues to do with domestic violence in society. The social

media also updates the audience on what is currently going on. Another role of broadcast media is to reflect public opinion on wide range of issues. Given these, the need to examine the role of social media in creating awareness of domestic violence in Kaduna becomes important.

The problem of the study stems from the fact that the rising spate of domestic violence in our society cast doubt on the ability of social media in creating awareness of domestic violence as it relates to the frequency of coverage, follow-up reported domestic, patterns of framing on the causes and level of social media awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence is a source of concern. It is against this backdrop that the study assessed the role of social media in creating awareness of domestic violence in the Kaduna North, Kaduna State.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to evaluate the role of social media in creating awareness of domestic violence in the Kaduna North, Kaduna State. While the specific objectives of the study are to;

- i. Determine the frequency of social media coverage of domestic violence-

related issues in Kaduna North, Kaduna State.

- ii. Examine the level of social media awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence related issues in Kaduna North, Kaduna State.

Research Questions

Based on the objectives of the study, the following questions were asked to guide the study.

- i. What is the frequency of social media coverage of domestic violence-related issues in Kaduna North, Kaduna State?
- ii. What is the level of social media awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence related issues in Kaduna North, Kaduna State?

Research Hypothesis

Based on the questions, the study formulated one hypothesis.

H₀₁: Social media awareness creation has no significant effect of domestic violence in Kaduna North, Kaduna State.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

To enhance the understanding of this study, it is necessary to put the discourse in a conceptual context to provide a framework for analysis. Thus, we can proceed to clarify the concepts of Domestic Violence and social Media.

2.1.1 Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is an act of intimidation, physical, verbal or emotional abuse that has become an epidemic (Didiugwu & Akinyemi, 2023). Domestic violence is not new to the Nigerian society. Domestic violence happens across all sectors of society. It cuts across the educated and the illiterate, the religious and the freethinkers, classes of career women and stay-at-home wives, the married and the single as well as all ages (Project Alert, 2016).

Domestic violence is a form of violence that occurs in a situation of intimate or family relationship. Females usually are often victims of this form of violence. Therefore, domestic violence can be defined as physical abuse, sexual abuse, and emotional and verbal abuse between people who have at some time had an intimate or family relationship. Fawole, Aderonmu and Fawole (2015) observed that domestic violence against women is an intimate or family relationship. This would exclude childhood

abuse, which could also be seen as a form of domestic violence in the context of the above definition. What constitutes physical, sexual, emotional and verbal abuse against women oftentimes would be influenced by the sociocultural norms of a particular society.

According to Adebayo (2014), domestic violence also known as domestic abuse, spousal abuse, battering, family violence, dating abuse and intimate partner violence (IPV) a pattern of behaviour which involves the abuse by one partner against another in an intimate relationship such marriage, collaboration, dating or within the family. In addition, domestic violence can take many other forms including physical aggression, assault (hitting, kicking biting, shoving, restraining, slapping, throwing objects; battery), or threats thereof; sexual abuse, emotional abuse, controlling or domineering intimidation stalking; passive, covert abuse and economic deprivation. It could be perpetrated on both men and women.

The National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (NCADV) (2015) views domestic violence as the willful intimidation, physical assault, battery, sexual assault and or other abusive behaviour as part of a systematic pattern of power and control perpetrated by one intimate partner against another. It

includes physical violence, sexual violence, threats and emotional or psychological abuse. NCADV sees domestic violence as control by one partner over another in a dating, marital or live-in relationship. The means of control include physical, sexual, emotional and economic abuse, threats and isolation.

2.2 Forms of domestic Violence

As reported by Bahago (2022), a person may experience a variety of forms of abuse which include:

- i. Physical abuse: This is one of the most prevalent types of abuse, with 83% of respondents in Obi and Ozumba's study reporting physical abuse. It includes beating, kicking, knocking, punching, choking, and confinement. Female genital mutilation is also considered physical abuse.
- ii. Sexual abuse This includes all types of sexual assaults, harassment, or exploitation, including coercing someone into having sex, using a child for sexual activity, including child pornography and child prostitution, and marital rape.
- iii. Neglect: This includes withholding food, clothing, shelter, medical care,

protection from harm, or a sense of being loved and valued from dependents, who may be adults or children.

- iv. Economic abuse This refers to taking from or defrauding a loved one, withholding money for necessities like food and medical care, manipulating or exploiting a family member for financial gain, preventing a loved one from working or controlling his or her choice of occupation, as well as manipulating or exploiting a family member for sexual or other purposes.
- v. Spiritual Abuse includes preventing someone from partaking in their religious or spiritual practises or using their religion as a means of dominating, controlling, or manipulating them.
- vi. Emotional Abuse includes name-calling, criticism, social exclusion, intimidating or exploitation to dominate, routinely making unreasonable demands, and endangering a person's sense of self-worth by putting him/her at risk of serious behavioural, cognitive, emotional, or mental disorders.

2.3 Effects Domestic Violence

Children are frequently the primary victims of domestic violence because witnessing abuse and living in an environment where someone else, typically a care giver, is a victim of abuse can be psychologically devastating for a child. Victims of domestic violence are frequently in a position of dependence (financial, emotional, physical, and otherwise) on the person abusing them, such as a husband and wife, children and parents, dependent relatives, elderly parents, and domestic servants.

According to Straus (1994), children who experience physical abuse from their parents are more likely to experience depression and have suicidal thoughts than children whose parents use other forms of discipline. Some researchers have also discovered that children whose mothers experienced physical abuse from their partners have IQs that are lower than average (BBC. New Education, 2003). Violence is a threat to adolescents' well-being, according to Anikweze (1998): the adolescent may be socialised to engage in violent behaviour; he or she may experience confusion and anger; the anger may be directed at parents or other children; the adolescent may exhibit aggressive behaviour, becoming disruptive

at home and at school; they may also become withdrawn, isolating themselves from others; and they may perform academically below par (CDC, 2006). An abused child, for example, may grow up not to trust other people, may enter relationships with an aggressive mode, or may become withdrawn, afraid to enter intimate relationships. This usually results in involvement in risky sexual behaviour.

2.4 Theoretical Review

Domestic violence is a complex issue that involves the chronic abuse of power. It goes beyond physical violence and includes calculated threats, intimidation, and control. Often, actual physical violence is the end result of months or years of such intimidation and control. Various theoretical perspectives have been proposed to explain domestic violence. Here are some common ones: Social Learning Theory suggests that individuals learn violent behavior through observation and imitation. Exposure to violence in the family or community can contribute to the perpetuation of domestic violence. While Ecological Perspective considers multiple levels of influence, including individual, relationship, community, and societal factors. It recognizes that DVA is shaped by various

interconnected elements. Furthermore, Biological explores genetic and neurobiological factors that may contribute to aggressive behavior and violence within intimate relationships while Psychological Theories examine individual psychological processes, such as personality traits, attachment styles, and cognitive patterns, to understand why some people become perpetrators or victims of domestic violence. In summary, understanding domestic violence from a theoretical perspective involves considering these various frameworks and their interplay. Relating this theory to the current study, social media interpretation of domestic violence must provide the direction of opinion and action against it. If the social media offer a contrary analysis of the cultures in some societies that aide the commitment of domestic violence in the negative light, such analyses must impact on the people and possibly change the rate at which domestic violence thrives in the society.

2.5 Empirical Review

Considerable studies have been conducted to examine the impact of social media on domestic violence in Nigeria. But the empirical evidence suggested by this considerable body of literature provides

mixed and inconsistent results. For example, Agudoso, et'al (2020) examined audience perception of television portrayal of domestic violence against men in Nigeria. Using triangulation, a survey and qualitative content analysis were adopted for the study. Through a multi-stage sampling technique, 200 copies of the questionnaire were administered to the respondents from four selected local government areas of Abeokuta Metropolis in Ogun State, Nigeria which had a population of 793,681 people. The qualitative content analysis was adopted to analyze the sampled Nollywood film titled "Mr & Mrs Abbah". Findings from the study revealed that the respondents were highly exposed to domestic violence content on television and that, this high level of exposure by female respondents to domestic violence content on television is contributing to the gradual shift in domestic violence, from men violating their wives to women violating their husbands. The findings also revealed that the television portrayal of domestic violence against men on Nigerian television is inadequate.

Fraser (2020) examined the coverage of domestic violence against women in select Nigerian dailies. Among the national dailies under review are Daily Sun, Vanguard and

Guardian newspapers. The researcher used the content analysis research method in reviewing the manifest contents of the three papers from March 23rd to June 2020. The study period covered a total of 100 days which translates to 300 publications of the three newspapers under investigation. The social responsibility and Agenda setting theories served as the theoretical framework for the study. Findings revealed that the newspapers neither gave prominence nor adequate coverage of domestic violence against women within the lockdown period. It was also found that the newspapers hardly follow-up their stories on domestic violence during the period. The researcher concluded that the select newspapers did not do well in their coverage of domestic violence in the period under investigation by publishing only 115 news items on such crimes within the period.

Orji, Anyanwu & Emeana (2020) examined Mbaitoli women's perception of the influence of television broadcast's in the campaign against discrimination and violence among them. The study was hinged on selective perception theory. A survey research method was used for this study. A sample size of 384 was drawn from the population of 151,225 using an Australian calculator. The

questionnaire was used for data collection. Findings revealed that the level of awareness of the campaign against discrimination and violence among women based on their exposure to television broadcasts is minimal at 50% and that television broadcast's in the campaign against discrimination and violence against women were perceived to be unsatisfactory at 46.1%. In essence, the finding indicated that exposure to television broadcasts does not significantly influence women's participation in the campaign against discrimination and violence among them at 44%.

Daniel, Aniekeme and Nnamdie (2019) examined Uyo Residents' Perceptions of Selected Newspaper Coverage of Gender-based violence in Nigeria. The study adopted a survey research method investigating the perception of newspaper coverage of domestic violence among 400 respondents. The findings reveal that majority of the respondents (51.3%) thought that Daily Sun and Vanguard newspapers do not cover Gender-based violence issues frequently.

Susmitha (2016) determined the Influence of Broadcast Media Messages on Awareness, Perception and Attitude toward Maternal Health Among Reproductive Women in Ilorin. Using the survey quantitatively, a

sample size of 382 respondents was selected for this study. While 400 copies of questionnaires were distributed to women in ancient and new settlements of Ilorin to anticipate a return. Data were analysed using frequency and percentage tables, mean, standard deviation, correlation and regression analysis. The study made the following findings: 1. Women in Ilorin depend mostly on broadcast media as a major source of information on maternal health but they identified radio as more effective than television in disseminating maternal health messages (58.2%). Besides talk shows and health programmes, maternal health messages were rarely promoted through other programmes (31.4%, 41.2). 3. Women agreed with the statement that broadcast media positively change their attitude toward maternal health ($M=1.9$, $SD=1.1$). 4. Women used broadcast media as a major source of enlightenment on maternal health ($M=2.2$, $SD=1.2$). 5. Women expressed a positive perception of broadcast media messages on maternal health ($M=2.3$, $SD=1.2$). 6. Hypotheses confirmed that awareness of women on maternal health has a positive influence on their attitude ($R^2=.552$, $P=<.000$). 7. Perception of maternal health messages on broadcast media positively influences the attitude of women towards

maternal health $r=.739$. The study concluded that broadcast media is popularly used by women and is a major source of enlightenment on maternal health issues but the radio was identified as more effective than television in disseminating maternal health messages.

Owusu-Addo, Owusu-Addo, Antoh, Sarpong, Obeng-Okrah and Annan (2018) adopted media framing in their study on Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG). The survey which sees the women and girls as critical public of the mass media was interested in the public health-related issues that domestic violence can cause in society. The study adopted the Qualitative content analysis research method in providing the analysis of how Ghanaian media represented Violence against Women and Girls in Ghana with a total of 48 news articles on the study. The findings indicate that the media framing of VAWG was episodic. It shows that the victims are primarily the ones that carry the blames from the news articles reviewed. In framing VAWG as an individual incident and women as helpless victims, the media fail to shape society's perception of VAWG as a social and public health issue. The study, therefore, concluded that for the media in Ghana to

contribute to the prevention of VAWG, there is a need for news coverage to focus on the social construction of the issue, and also raise awareness about support services available to victims.

Graham-Harrison, Glufrida and Ford (2020) carried out a study on the Role of Media in Domestic Violence. The research design adopted in this study was a descriptive survey design. The method of data collection was the Key Informant Interview (KII). The question guide titled "Domestic Violence Questionnaire (DVQ) was used to gather the required data. The data collected were analysed using qualitative content analysis. The study discovered that media could also provide a platform for key influencers (celebrities, politicians, sports people, women groups and so on) to publicly challenge violence. Media has been a useful way to expose abuse wherever it happens, and for women and men across the world to come and disclose the information is a vital tool in this fight. With the right information, women became substantially more willing to report incidents of VAW to authorities and agents of the state. Moreover, men and women became more likely to believe that their fellow community members would intervene to stop VAW. To effectively

address the problem of this form of domestic violence in Nigeria, the media have to brace up for the task of uncovering cases of domestic violence by husbands, brothers, in-laws, gangs/boys, sects, etc. and following up on such cases in the court of law, intensifying effort at awareness creation, giving prominence to the reportage of cases of domestic violence, devoting special page for discussion of domestic violence (in the case of print media), organizing debates on the issue to enlighten the public about the incidence of violations of the rights of women and the girl-child, carrying out in-depth analyses of issues concerning domestic violence, use of improved surveillance system such as the closed circuit system installed in strategic places such as the parks, churches, markets, schools and other public places, alerting government of any possible outbreak of violence among others.

Dienye and Gbeneol (2009) researched Mass Media Messages and Domestic Violence in Nigeria. The study noted that Media can play a useful role in the propagation of information about domestic violence. It can be used to create awareness, convey education and act as deterrence to various waves of abuse. Mass media has saturated the industrialized world. The television in the

living room, the newspaper on the doorstep, the radio in the car, the computer at work and the fliers in the mailbox are just a few of the media channels daily delivering news, opinion, music and other forms of mass communication. These days, abuse messages are preoccupied with grabbing attention and sustaining interest, rather than transferring persuasion messages. This has largely been due to a perception to build women's self-confidence, discourage men from gender-based violence, and make society take notice and speak up instead of looking away. This article, therefore, shows the portrayals of women in different messages in the media.

It is clear from the review of related literature that there have been several empirical investigations into the study area. Most authorities cited believe that domestic violence is on the increase and that the broadcast media has a very important role to play in creating awareness of domestic violence issues. To this effect, the media is believed to be the most powerful instrument that can influence our values beliefs, attitudes, thoughts and behaviours; sometimes consciously and at other times unconsciously, reinforce negative personal, societal and cultural precepts regarding women.

3.1 Methodology

The study employed a Survey research design. The survey research method entails the collection of standardized information from a specific population or sample employing a questionnaire. This type of research method is the most appropriate when the goal is to sample the opinions of respondents over a given issue. To this end, the researchers decided to employ this research method to elicit responses from the social media houses in Kaduna State. The quantitative research design was chosen as the main and substantial method of the study.

3.2 The population of the Study

Kaduna North Local Government of Kaduna State has a total projected population of 538 600 with a 70.20 km square area and a population density of 7,672 km square. For the purpose of this study, the Population projection of 2023 is used.

3.3 Sample and Sampling Technique

The majority opinion of a cross section of selected people capable of representing the entire population is said to be a sample. In this study, a sample size of 277 is selected based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970).

3.4 Method and Sources of Data Collection

The questionnaire was formulated to address research objectives and questions thoroughly. An introductory statement was provided to help inform the respondents the need for them to participate in the study and assurance of confidentiality of their involvement.

Structured questionnaires were administered to chosen sample size LGA who the researcher found convenient and able respond to the questions. Respondents were told of their right and the appropriate way to respond to the questions. The researcher was available to assist respondents.

3.5 Measuring Instrument

A survey questionnaire was designed as the instrument of the study. The questionnaire items include Likert scale questions. The questionnaire was administered to all the selected journalists, while the researcher purposively selected and interviewed individuals from different works of life in the Enugu Metropolis.

3.5.1 Validity of the Instrument(s)

The content of the questionnaire was validated using face and content validation.

Reliability of the Instrument(s)

In testing the reliability of the instruments, the researchers employed the pretest techniques. On completion, the researchers discovered that the responses for the two sets of a questionnaire given out were consistent or near consistent. Cronbach Alpha coefficient of 0.77 was obtained.

3.6 Methods of Data Analysis

The descriptive analysis adopted for the study is the tabular, textual and statistical modes of data presentation used. The stated frequency is ensured by providing a mean score for the responses to each of the relevant questions in the questionnaire. Equally, the z-test technique was applied in testing the hypotheses formulated for the study.

4.1 Data Analysis AND Discussion of Results

In this study, a total of two hundred and seventy-seven (277) copies of the questionnaire were administered to the respondents. The researcher was able to retrieve two hundred and fifty-two (252) copies of the administered questionnaire from the respondents representing 91%.

4.2 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

Items	Frequency	Percent
Gender		
Male	164	65
Female	88	35
Age		
15–24	79	31
25 –34	153	61
35-44	16	6
45 and above	4	2
Marital status		
Single	96	38
Married	156	62
Religion		
	217	86
Islam	35	14
Christianity		
Education		
Primary	71	28
Secondary	41	16
Diploma and equivalent	32	13
Qur’anic education	108	43
Tribe		
Hausa	103	41
Igbo	47	19
Yoruba	79	31
Others	23	9

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Table 2 showed the gender of the respondents. From the table, 164 (65%) which constitute the larger part of the respondents are males, while 88 (35%) of the respondents are females. This therefore implies that majority of the respondents are males. Analysis of table 2 reveals that 153 out of 252 respondents or 61% of the respondents fall within the range of 25 – 34. Generally, people in the age bracket are considered matured by society and their perception are assumed to have some value and are capable of objective reasoning. Furthermore, Table 2 shows the marital status of the respondents. 96 respondents representing 38% are single, while 156 respondents representing 62% are married. This implies that majority of the respondents

are Married. The higher proportion of married respondents is a reflection of the value attached to marriage in the society that believes that a married person is ready for higher responsibility.

In addition, Table 2 showed the academic qualification of the respondents from the table, 71 (28%) of the respondents have primary school certificate, 41 (16%) have secondary school certificate, 35(13%) have Diploma education certificates in different fields, 108(43%) have Quranic qualification. This implied that majority of the respondents have attained Quranic level of education. The responders were mainly Hausa by ethnicity at 41% (104) and dominated by Muslim, having 86% (217) of the total respondents of the study.

Table 3: Frequency of Social Media Coverage of Domestic Violence-Related Issues in Kaduna North

S/N	Response	SA	A	U	D	SD	Total	Mean	Decision
1	The social media pays a special focus on domestic violence	89	78	15	41	29	252	3.4	Accepted
2	The social media devote more time to domestic violence related issues	122	67	-	28	35	252	3.2	Accepted

3	The social media offers better insight into violence in home	61	142	4	35	10	252	3.0	Accepted
4	The social media reports all kinds of domestic violence more often than not	139	68	6	9	30	252	3.6	Accepted
5	The social media make sure more frequently that cases of domestic violence are not swept under the kept	51	155	20	26	-	252	3.7	Accepted
Grand Mean								3.16	

Source: Field Survey, 2024.

Table 3 above shows the mean distribution of opinions of the respondents on the effect of broadcast media coverage of domestic violence-related issues in Kaduna North of Kaduna State, Nigeria based on a tabulated acceptance mean rating of 3.0. With regards to items (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5), the mean score of 3.4, 3.2, 3.0, 3.6 & 3.7 respectively, and the Grand Means of 3.16 showed that the respondents agreed that the social media in Kaduna North frequently pay attention to the cases of domestic violence related issues in Kaduna North of Kaduna State, Nigeria.

Conclusion

The study investigated the role the role of social media on creating awareness on domestic violence in Kaduna north, Kaduna

state, Nigeria. The finding of the study revealed that the frequency of social media coverage of domestic violence-related issues in Kaduna North is significantly high and that the level of social media awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence-related issues in Kaduna North is significantly high. The study concluded that the social media has a special role to play in stemming the tide of domestic violence through frequent coverage, follow-up reported cases of domestic violence and proper awareness creation on the effect of domestic violence-related issues. The social media have the power to help create healthy communities by increasing access to confidential resources and information about sexual assault, child

abuse, wife battery and all kinds of domestic abuse. Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made; that to address effectively the issue of domestic violence in Kaduna North, the social media have to work harder to brace up for the task of uncovering cases of domestic violence cases at different levels. In addition, social media organizations should always be involved by the security agencies when any domestic violence-related cases are being treated to create more awareness of domestic violence to deter the existing and future intended domestic violence in society.

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MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF A PLURALITY GOVERNMENT IN NIGERIA: A STUDY OF THE 2023 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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ABSTRACT

Since the return of multi-party democracy to Nigeria in 1999, there has been a challenge of forming governments that truly reflect the will of the Nigerian people. However, none has been as evident as the Tinubu government produced in 2023, which got elected by 36% of votes. The study examined the relationship between multipartism and the rise of a plurality presidency in 2023. The research was anchored on Duverger's law as its theoretical foundation. The theory argues that plurality systems with single district member representatives tend to produce two parties. The study adopted an *ex post facto* design to study the Nigerian presidential election that had already occurred. The study used surveys and documentary (mixed method) methods to gather data, which were then analysed using simple percentages. The study found that vote splitting between multiple parties was responsible for producing a minority plurality government in Nigeria's 2023 presidential election where the APC won with fewer votes than all opposition parties combined. The study recommended the adoption of a two party system in Nigeria to ensure the production of majority governments.

Keywords: *Multiparty democracy, Plurality government, Popular government and Presidential election*

Introduction

Legitimacy is crucial in any political setting, but it is particularly crucial in multiparty democracy where leaders emerge from

popular choices. It is not enough to hold elections but to have ones that reflect the collective will of citizens in governance, as argued by proponents of liberal democracy

such as Dahl (1998), Dahl (2010), and Haxhiu & Alidemaj (2021), among others. For a very long time, Africa suffered from the problem of producing popular government starting from the 1960s, militaries intervened while others ran authoritarian or one party states. The struggle for many civil society organisations was to propagate the idea of instituting multiparty democracy across Africa. However, Kaya & Wyk (2001) argued that African petty bourgeois in charge of politics across the continent never gave in to the demand for multiparty democracy. They argued that the clamour for multiparty democracy away from what they described as one party rule (which includes military rule) was driven by a multiplicity of external and internal factors in the late 1980s. The external factors included could be divided into two: one was the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe which led to liberal democratic changes. The other is the imperialism demands for multipartism in

order to receive development assistance. Their justification for opposing multiparty democracy was that the idea did not originate in Africa.

The internal factors on the other hand can be divided into three sections: The Western notion of political modernisation forms the basis of one section. The debate over democracy is thus reduced to a choice between one-party and multi-party systems. It contends that whereas multi-party systems are a hallmark of the West and are essentially democratic, one-party systems, which are prevalent in the majority of post-independence African nations, are essentially autocratic. Thus, it is the duty of the West to disseminate what is known as "genuine pluralist parliamentary democracy" across the developing world, especially Africa (Kaya & Wyk, 2001).

One may consider the second section of the internal-centred explanation to be a

"conspiracy" theory. It contends that the petty-bourgeoisie, who established political dominance through the one-party state, halted Africa's democratisation process after political independence, which is why the masses of Africans have chosen to seek democracy. The battle among the many African petty bourgeoisie factions for the exclusive right to political power to profit from independence at the cost of the continent's masses was the reason for the attempt to halt the democratisation process. The one-party system and the crises of African democracy form the basis of the third internal argument for the continent's tendency towards a multi-party movement (Kaya & Wyk, 2001).

Regardless of the opposition of some African leaders to the rise of multiparty democracy in the continent, it was promoted as the solution to Africa's economic stagnation of the 1980s. This gave rise to a wave of democratisation that characterised the continent. Nigeria

returned to democracy in 1999 and adopted multiparty democracy, where thirty associations applied to participate, but only nine were shortlisted to contest the December 5 1998 local government elections. Only three were considered qualified after the proceedings, according to a post-mortem analysis of the parties' participation. They included the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP (to be known later as All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Consequently, in later elections for state and national assemblies, governorships, and the presidency, the electorate's options were restricted to the PDP, APP, and AD. The next governorship election saw the PDP winning 21 seats while APP had 9 and AD had 6. The PDP's overwhelming victory on December 5, 1998, in the gubernatorial elections cemented the alliance between the APP and the AD. Together, they fielded Olusegun Obasanjo and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar of the PDP

against Chief Olu Falae and Alhaji Umaru Shinkafi of the APP/AD (Ologbenla, 2007).

The number of political parties in Nigeria has now risen to Nineteen (Independent National Electoral Commission, 2024). However, Ologbenla (2007) argued that the collaboration between the APP and the AD resulted in a confused emphasis, depriving not only the APP/AD of electoral success but also the PDP of a specific and distinct ideology. This seeming lack of ideology may be traced back to the manic haste to remove the military from power in Nigerian politics. Party formation in Nigeria tends to favour elitist parties led by conservative figures. Without a radical ideological base, any political process will unlikely challenge the country's neocolonial and dependent capitalism. This is in addition to the fact that the majority of political parties, save for the United People Party (UPP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), had similar ideological inclinations.

The 1999 presidential election was more or less a contest between two parties. It saw a popular president emerge, and the election was not thoroughly contested. President Olusegun Obasanjo was elected by 18,738,154 Nigerians, representing 62.8% of all valid votes (Toromade, 2023). President Obasanjo maintained his popularity as the 2003 presidential election saw him re-elected by 24,109,157, representing 61.8% of the total valid votes. He did not only maintain his popularity; the voter turnout peaked at 69.1% and has been the highest in the country since the return of democracy in 1999. The election, however, saw a bitter contestation of its outcome by President Obasanjo's closest rival, General Mohammadu Buhari, who went to court to claim that he, rather than Obasanjo, won the election.

2003 saw the peak of a president's popularity as voter turnout continued to plummet, leading the country to produce fewer and less popular presidents. The 1999 presidential

election experienced a 52.3% turnout; the 2003 election peaked at 69.1%, and 2007 experienced a decline from the 2003 high to 57.5%. The 2011 election declined to 53.7%, with the 2015 election declining to 43.7% (Hamalai, Egwu and Omotola, 2017). The 2019 election was one of the lowest recorded 34.75% turnout (YIAGA Africa, 2022). The 2023 presidential election recorded the lowest turnout at 26.72% (Amata, 2023). Nnoli (2023) further added that the President, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, got elected by 36% of the 26.73% that turned out. This represents a mere 9.6% of eligible voters in Nigeria, which may lead to a legitimacy crisis for him. This landed his presidency in some of the problems that plurality presidents face. It is far more worrying that his government was elected by 36.61% of valid votes. At the same time, his three closest Rivals, Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar of the PDP, Former Governor Peter Obi of the LP, and Former Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso

of the NNPP, collectively got 60.7% of votes. This means that the opposition candidates who were all formerly together in the PDP before the split for the 2023 presidential election were more popular than the president.

There are multiple challenges associated with a president emerging from a plurality system where his emergence was a result of a minority vote or emerging with fewer than 50% of votes. Absence of a clear mandate: The president could not have a strong enough mandate to carry out their programme and policies since they were not chosen by a majority of people. Political polarisation: When opposition parties contest a president's legitimacy and refuse to work with them, he or she may experience a higher level of political polarisation. The lack of a strong majority might make it difficult for the president to enact laws through the legislative branch, resulting in deadlock and ineffective government. Building coalitions: To get

support for their plans, the president may need to develop coalitions with other political parties. This can be difficult and may mean making concessions on their agenda. Legitimacy issues: If a president is chosen by a plurality, there may be doubts about their qualifications to hold office and their legitimacy, particularly if there is strong resistance to their leadership. In general, the absence of widespread mandate and support from the people may pose serious obstacles for a president coming from a plurality in a presidential system when it comes to successfully leading and carrying out their programme. Despite these few problems associated with having a plurality government, it is pertinent to understand that how one arose in Nigeria.

Research Question

Extant literature is yet to interrogate how the split among opposition parties in Nigeria produced a minority plurality president in the 2023 presidential election. To fill this gap,

the study is guided by the following research question:

1. Did the split between opposition parties enhance the APC's victory in the 2023 presidential election?

Objective of the Study

This study has both broad and the specific objectives. Broadly, the research assessed how multi-party democracy gave rise to a plurality government in Nigeria in the 2023 presidential election. Specifically, the study aimed to:

1. Ascertain if the split between opposition parties enhanced the victory of APC in the 2023 presidential election.

Theoretical framework

The research was anchored the theoretical foundation of Duverger's law. Duverger's law is a political science theory that was propounded by Maurice Duverger in 1954. The theory was formulated to explain the

relationship between the number of parties and the electoral system in place (McLean & McMillan, 2009). Prior to Duverger, it had been the interest of political scientists to understand how two party systems develop. The theory argues that two-party systems tend to emerge where single-member districts are produced through plurality rule (Fey, 2007). The plurality system is the easiest way to determine the outcome of an election. To win, a candidate has to poll more votes than any other single opponent; the candidate does not have to poll more votes than the entire opposition, as needed under the majority formula (Webb, Eulau, & Gibbins, 2024).

A single-member district is an electoral constituency that elects one person to represent it in the legislature. These members are chosen through elections in which the eligible residents of that constituency vote for their preferred candidate. The winning candidate in such an election subsequently enters the country's legislative system. In a

single-member district system, voters choose 'one' candidate to represent them in the legislature. Technically, it is the most straightforward method to decide the winner of the election process. In these elections, candidates from many political parties compete, and the winner is the one who receives the most votes (i.e., the plurality). This method is known as the single-member plurality (SMP) voting system (Nirula, 2023).

Duverger (1954) provided the following justification for his theory: People will strive to make their vote count by voting for a less preferred party with a higher chance of winning rather than wasting it on a third party with no chance of winning. Known as "strategic voting" or "tactical voting," voters respond rationally to the relative likelihood of success of various candidates (Fey, 2007). Beyond strategic voting, Fey (2007) argued that Duverger's law can be justified with strategic candidates. He said that politicians

driven by policy are driven to operate in a way that creates a two-candidate race even with nonstrategic or "sincere" voters.

There are several possible candidates, but they are all solely driven by policy concerns and lack the ability to deliver on their promises. Duverger's Law reasoning affects the candidates' calculation of values since it is policy-motivated. That is to say, because people cast real ballots, a candidate who decides to run may very easily deduct votes from a contender she would want to win, without having an impact on the percentage of votes for the contenders she would prefer to lose. In other words, in a campaign with several candidates, the withdrawal of one candidate benefits the others who hold similar beliefs and does not benefit the ones who have opinions that differ. Therefore, in many instances, withdrawing from the campaign actually benefits a candidate who is driven by policy but has very little chance of winning since it increases the likelihood

that a desired policy will be implemented. This is how prospective candidates' strategic decisions about whether or not to run for office are similarly affected by the 'wasted vote' logic of strategic voting (Fey, 2007).

Application

The theory explains how a plurality candidate emerged victorious from Nigeria's 2023 presidential election. Nigeria has a single-member district system in place where all elective offices, including executive offices, only produce one occupant at a time. In this case, it is the position of the president. Also, victory is determined by a plurality rule system where the emergence of a winner is determined by scoring the highest vote of any candidate and not necessarily getting higher than other contestants combined. This is the ground upon which the theory said that the emergence of a two party system is consequent.

The history of presidential elections in Nigeria shows that every time multiple strong

parties contend in elections, it tends to split voters and produce a president that is not very popular nationally, usually seen in some regions or candidates contesting the outcome of the result. The reason why the first republic produced a seemingly peaceful outcome was that the NPC and NCNC went into an alliance, making it a more or less contest between two major parties (Mohammad, 2023). President Shehu Shagari won the election in the second republic with only 33.77% of the votes, but all opposition candidates collectively got 66.23% of the votes (Mohammad, 2023). However, when only two parties were contested at the beginning of the fourth republic, the president who emerged was very popular, with more than 60% of the votes (Mohammad, 2023). When some opposition parties united in 2013 to form APC, they were able to wrestle power from the party in power in 2015 successfully. This ushered in an era of a major two-party contest

at presidential elections between the PDP and APC until a split in the PDP camp, which led some to LP and others to NNPP.

Methodology

The study adopts an ex-post facto research design. The ex-post facto research design is a type of survey research that studies events that have already occurred (Aniche & Efanodor, 2018). This particular research design was adopted because it studied an event that has already occurred which is the 2023 presidential election and was interested in uncovering specific facts about the election.

The study involves the entirety of the Nigerian population as of 2023 when the presidential election took place. Worldometer (2024) estimates the population to be 223,804,632. However, the study focused on the 93,469,008 who registered to vote in 2023 and specifically the 87,209,007 who collected their Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) (Suleiman, 2023). The study also

adopted a nonprobability sampling technique where a specific segment of the population was targeted.

A mixed method of data collection was utilised with triangulation that collected both primary and secondary data. 400 questionnaires were distributed across all 36 states of the federation, including the FCT, but only 318 were returned. We also conducted polls on social networks to get people's perspectives. The 400 questionnaires were distributed across Nigeria, but not evenly across states, to collect primary data. States where opposition parties won, especially the third and fourth in the election, LP and NNPP, received more questionnaires. States where LP won specifically received more questionnaires because they were mostly states where PDP traditionally won in presidential elections, except for Lagos. The states LP won included Abia, Anambra, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Enugu, FCT, Imo, Lagos, Nasarawa,

and Plateau. NNPP won only in Kano. The questionnaires were distributed as follows: 300 questionnaires representing 75% were distributed to states won by LP and NNPP, with LP states receiving more. A total of 288 questionnaires were distributed to LP states (including the FCT); each state received a total of 24 questionnaires that were further distributed as follows: 8 questionnaires were distributed to each of the three senatorial districts in the states. The ones in the FCT were distributed evenly to all 6 LGAs. Kano received 12 questionnaires, and its senatorial districts received 4 questionnaires each. The remaining 100 questionnaires were evenly distributed to the remaining 72 senatorial districts in 24 states. Where each senatorial district got 1 questionnaire. 1 extra questionnaire was distributed to each state capital in those 24 states, leaving an extra 4 distributed to Port Harcourt City in Rivers state, where the contestation was fierce.

Equally, social media surveys were conducted on X (formally known as Twitter) and WhatsApp, targeting demographic groups where supporters of opposition parties, especially LP and NNPP, were prevalent.

Secondary data were obtained from newspapers, magazines, and official publications of political parties, as well as the INEC.

The data were analysed using statistical tools like the simple majority and presented using graphs and charts. Content analysis was also used to analyse publications and speeches of major actors in the Nigerian political scene.

Data Presentation, Analysis, and Discussion

Views have been expressed that the split in the PDP led to a victory for the APC in the 2023 presidential election. The view was that the APC candidate and the party were unpopular in the election owing to some unpopular policies of the party in power, the

rise in inflation, fuel scarcity, insecurity, and the implementation of the Naira redesign, which saw many Nigerians suffer from cashlessness among many. The opinions are that the majority of Nigerians wanted a change from APC and were prepared to vote against them, but the split in PDP displaced many votes into third and fourth parties, which allowed the APC to win with 36% of votes. The Anambra state governor, for instance, shared this view prior to the election through an open letter to the candidate of the LP, Mr Peter Obi, where he emphasised that Mr Obi was misleading the Southeast into obscurity in national politics. He stressed that Mr Obi was inversely campaigning for the candidate of the APC and was going to make their path to victory easier by splitting the vote of the opposition (Soludo, 2022). Looking at the result after, the LP had 6,101,533 or 25.4% of votes, while the PDP had 6,984,520 or 29.07% of votes. If

combined, it would have amounted to 13,086,053 or 54.47% of votes.

The combined result of the PDP and LP shows the potential for the opposition to win if the split had not happened. This is because the candidates of the PDP and LP ran on a joint ticket in the previous election in 2019. If the votes of the NNPP, whose candidate also left the PDP, are added, it becomes even bigger, yielding a total of 14,582,740 or 60.7% of the votes. This figure almost doubles the votes of the APC that won the election, raising concerns about how Nigeria produced such a plurality president at a time when the country is grappling with a multitude of issues. Views differ about the potential of the combined votes of the opposition parties in the 2023 presidential election. The APC had boasted before the election that they would not have lost the election because even when the candidates of the PDP and LP ran a joint ticket with the support of the NNPP candidate, the APC still

defeated them, and as such, a combination of them would not have harmed the APC's chance of winning. However, looking at the results afterward, it is clear that the opposition had more support than the APC.

A chieftain of the PDP and governorship aspirant in the Ogun state in 2023, Mr Shegun Showumi, observed that the mere fact that the combined votes of opposition parties outnumbered that of the APC does not necessarily mean they would have won if they had stayed together. He observed that the fact that a lot of people voted for the LP and NNPP does not mean that those same people would have voted for the PDP if they were combined (Showumi, 2024). To this end, it is pertinent to understand if that would have been the case if there had been no split in the PDP camp. In the bid to understand this, we went to the voters themselves to get their views about what they would have done if the split had not happened.

Respondents were asked what they would have done in retrospect if the opposition had

not split. The following responses were gotten.

Table 1: The parties voted by respondents

S/N	Question	Options				Total
1	What party did you vote for in the 2023 presidential election?	APC	PDP	LP	NNPP	
		28	29	228	33	318
		9%	9%	72%	10%	100%

Source: Authors' questionnaire (2024)

Table 1 above shows the parties voted by respondents. 9% voted for the APC, another 9% voted for the PDP, and 72% and 10% voted for the LP and NNPP, respectively. The LP and the NNPP, the target population for

this study, collectively constitute about 82% of respondents. This shows that the study has a good representation of the target population. The study thus investigated the following:

Table 2: The parties respondents would have voted for if there were only two options

S/N	Question	Options			Total
2	If you voted for any opposition parties other than the PDP, what party would you have voted for if the party you voted for was not on the ballot and if you were given only two opinions between the two largest political parties in Nigeria?	APC	PDP	None	
		38	183	97	318
		12%	58%	30%	100%

Source: Authors' questionnaire (2024)

Table 2 above shows the parties respondents would have gone for if the options were only

two and the PDP had not split. 38 people, representing 12% of respondents said they

would have voted for the APC if only two options existed between the APC and PDP. 183, representing 58% of respondents said they would have gone for the PDP in the same situation while 97 or 30% of respondents said they preferred neither of the parties. A further breakdown of the preferences would show how supporters of

each party made their choice between the winner of the election and the runner-up with neither being the control. The implication is that the majority of the respondents who voted for other opposition parties other than the PDP would have voted for the PDP if the other opposition parties had not contested in the election.

Table 3: Preferences of all parties between APC and PDP

Party	Voted for	Prefers APC	%	Prefer PDP	%	Prefer None	%
APC	28	18	47	2	0.7	8	8
PDP	29	0	0	28	15.3	1	1
LP	228	6	16	142	78	80	83
NNPP	33	14	37	11	6	8	8
Total	318	38	100	183	100	97	100

Source: Author’s questionnaire (2024)

Table 3 above shows the preferences of all the top four parties in the 2023 presidential election. It shows their preferences between the winner and runner-up supposing it was a two-party race.

It is clear that 18, representing 47% of APC supporters, said they would have gone for the APC. Interestingly, 14 respondents,

representing 37% of the 38 respondents who said they would have voted for the APC, said they voted for the NNPP. While 6, representing 16% of them, said they voted for the LP. Unsurprisingly, 0% of PDP supporters said they would have gone for the APC. 28 or 15.3% of respondents who voted for the PDP said they would have retained their support if it had been a two-horse race.

142 or 78% of respondents who said they preferred PDP to APC said they voted for the LP. 11 or 6% of respondents who said they would have voted for the PDP said they voted for the NNPP. Surprisingly, 2 or 0.7% of respondents who said they would have preferred the PDP said they voted for APC.

The goal of this research is to find out how Nigerian voters would have voted if they had only two choices in the 2023 presidential election between the PDP and the APC. It specifically targets supporters of the second and third runner ups, whose candidates were former members of the PDP. The research isolated their responses, as presented below.

Table 4 Preferences of second and third runner ups

Party	Voted for	Prefer APC	%	Prefer PDP	%	Prefer None	%
LP	228	6	2	142	62	83	36
NNPP	33	14	43	11	33	8	24
Total	261	20		153		91	

Source: Author's questionnaire (2024)

Table 4 above shows the preferences of the supporters of the second and third runner ups in the election in question. Out of the 228 respondents that said they voted for the LP, 142 representing 62% of them said they would have voted for the PDP if they had the option to choose between the party and the APC. 6, representing 2% of them said they

would have gone for the APC while 83, representing 36% of them said they preferred neither of the two parties. This simply means that majority of LP's voters would have gone for the PDP. A recalculation going by the percentages above would have probably added the following votes to the PDP from the LP. PDP had 6,984,520 while the LP had

6,101,533 votes, if 62% of it or 3,782,950 is added to what the PDP got, it would have been 10,767,470 votes. This may have happened because LP got majority of its votes from regions where PDP had traditionally won with the exception of Lagos.

Out of the 228 respondents who said they voted for the LP, 6 representing 2% of them said they would have voted for the APC if they had the option to choose between the party and the PDP. The APC had 8,794,726 votes, if the same recalculation by percentage is done, the following votes would have gone for the APC from the LP, 122,031 giving rise to a combined vote of 8,916,757.

83 or 36% of respondents who said they voted for the LP said they preferred neither PDP nor APC. It means 2,196,552 of their voters would have voted for neither of the two.

11 or 33% of the respondents who said they voted for the NNPP said they would have voted for the PDP if they only had the option to choose between the party and the APC. NNPP got 1,496,671 votes. 33% of that is 493,901. On the other hand, 14 or 43% of respondents said they would have voted for the APC if they could choose only between the PDP and the APC. This means that most people who voted for NNPP would have voted for the APC if they had only to choose between the party and PDP. Unsurprisingly, the party got 67% of its vote from Kano state, which has voted for the APC since 2015. 43% of the votes for NNPP is 643,569. Furthermore, 8 or 24% of them said they would have voted for neither the PDP nor APC if they had only two options. This amounts to 359,201 votes. These types of votes will be termed neutral.

If the percentages of votes taken from the LP and the NNPP are added to the PDP and APC, the following results may have played out:

PDP would have won the election with 11,261,371 or 47% of valid votes. Conversely, the APC would have come second with a total of 9,560,326 votes or 40% of votes. It is still clear that the PDP would have won but not as a popular choice because it would have just been a victory with 47%; even though it was an improvement from APC's 36% victory, it would still not have produced a majority government. However, if the remaining opposition parties, whose votes amount to 648,490, were added with the 2,555,753 that said they were neutral, it would be discovered that 3,204,243 would have voted for neither of the parties. Since the remaining opposition parties were not tested to find their preference between the PDP and

APC, the ones from the LP and NNPP would be tested. If the 2,555,753 are divided equally between PDP and APC, eliminating 1 to make it even, they would get 1,277,876 additional votes each. This will result in PDP getting 12,539,247, or 52% of valid votes. The APC would have had 10,838,202 votes, or 45% of valid votes.

Beyond this, it is important to also test if respondents' answers to other questions validate the answers given here. This is to ensure that the result gotten here is generalisable. The study will test how voters would have acted now that they had seen third and fourth parties not being strong enough to defeat the larger APC and PDP.

Table 6: How Nigerians would have voted if there was a third force in the presidential election to be reconducted

S/N	Question	Options		Total
3	If the election was to be re-conducted today, would you vote for a third force party?	Yes	No	
		93	225	318
		29.25%	70.75%	100%

Source: Authors' questionnaire (2024)

Table 6 above shows that Nigerians were less likely to vote for third-force parties today if the election was to be reconducted. 70.75% of respondents said they would not vote for third-force parties if the election were to be reconducted today. This came as a realisation after seeing their votes not being strong enough to make any third-force parties win but rather pave the way for the APC.

The majority of LP supporters said they would have voted for the PDP if they had only two options between the PDP and the

APC; however, the addition from them could have made the PDP win but will not produce a popular president. There are views that a good number of the LP voters were supporters of their candidate, Mr Peter Obi. It is important to test if his person, in addition to the person and structure of the PDP, would have produced victory and a popular president. We did so by combining them on a PDP ticket like it was in the 2019 presidential election.

Table 5: How Nigerians would have voted if the PDP and LP candidates had a joint ticket

S/N	Question	Options		Total
3	If the election were to be re-conducted, would you have voted for the PDP if they had run a joint ticket with the LP candidate?	Yes	No	
		233	85	318
		73%	27%	100%

Source: Authors' questionnaire (2024)

Table 5 above shows how Nigerian electorates would have voted if the candidates of the PDP and LP were combined in a ticket under the PDP. 233 or 73% of respondents said they would have voted for

that option, and only 85 or 27% of respondents said they would not. However, supporters of each party expressed different opinions. The opinions were as follows:

Table 6: Preferences of all parties if the PDP and LP candidates had run a joint ticket

Party	Voted for	Yes	%	No	%
APC	28	2	1	26	31
PDP	29	29	12	0	0
LP	228	193	83	35	41
NNPP	33	9	4	24	28
Total	318	233	100	85	100

Source: Authors' questionnaire (2024)

LP is the target in this test, so the percentage of LP will be isolated. 228 respondents said they voted for the LP; out of them, 193, constituting 87% of LP voters, said they would have voted for the PDP if they had a combined ticket with the candidate of the LP. 87% of the 6,101,533 that voted for the LP is 5,308,334. If this is added to the 6,984,520 that the PDP got, it would give rise to 12,292,854 or 51% of total votes, making the PDP win and also producing a majority government. To solidify their stand, supporters of the second and third runner ups were asked to identify between the winner and the runner-up, the one who was most similar in terms of ideology, policy prescriptions, and programmes; 79% of the

respondents who said they voted for the LP identified the candidate of the PDP as the one most similar to theirs.

Beyond the number of votes, the second major requirement for winning the Nigerian presidential election is the spread of votes. A prospective winner is expected to get the majority of lawful cast votes and at least 25% of votes in 2/3 of all Nigerian states, including the FCT (Agbakoba, 2022). The candidate of the PDP fulfilled the criterion of nation spread in 21 states (Vanguard, 2023). Going by the fact that the majority of LP supporters said they would have gone for the PDP if they had a combined ticket with the candidate of the LP, the PDP would have

gotten an addition of 11 more states to make it 32 states where the party would have had 25% and above making it possible for the PDP to win based on this criterion.

Conclusion

The study interrogated the relationship between a multiparty system and the production of a minority plurality government in the 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. Specifically, it inquired whether the split in the PDP among presidential candidates led to the victory of the APC. The study concludes that the split in PDP led to victory for a minority plurality APC, which only garnered 36% of the votes. The combined votes of all opposition parties were 64%; if they had combined into one, they would have probably won, especially the PDP 'offshoot' parties, LP and NNPP, and more critically, LP. This is seen as such because most of LP's supporters said they would have voted for the PDP if their choice was only between the party and the APC.

More of them said they would have voted for the PDP if there had been a joint ticket between their candidate and that of the PDP. They also saw the candidate of the PDP as the most similar in terms of ideology to theirs.

Also, examples abound in Nigeria where vote splitting between similar parties and candidates led to victory for parties and/or candidates most different from them as well as victory for similar parties and candidates who merged. A vote split between PDP and SDP in Ekiti state led to victory for a plurality APC, which got less than 50% of votes in the 2022 governorship election. A vote split between PDP and LP led to victory for a plurality APC, which got less than 50% of votes in Kaduna state in the 2023 governorship election, among many. On the other hand, a coalition between all opposition parties in Bauchi state against the APC led to victory for an opposition PDP in the 2019 governorship election. The PDP won with more than 50% of the votes.

A merger of four major opposition parties in 2013 also produced a majority victory against the PDP in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. The opposition parties had previously split their votes and lost consistently to the PDP. The victory from their merger produced a victory of more than 50% votes. Multipartyism is, therefore, responsible for the rise of a plurality government in Nigeria.

Recommendation

Following its conclusion, the research recommends the following:

1. Nigeria should abandon multi-party democracy and adopt a two-party system in which only two ideologically distinguishable parties compete. This would ensure that winners emerge with more than 50% of the votes and run a majority government.

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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FIREWOOD PRODUCTION AMONG THE GBAGYI WOMEN OF CENTRAL NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This study investigates firewood production among the Gbagyi women in Central Nigeria, employing a qualitative exploratory research. Through in-depth interviews, participant observation, and content analysis, the study explores the historical experiences, challenges, and cultural influences shaping the involvement of Gbagyi women in firewood production. By adopting feminist economics, the research highlights the intersectionality of gender, culture, and economic resilience, aiming to identify the often-overlooked contributions of Gbagyi women to socio-political and economic development of central Nigeria. The study concludes that Gbagyi women significantly contribute to poverty reduction, sociopolitical and economic development of central Nigeria in the face of modernization and changing energy preferences. It recommends policies supporting rural women's economic agency in the global South.

Keywords: *Rural Economy, Gbagyi Women, Central Nigeria, Firewood Production, Gbagyi Culture.*

Introduction

Despite the critical role played by Gbagyi women in firewood production in Central Nigeria, little research has investigated the socio-economic dynamics and challenges associated with this activity. This study seeks to address the existing gap in scholarly knowledge by examining the **economic resilience and gender dynamics** of firewood production among rural Gbagyi women in

Central Nigeria. The research aims to uncover the historical, cultural, socio-political and economic dimensions of this practice, exploring the impact on women's lives, community development, and the evolving dynamics in the face of modernization.

With the growth in science and technology, firewood is now seen as a means of providing energy to the underdeveloped, rural and or less privileged class. The collection of

firewood varies across regions and some places have specific areas for the collection (Aina and Odebiyi, 1998; Jacob et al., 2017). Other places may integrate the collection of firewood in the cycle of preparing a plot of land to grow food as part of a field rotation. For this study, firewood production means collection, cutting and selling of woods or log of woods that are used as fuel for heating or cooking.

The Central Nigeria is peopled, among others, by the *Gbagyi* ethnic groups that are hardworking and contributing to the socio-economic development of their area of abode (Bala, 2008). The role of *Gbagyi* women in the socio-economic development of the Central Nigeria area cannot be over-emphasized as no sector of the economy today that women cannot be found, apart from the dominant role they assumed in their communities. In some families, because of their integrity and economic wellbeing, women became the breadwinners (Osemeobo, 2005).

The study explores the socioeconomic life of *Gbagyi* women in central Nigeria and focuses on an important lifestyle of the rural *Gbagyi* women in the economic development of their area. The *Gbagyi* women are so distinct and pronounced when the issues of firewood production come to mind. Rural women have

made it an occupation to collect, process and sell firewood. Such economic contribution by *Gbagyi* women demonstrates their resilience and significantly adds value to the socioeconomic activities of the region and gives women a special family and community role. Despite challenges, *Gbagyi* women exhibit economic resilience in the face of changing circumstances. Their ability to adapt to new market dynamics, participate in commercialization, and navigate socio-economic shifts underscores their resilience in sustaining this traditional economic activity.

The significance of this study lies in shedding light on the often overlooked yet vital role of *Gbagyi* women in the economic development of Central Nigeria through their engagement in firewood production. By exploring the historical, cultural, sociopolitical and economic dimensions of this activity, the research contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the socio-economic dynamics within the region. Furthermore, the study's findings have broader implications for gender roles, rural economies, and sustainable resource management. Recognizing the significance of *Gbagyi* women's contributions could inform policies and initiatives aimed at supporting and enhancing the economic

empowerment of women in similar contexts. This could foster sustainable practices, and preserving cultural heritage.

By identifying challenges of Gbagyi women firewood production such as resource scarcity, environmental implications, and changing energy preferences, the study contributes insights into sustainable practices and policy considerations in the region. It is a novel contribution to the historical account of rural women's contribution to development that most literature about the economic history of north-central Nigeria has neglected. The spill-over effect of Gbagyi women's firewood production is visible in reducing the poverty level of most rural communities, societal recognition and relevance of womenfolk in the development of most communities, and the support for their children's education and social festivities.

Origin of Gbagyi People: A Historical Review

The *Gbagyi* language is part of the "Kwa" sub-division of Niger Congo language family. The people speak two dialects called *Gbagyi*"Yamma" and *Gbagyi*"Ngenge"; while they are loosely called "Gwari" by Hausa-Fulani and Europeans during pre-colonial Nigeria. They are predominantly

found in Central Nigeria states of Niger, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Kogi and Federal Capital Territory (Baba, 2000). They arrived and settled in Central Nigeria for two reasons. When they were driven away by wars from Borno and Zamfara, they gained stability in their present settlements because it provided them with defensive cover against external attacks. The terrains have long stretches of rocks and hills for military strategy. Another fundamental reason was the rich agricultural potential of their new settlements. The *Gbagyi* have two major occupations, farming and hunting in order of priority.¹ The Central Nigeria favours the cultivation of varieties of crops.

According to oral traditions, the *Gbagyis* are believed to have originally migrated from "Yaman" (Middle East) to Borno where they might have settled with the *Koro* people. They and the *Koro* people were driven westward from Borno by the Kanuri through wars in the 16th century, from where they sojourn to their present location in Central Nigeria (Baba, 2000).

The name Gbagyi

The name *Gbagyi* came as a result of what man ate and regarded as his stable food, when the art of farming was yet to be discovered

and man lived a non-sedentary life and survived on the collection of fruit. These fruits are called "*Gbagyi*" by the people referring to a person who eats fruit. Subsequently, they therefore referred to every human being as *Gbagyi*, meaning, the one who eats fruits. The use of the term and the act of protecting every *Gbagyi* tree around him marked the beginning of the development of farming and the art of farming developed as an occupation among the *Gbagyis*. The art of farming, coupled with their intellectual ability to create for themselves a better condition of living distinct from others gave them their identity and firmly established their name "*Gbagyi-Za*" (Bala, 2008: pp1-2).

Meanwhile, their Hausa neighbours who could not pronounce the word *Gbagyi* called them *Gwari* and made reference to them as a people from the bush (Baba, 2000). This could not be divorced from the *Gbagyi*' preference to live in isolation or refusal to be intimidated by any foreign culture and being mindful of residing close to their lands to farm. In most occupied lands originally indigenous to *Gbagyis*, the *Gbagyi* people shift to the outskirts/suburbs of towns and cities because they don't want to be disconnected from their farmlands. The *Gbagyi* people always demonstrate honesty,

and transparency in their dealings and are accommodative in nature. These attributes gave birth to the slogan "*mu yishi gwari gwari*", meaning let's do it in its dearest, cleanest and most honest terms (Ciroma, 1995: p67).

Gbagyi dialects

Language with dialect has become so common among Africans today and the *Gbagyi* language is not an exception. This is because of the pragmatic nature of the language with about thirty-five dialects (Yaro Sada, 1996: p3). It is common to find a *Gbagyi* village with a dialect which may only be understood by their neighbour. The *Gbagyi Ngenge* (aka *matai*) covers Minna, Bosso, Kuta, Paiko, Kaduna, Nasarawa and its environment; while the *Gbagyi Yamma* (aka *Nkwa*) covers Izom, Gawu, and F.C.T. Within the *Ngenge*, there are also *Gbagyi Nkwa* and out of this there is the *Kwange* and the *Paiko's*. Within the *Kwange* again, there are some in Minna, Bosso, Maikunkele, Shatta, etc. that also have minor differences between them. For example, Bosso/Maikunkele will say "*Nche*" meaning myself, while Minna, Kuta, and Kaduna will say "*Ngye*".^{2,3} Despite dialectic differences, it is difficult for strangers to differentiate between them but not within themselves. Basically, the language remains the same

except for cases of minor differences and or in the meaning of some words.

It is pertinent to note that more *Gbagyi* dialects exist among the *Gbagyi* of Minna, Paiko, Izom, Gwagwalada and Kwali, among others. Those around Kuta, Dikko, Kaduna, Bwari and Nasarawa have less number of dialects. However, better communication between these dialects is being enhanced with colloquialism, now that there is greater integration within the *Gbagyis*.⁴

Characteristics of Gbagyi women

The *Gbagyi* woman is a wife, mother and nurse. The upbringing of a child is mostly her sole responsibility; she prepares her children for a long life achievement. She guides children to the path of knowledge, righteousness and prosperity. The woman is the first child agent of socialization. The *Gbagyi* woman is extremely industrious as she always engages in commodity production and participates in agricultural endeavours. She is often not part of the practical farming activities, yet participates in clearing the land for cultivation and planting seeds or seedlings on ridges prepared by the men. The women harvest groundnuts and extract the oil from various nuts and crops. They gathered firewood; some make locally prepared bear (*Oje*) which is consumed pleurably on

occasions (Shednayi, 1999). They also prepare local soup ingredients.

The women keep the home and surroundings clean lay the floor of the house and help men bring home harvest. The harvests they bring home are usually rewarded with the proportion of the crops harvested. All these are of course in addition to the fetching of water, cooking and other domestic chores. A *Gbagyi* woman is a pillar and supporter of her husband in so many ways. While the husband provides raw food, she takes the responsibility of soup. She provides warm water and washes his back when he comes back from the farm or other activities.⁵ There are no limits to the number of wives a man could marry. In fact, the more wives a man has, the more he is considered successful, wealthy and rated highly in society. Indeed, a woman bearing children is considered more valuable, because children are seen as economic assets.

Women in Firewood Production: An Empirical Review

While there is no extensive body of literature specifically dedicated to women in firewood production and selling, studies related to gender roles in forestry, rural livelihoods, and the informal economy dominate insights into the experiences of women engaged in these activities. In their respective studies,

researchers have investigated the multifaceted impacts of firewood use in various regions, shedding light on crucial aspects related to gender, health, environmental degradation, and socio-economic implications. Carol et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive exploration of the multifaceted relationship between gender and forestry, offering valuable insights into the roles of women across various dimensions of forest-based livelihoods.

Nathan et al. (2018) investigate gender-related factors influencing cooking fuel use in rural areas, suggesting that the value of women's labour plays a pivotal role in fuel adoption. However, Swapnali (2015) investigates the physiological exertion and musculoskeletal problems faced by tribal women in Meghalaya during firewood collection. Highlighting the unnoticed work of rural women in fuel and water collection, cooking, and child care, Nagbrahmam and Sambrani (1983) noted how this contribute to their increased drudgery and poverty. Elena (2015) studies time allocation in rural Ethiopian households, emphasizing women's involvement in time-consuming fuel collection.

Margaret and Clancy (2020) focus on gendered health issues arising from firewood use in rural areas. They underscore the

neglect of negative health impacts, particularly on women, emphasizing the necessity of incorporating social issues like gender and health into energy policies. Wole-Alo et al. (2022) also explore the health impact of firewood use on rural women in Ogun State, Nigeria, advocating for alternative energy sources with fewer health hazards. Raimi et al. (2015) investigate the environmental degradation resulting from women's reliance on firewood in Bayelsa State, Nigeria. Rooted in Materialist Feminist theory, their study highlights women's material marginalization and its contribution to biodiversity loss, increased carbon emissions, and sustained flooding. The research provides policy recommendations to address these challenges. Austin et al. (2012) concentrate on the role of firewood in deforestation in South-Eastern Nigeria, emphasizing the interconnectedness of trees and women in household economies. They argue that deforestation poses a threat to sustainable development.

Nabinta et al. (2007) examine rural energy challenges in Nigeria, emphasizing the need for integrated energy packages to foster sustainable rural development. For Daniel et al. (2017), on firewood marketing in Uyo Capital City, they identify factors influencing profitability and recommend the evaluation

of firewood species production. While examining energy burdens on women in rural Kenya, Njenga et al. (2021) propose solutions such as farm residues and efficient cookstoves. Inayatullah and Pervez (2015) discuss gender time poverty and the impact of introducing improved cooking stoves on fuel wood consumption and women's time. Nuratu (2016) examines the gender dimension in fuel wood management, recommending women's involvement in decisions on alternative clean energy sources. Bina Agarwal (2010) critically examines the governance structures and challenges faced by women in community forestry. These works not only deepen our understanding of gender dynamics but also highlight the need for more inclusive and equitable forest management practices.

Comparing perspectives on well-being between firewood and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) users in rural India, Yuwan et al. (2020) highlight shifts in perceptions after transitioning to LPG. Even though Larinde and Olasupo (2011) investigated the socio-economic aspects of fuelwood collection in Oyo State, Nigeria, emphasizing profitability and the need for education to promote rational exploitation and tree preservation, research in other areas is needed. The Gbagyi women in Central Nigeria have a history of

involvement in firewood production and peculiar ways of confronting emerging challenges of sustainability and energy shift. This aspect of Gbagyi women's economic resilience and dynamism has not received adequate academic attention.

Feminist Political Economy: A Theoretical Review

Challenging conventional paradigms and advocating for a more inclusive and gender-aware approach to economic analysis, feminist economists have collectively reshaped the landscape of economic thought. Waring's (1988) work emphasizes the undervaluation of women's unpaid work in traditional economic measures. She calls for a reevaluation of economic systems to recognize and account for the significant contributions of women in various spheres, challenging the gender biases inherent in economic indicators. Elson's (1999) research focuses on the intersectionality of gender, class, and race in economic structures. She emphasizes the need for policies that address the specific needs of women in economic development, highlighting the interconnected nature of social identities and economic outcomes. Folbre's (1997) contributions centre on the economics of care and household production. Her work explores the

economic implications of caregiving and challenges traditional economic models that often neglect the importance of unpaid care work in sustaining societies.

Sen and Nussbaum (1993), through the Capability Approach, provide a framework that goes beyond traditional economic indicators to assess human well-being. Their approach emphasizes the importance of individuals' capabilities and freedoms, offering a broader perspective that aligns with feminist goals of addressing human development and agency. Sen's (2007) contributions encompass issues related to women's health, development, and economic empowerment. She has advocated for gender-sensitive policies and programs, recognizing the importance of addressing women's specific needs to achieve meaningful and sustainable development.

Van Staveren (2011) has worked on feminist methodology, economic modelling, and the economics of development. Her contributions include advocating for pluralism in economic thinking and promoting diverse perspectives that better capture the complexities of economic interactions, including gender dynamics. Ostrom's (1990) work on commons and collective action has implications for understanding the role of women in resource

management. While not exclusively focused on feminist economics, her research contributes to discussions on gender and economics, particularly in the context of shared resources. Nelson (2001) advocates for incorporating feminist perspectives into economic analysis. Her work challenges gender biases in economic models and promotes a more inclusive approach that considers the diverse experiences and contributions of women in economic systems.

Methodology and Theoretical Underpinnings

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative exploratory research to investigate the involvement of Gbagyi women in firewood production in Central Nigeria. The research is anchored in feminist economics, aiming to uncover the intersectionality of gender, culture, and sociopolitical economic role of women. This approach allows for an in-depth understanding of the historical experiences, challenges, and cultural influences that shape the involvement of Gbagyi women in firewood production.

The study utilizes a purposive sampling method to identify 35 key informants who provide rich, relevant data on the topic. These

informants include 10 Gbagyi women actively engaged in firewood production (28.6%), 8 community leaders (22.9%) with insights into the cultural and economic aspects of firewood production, 7 local market traders (20.0%) involved in the buying and selling of firewood, 5 environmental and academic experts (14.3%) with knowledge of the ecological impact of firewood production, and 5 social/civil society groups and policymakers (14.3%) focusing on rural economic development and women's economic empowerment. Data collection involved in-depth interviews, participant observation, and content analysis. Semi-structured interviews provided insights into personal experiences and sociopolitical and economic impacts, while participant observation offered a physical understanding of the daily activities and social interactions involved in firewood production. Additionally, content analysis of documents and records contextualized the findings from interviews and observations.

The analysis of data process began with the transcription and coding of interviews and field notes, followed by thematic analysis to identify recurring themes related to cultural significance, economic resilience, gender roles, and environmental impact. Data from interviews, observations, and content

analysis were triangulated to ensure validity and reliability. The findings were then interpreted through the lens of feminist economics, emphasizing the economic contributions of Gbagyi women and the interplay of gender and culture. Finally, a coherent narrative was constructed to highlight the sociopolitical and economic roles of Gbagyi women in firewood production and their impact on community development.

Theoretical framework

This study employs a feminist economics framework to explore the socioeconomic aspects of Gbagyi women's involvement in firewood production in Central Nigeria. Feminist economics examines how gender roles and inequalities impact economic structures, policies, and outcomes (Agenjo-Calderón & Gálvez-Muñoz, 2019; MacDonald, 2003; Van Staveren et al., 2007; Barker, 2013). By emphasizing the intersectionality of gender, class, and ethnicity, this framework provides a lens to understand how Gbagyi women navigate economic activities within their specific cultural and social contexts. The incorporation of feminist economics enables a comprehensive analysis of the roles,


challenges, and contributions of Gbagyi women in the firewood production and its broader societal implications.

Feminist economics emerged in the early 1990s as a response to the limitations of traditional economic theories in addressing issues related to gender, inequality, and women's experiences (Agenjo-Calderón & Gálvez-Muñoz, 2019). Key figures who have shaped the field include Marilyn Waring (1988), Julie A. Nelson (2001), Diane Elson (1999), Nancy Folbre (1997), Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (1993), Gita Sen (2007), Irene van Staveren (2011), and Elinor Ostrom (1990). This approach critically examines traditional economic theories and practices, emphasizing the recognition and valuation of unpaid domestic and caregiving work, the significance of the care economy, and the intersection of gender with other social categories such as race, class, and ethnicity. Applying feminist economics to the study of Gbagyi women in firewood production offers valuable insights into how their economic activities are shaped by traditional gender roles and societal expectations. It also highlights their agency,

decision-making power, and the intersectional factors influencing their socioeconomic resilience (Barker, 2013; Njenga & Mendum, 2021).

Gbagyi Women and Socio-Political and Economic Development

In the political structure and power distribution among the Gbagyis, women have no or less role in the decision-making process. However, the culture of the people gives a prominent role to the women in economic engagement and social development of their communities. The progress and development of every community in Gbagyi society depends on the active role of the women folk. Gbagyi women are becoming active members of their communities as significant socioeconomic contributors to community development through their dominance of firewood production.⁶ They collect, transport and sell firewood to earn income to support their families. They traditionally carry a load on their shoulder, including firewood. This is illustrated in the pictures below.

Figure 1. Gbagyi women carrying firewood

Source: A: <https://www.flysafemagazine.com/why-gbagyi-differs-from-all-tribes/>;

B: <https://en.rattibha.com/thread/1569211666377867264>;

C: <https://tr.pinterest.com/pin/666392076089920341/visual-search/>;

D: <https://jujufilms.tv/2014/07/08/fetching-firewood/>

The Gbagyi women as shown above are mostly known for carrying loads on their shoulders or on the upper parts of their backs. They have a lot of respect and attach much importance to the head and believe that there cannot be life without the head. They believed that the head is the powerhouse of every human being and as such it should be free from excessive loads. The neck connects other parts of the body and should therefore not be made a pillar of transporting loads.⁷

Gbagyi women believed that one could carry more and heavier loads on the shoulder which provides the added alternative of shifting the weight from one burden shoulder to another. They also believed that with this system weight of the loads is transmitted to and shared with all parts of the body, unlike the situation when the head is used while the neck suffers most.⁸

How firewood is obtained?

The firewood is mostly obtained during the dry season when the farm produce is brought home and women seem to be less engaged. The season favours much more free movement into terrains that hitherto could not be reached during the rainy season. The season also favours less risk of attacks by wild animals or reptiles and enhances easier cutting and piling of firewood (Graham, 2003).⁹ Obtaining or production of firewood is a woman-organized economic activity among the Gbagyi people. Given the historical significance of notable community perception of the role of Gbagyi women in firewood production, one significant historical factor is the migration of the Gbagyi people. "As we moved and settled in different regions, the practice of firewood collection adapted to the local environments. It became not just a domestic task but also a means of economic contribution, especially for women."¹⁰

This outlined the economic role an average Gbagyi woman attached to firewood. According to an informant, "the tradition of women being responsible for firewood production dates back generations. It's considered a practical task associated with nurturing the household. There's a belief that women, through this activity, contribute to

the overall well-being of the family."¹¹ The process of obtaining firewood is labour intensive especially when considering the tools used, gathering and transporting home from place of produce.

The basic tools used in the process of firewood production are axes of different sizes depending on the user, cutlass and a bowl of either flat shape or oval shape. The axe is used to cut down the selected trees. The cutlass is used to cut attached branches of trees (Baba, 2000). They may be allowed to dry in the forest or where the tree is cut down to reduce the heaviness of the wood. The obtained firewood is transported home immediately or at a later date by individual women involved, or a mother with her children. It may also be taken home if the place of production is not far from home. Gathered firewood can remain in the forest or near farmlands because of the security of the product. The Gbagyi society does not allow taking what doesn't belong to a person and severe punishments await erring members such as public beating or reporting to security agents.¹²

The firewood is also obtained through communal labour (*Gbedogu*), women formed themselves into groups and provided the needed labour to individuals one after the other just as the men used in the farm. In a

typical Gbagyi village, firewood gathered could last for many years, while in every dry season, more and more could be gathered. This gathering serves so many purposes, in case of health challenges and the woman is not strong enough to go and fetch firewood in the forest, the reserved ones at home will be used pending when she recovers. It is mostly common for women to assist one another by fetching water when the need arises, but very rare to assist one another by fetching firewood. It also served as a gift/present especially to a nursing mother, ceremonies, etc when money or relevant materials cannot be afforded.¹³

Among the Gbagyi young girls of Central Nigeria generally, they don't own nor sell firewood of their own, rather they gather, own and sell firewood in conjunction with their mother. The mother designs and directs the sale of firewood. However, on the demise of the mother, the daughter inherits the firewood left behind by the mother, except in some cases where religion has defined the system of inheritance. It's pertinent to point out that all the basic tools used are locally provided by the blacksmith or purchased in nearby markets.¹⁴

Gbagyi Women and Firewood Production as a Sociopolitical and Economic Engagement

Firewood refers to the wood intended to be burned, typically for heat. It could be further explained as the substance making up the central part of the trunk and branches of a tree used as a material for construction, or to generate energy or fuel for heating or cooking (Njenga and Mendum, 2021; Jacob et al., 2017; Larinde and Olasupo, 2011). Among the Gbagyi women, the rocky and mountainous terrains of their ancestral abodes provide rich reserves of treasured trees. Therefore, piling firewood for domestic and market use is a mandatory cultural activity for every housewife, who performs such a task with joy and pride.

However, it's important to point out here that not all trees are used for firewood.

Some trees are considered more suitable for firewood, not just for their burning properties but also for cultural reasons. For instance, certain trees are avoided due to spiritual beliefs. The choice of wood is often guided by a blend of practicality and cultural considerations.¹⁵

This is a result of some belief in customs and traditions, and this also varies from tribes and as well communities. Trees such as '*koyi*' (*kadenya* in Hausa) (shea nut tree in English),

naknayi or *akagyi* tree (*kiriya* in Hausa) and *loyi*, etc, are mostly used for firewood not just because of the heat they provide, but because of their good potash (*asna*), while '*Za'ani*' tree which is believed to be an abode for ancestral spirit is not used for firewood. However, in the event of a newborn baby, some parts of the tree is cut, boiled and used in bathing and giving to infants to drink. Related to this also is the *kwaayi tree* or *baobab tree* (*itachen kuka* in Hausa). It is believed that this tree when used for firewood, the whole community will face the wrath of mosquitoes throughout the season.¹⁶ Gathering of firewood for domestic and commercial uses is an integral part of Gbagyi culture. Any married woman who fails in this capacity is considered lazy and valueless. Although, Gbagyi are one of the many ethnic groups indigenous to Niger State and FCT, have several cultural attractions for housewives, gathering heaps of firewood, reminiscent of the famed groundnut pyramids, is a cultural obligation fulfilled happily by every woman.¹⁷ However, it is interesting to point out that, the various movements of the Gbagyi people into different abodes searching for shelter and virgin land for cultivation and security during the 16th and 17th centuries, the gathering of wood fire and the way they arranged it has

always been a significant factor in identifying their various settlements. A social historian from Kuta Community said that “in our community, firewood production by Gbagyi women is often seen as a traditional and essential role. It's perceived as part of the gender division of labour, where women are expected to contribute to household needs, and firewood, being a basic necessity, is considered their domain.”¹⁸

The Gbagyi women uniquely arranged firewood, mostly outside their houses known as "*Shuwa Doko*". Firewood is arranged simultaneously according to sizes, starting with the bigger/ heavier ones. Just like their neighbors such as the Koro and Kadara ethnic groups, the Gbagyis arrange firewood in their houses in other to serve two purposes. First firewood is arranged to serve as a fence of a house, especially among the Koro people, secondly; wood fire is arranged in the form of a cage used for rearing/keeping animals, such as pigs among the Kadara people.¹⁹

It is significant to point out that prior to the 20th century, the gathering of firewood by the Gbagyi women of central Nigeria was merely a cultural heritage without any economic significance attached. Sources ascertain the fact that even during the period of trade by barter, there were no shreds of evidence providing that the Gbagyi women used

firewood as an article of trade within themselves or with their neighbours. However, firewood was gathered through communal labour for a new bride and for a mother who gave birth to friends and relatives. The politics in this manner is the importance attached to the number or group of women that participated in the gathering and the amount of loads so gathered. Thus this determines the power and prestige of a Gbagyi woman.²⁰

It is also pertinent to point out that, the amalgamation of Nigeria by the colonial masters in 1914 and the establishment of rail lines in the country in 1908-1918, which passes through the heart of Gbagyi land, led to intergroup relations as a result of socio-economic activities. Among the Gbagyi women of Niger and FCT, this social interaction led to rural-urban migration and urbanization led to the establishment of a market in the present Minna mobile Central area. The Gbagyi Yamma (Nkwa) were the first women to commercialize firewood. They were primarily selling for the migrants and railway workers in the Minna metropolis. People were seen patronizing Gbagyi (Nkwa) women and the women would also carry the firewood home for their customers. The Gbagyi Ngenge (Matai) later joined in the business thereby creating competition

amongst the various dialects. The growth in the trade and competition that followed led to the Gbagyi women hawking firewood across the nooks and crannies in the Minna metropolis.²¹

By the 20th century, the commercialization of firewood among the Gbagyi women assumed a wider dimension. Among the Gbagyi women of Kaduna and Nasarawa states, women sell firewood to raise capital to start other businesses such as small-scale manufacturing goods, and buying and selling of cash crops. The Gbagyi women of Kuta, Paiko, Gawu and Bosso in Niger State, on the other side, sell firewood to obtain money to farm crops such as groundnut, soya beans, etc. and to get funds in preparing children for marriage.²² A Psychologist indigenous to Bosso Community said:

The income generated from firewood sales acts as a financial buffer for families, especially during challenging times. It contributes to reducing poverty levels in our community and supports various economic activities. For instance, some women invest their earnings in small businesses, creating a ripple effect that strengthens the economic fabric of the entire community.²³

Among the Gbagyi of Ushafa in FCT, the commercialization of firewood has become a must, because it provides ample opportunity,

especially among the hard-working widows to fund their children's education. This explains why it's very rare to find a Gbagyi widow in prostitution. Accordingly, a women activist in the Gbagyi community of Abuja said that:

Firewood production is a significant part of our economic activities. By collecting, processing, and selling firewood, we contribute to the household income. We help meet basic needs like food, education, and healthcare. Additionally, our community benefits from the economic activities generated, which, in turn, contributes to local development.²⁴

Some of the women used the income generated from firewood production to grant soft loans to their husbands during the farming season to enable them to acquire farm inputs such as fertilizer and other tools. The loan is paid back in cash or with farm produce after harvest.²⁵ The women right from inception are known to be hardworking. They are seen assuming the position of breadwinners in their families (Biran et al., 2004). This is proven beyond reasonable doubt as the reasons behind the dominant role of the Gbagyi women in this sector of the economy. A popular Gbagyi woman selling firewood along Suleja-Minna road said that:

Firewood sales have played a crucial role in funding our children's education. Many women in our community allocate a portion of their earnings to ensure their children receive proper education. Additionally, during social festivities, the income helps families participate more actively, contributing to the vibrancy and unity of the community.²⁶

The mothers are so close to the daughters; they are often seen as associates. The intimacy is therefore a gradual process towards preparing and providing the items in order of priority for the daughter towards marriage. To achieve this goal, the woman tends not to rely completely on the father's efforts by engaging in selling firewood. By engaging in firewood production, "the Gbagyi women not only create economic opportunities for ourselves but also contribute to poverty reduction in their communities. The income generated circulates within the local economy, uplifting various households."²⁷ Moreover, the collective efforts promote a sense of community solidarity, which is vital for addressing shared challenges and improving overall well-being.

Other economic activities involved and dominated by Gbagyi women, especially of FCT include; the manufacturing/designing of

pots among the women of Wushafa and Kwali. The role of women in the economic development of their communities cannot be complete without acknowledging the significant role of the late icon and pottery model Dr Ladi Kwali.

Unveiling Challenges and Opportunities for Gbagyi Women in Firewood Production

The gathering and selling of firewood among the Gbagyi women of central Nigeria comes with some challenges. While it is recognized as an essential task, “there's a tendency to undervalue the economic contribution of Gbagyi women in firewood production. The traditional gender roles sometimes limit the recognition of the economic worth associated with the hard work these women put into firewood production.”²⁸ This is further elaborated by a political economist and feminist scholar: “since it's viewed as a ‘women's duty,’ there might be less external support or acknowledgement of the economic significance. This can affect things like access to resources, funding, or even policies that would otherwise empower Gbagyi women economically.”²⁹

Personal observation of firewood production and sells revealed that firewood is getting scarce. Unlike two or three decades ago when

firewood could be obtained a little distance from the villages, the women have to go a very long distance in search of an available place or forest where a kind of firewood could be found. This, therefore, resulted in changes in the quantity and prices of firewood. The longer the distance of sites or sources from the village, the higher the transportation cost and the higher the prices of firewood. Consequently, the deeper the women go into the forest to fetch firewood, the more they get exposed to wild animals and endanger their lives, as well as forest officials. After fetching firewood, some women encounter forest officials or lack transportation means to reach broader markets. Lack of adequate transformation system to convey firewood to markets remains a major challenge and “interventions could include creating local markets, where women can sell directly to the community. Although, some of them access cooperative transportation systems to reach more distant markets places.”³⁰

There is the problem of deforestation and attacks by the forest superintendents. They believed that no one could stop them from exploiting the God-given gift of nature in their environment. When they trespass into government reservation areas, oftentimes, they are chased out and when apprehended by

securities, they are prosecuted according to the law.³¹ In some cases, they have to lobby with the guards. It's quite unfortunate that they don't know the gravity of the problem that forest exploitation can pose to human health.³² However, a social welfare worker in Paiko talked about how some community leaders and NGOs are initiating awareness campaigns to promote a more inclusive understanding of Gbagyi women's economic roles.³³ These initiatives encourage recognizing and valuing the economic contributions of women in firewood production but encourage reforestation.

From the cultural and spiritual realm, there is a cultural belief that women also face problems of spiritual attacks when tempered with trees that are spiritually occupied. These trees are believed to be homes and places of meetings by evil spirits and attempt to destroy their domains attracts counter-attacks from the evil spirit. Oftentimes, the women had to call for the services of people who were believed to possess the powers to checkmate the spirits. This service may attract some financial implications that translate into the cost of production and the final price of the firewood to be sold to consumers. Oftentimes, it results in little or no gain for the women. Thus, interventions often involve community awareness

programs challenging stereotypes and emphasizing the economic value of women's contributions. While responding to how communities could understand and appreciate women's dual roles, a women activist noted that "we are fostering a more inclusive environment, encouraging women to actively engage in economic activities like firewood and charcoal production."³⁴

Firewood could also be fetched from an inherited land and trees could also be purchased to produce firewood.²⁰ But the inherited lands are getting smaller and more scarce as a result of growth in population, expansion and urbanisation. This explains why the firewood business today has become very lucrative. There is an ongoing shift in the demand for raw firewood to charcoal, derivable from firewood. Many firewood vendors are now converting firewood into charcoal to meet market demand and remain relevant in the cooking and heating needs of many households.

Modernization affects the economic production of firewood (Eze et al., 2021). The introduction and use of gas cookers, electronic gadgets and charcoal for cooking in various houses are affecting patronage of firewood, as many households prefer to go with the trend of modernity. The smoke from the wood also posed a threat to health. The

local method of fetching the wood is so much energy demanding and not all women can afford the services of engine operators. However, with basic business and financial literacy, Gbagyi women can make informed decisions about their economic activities. Interventions might involve workshops or training programs focused on entrepreneurship, financial management, and sustainable harvesting practices to enhance both economic and environmental outcomes. Such interventions can ensure the economic resilience of Gbagyi women and facilitate sustainable practices in emerging changes in energy preferences.³⁵

Conclusion

This study provides a multidimensional perspective to understanding cultural traditions, gender roles, sociopolitical and economic resilience of Gbagyi women within the Gbagyi community. The findings emphasize the pivotal role of Gbagyi women in the economic development of their communities through the culturally significant practice of firewood production. It highlights the evolving nature of firewood production, transitioning from a communal and cultural practice to a commercialized endeavour. This transformation is intricately linked to urbanization, market dynamics, and

changing consumer preferences. The commercialization of firewood among Gbagyi women reflects broader shifts in economic activities and livelihood strategies. It reflects the adaptability of communities to changing sociopolitical and economic contexts.

The theoretical framework, rooted in feminist economics theory, provides a lens through which to understand the intricate interplay of socioeconomic factors and gender dynamics. The study aligns with feminist economics to emphasize on recognizing and valuing women's economic contributions, often overlooked in conventional economic analyses. The framework proves instrumental in explaining the empowerment of Gbagyi women as economic agents and breadwinners, challenging traditional gender norms.

The research contributes significantly to existing knowledge by revealing the cultural and historical dimensions of firewood production among the Gbagyi people. It sheds light on the economic significance of this activity, not merely as a means of sustenance but as a pathway to poverty reduction, community development, and the empowerment of Gbagyi women in political decisions of communities. It bridges the gap between cultural practices, gender roles, and

socioeconomic resilience, offering valuable insights for scholars, policymakers, and development practitioners. The research not only adds to the growing body of knowledge on feminist economics but also serves as a foundation for future studies exploring the economic contributions of women in diverse cultural contexts in the developing world. Ultimately, the study contributes to a more inclusive and comprehensive understanding of economic activities, recognizing the agency and impact of Gbagyi women in shaping the sociopolitical and economic development of Central Nigeria.

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- ¹ Interview with a community leader, Idris Adamu Zango, in Minna, Niger State, November 10, 2023
- ² Interview with an elderly housewife and firewood vendor in Fuka town, Niger State, October 28, 2023.
- ³ Interview with a social historian and community leader in Minna, Niger State, November 10, 2023
- ⁴ Interview with a community leader in Paiko, Niger State, November 11, 2023
- ⁵ Interview with a housewife and firewood vendor in Gwam, Niger State, April 22, 2023. It is observed that men have recognized women as partners in

household maintenance and women have accepted such responsibility across all households visited.

- ⁶ Interview with a social welfare officer and community member of Kuta, Niger State, November 25, 2023
- ⁷ Interview with a house wife and community elder in Fuka town, Niger State, April 22, 2023
- ⁸ Interview with a retired civil servant in Kuta, Niger State, April 20, 2023
- ⁹ Interview with a community leader in Gawu, Niger State, October 25, 2023.
- ¹⁰ Interview with a community leader in Kuta, Niger State, November 14, 2023.
- ¹¹ Interview with a traditional title holder and community leader in Chanchaga, Minna, Niger State, April 10, 2023.
- ¹² Interview with a housewife and firewood vendor in Ushafa Village, Federal Capital Territory, April 15, 2023.
- ¹³ Interview with a youth leader in Gawu, Niger State, November 12, 2023.
- ¹⁴ Interview with social historian and community member of Kuta in Minna, October 28, 2023
- ¹⁵ interview with a farmer and community member of Gwam, Niger State, October 20, 2023
- ¹⁶ Interview with a female civil servant and community member of Chanchaga, Minna, Niger State, November 10, 2023.
- ¹⁷ Interview with a social historian in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, Niger State, November 10, 2023
- ¹⁸ Interview with a housewife and firewood vendor in Kafin Koro, Niger State, April 20, 2023.
- ¹⁹ Interview with a business woman in Kuta, Niger State, April 25, 2023.
- ²⁰ Interview with an elderly business woman in Kafin Koro, Niger State, April 20, 2023.
- ²¹ Interview with a social historian in Minna, Niger State, October 20, 2023.
- ²² Interview with a social psychology expert in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, Niger State, October 21, 2023.
- ²³ Interview with a woman activist in Ushafa, FCT, Abuja, April 20, 2023.
- ²⁴ Interview with a firewood vendor in Lambata, Niger State, October 20, 2023.
- ²⁵ An interview with a firewood vendor in Lambata originally in Gbagyi Language but translated into English Language by an expert, November 10, 2023.
- ²⁶ Interview with a Gbagyi student in Niger State College of Education Minna, November 19, 2023.

- ²⁷ Interview with a social historian in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, October 20, 2023.
- ²⁸ Interview with a political economy expert in Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida University Lapai, October 20, 2023.
- ²⁹ Interview with an environmental official in Paiko, Niger State, November 12, 2023.
- ³⁰ Interview with a forest management official in Paiko, Niger State, November 12, 2023

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- ³¹ Interview with a forest management official in Paiko, Niger State, November 12, 2023
- ³² Interview with a social worker in Paiko, Niger State, November 10, 2023.
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PERFORMANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF JOB SATISFACTION FOR LIBRARY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research paper is to appraise Performance and improvement of Job Satisfaction for library development in Nigeria. The study was carried out to investigate the following: Factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. The extent to which job satisfaction influences librarians' performance in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. And Factors that can hinder job satisfaction and performance of librarians as well as Strategies for enhancing job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Review of related literatures was also observed. Furthermore, survey method was adapted for the study with questionnaire constructed, validated and used for the collection of data related to the research question were formulated to guide the study. The population of the study was 50 library staff and students of the institution were sampled and simple percentage, means were used for data presentation and analysis, the researcher in the course of this study found out that salary status is the factor that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Herzberg's two-factor theory was adopted for the purpose of this paper. Consequently, it was therefore recommended that, existing constituents of job satisfaction can be sustained and improved through constant evaluation of the librarians on these areas to ascertain whether there is a shift in what previously constituted job satisfaction for them and when there is need for quick efforts to adjust.

Keywords: *Performance, Job satisfaction, Library, Development, Nigeria.*

1.1 Introduction

Job is a purposive human activity. It is an exercise of man's faculties for the production of a particular desired goal in the form of goods and services. (Eze, 2002). Job has been and will continue to be part and parcel of man's existence in this physical world. It is a means by which societal and individual needs are met. Therefore, job is very natural to man, controls and animates him both in everyday existence and in social and intellectual life. Job is not just about an employment; rather it goes further to mean an activity that produces something of value to and for the society. People have always asked questions on why people stay on a particular job all the days of their life?. Not all jobs have high salaries, high prestige or pleasant working conditions. Some have long hours at work, dangerous environment and a high stress. However, some people are just willing to endure these negatives and still hold onto their jobs. This can be attributed to the fact that some people might naturally like their job as it is, and not the conditions surrounding the job or they have no opportunity for a better job; and so they hold to it. However, It will not be a perfect situation even when an employee sticks to a job and the performance is in a high scale, but the workers mind is dull, his emotions

wrapped and in a shattered working condition. Even if it seems perfect in the short run the effect in the long run might be doubtful. Therefore it is not appropriate to think of human element in an establishment in terms of productive efficiency alone, but of equal importance is the satisfaction derived by the individual from the job. Job satisfaction entails, the feeling on the part the individual that he shares the basic purpose of a group of which he belong. A mind set which makes it possible for him to perform his task with energy, enthusiasm, and self discipline, sustained by a conviction that in spite of obstacles and conflicts, his personal and social ideas are worth pursuing. However, librarians attitude in terms of satisfaction towards work may have an effect on their performance. Given the conditions under which attitude and behavior are consistent, it would be expected that job satisfaction would be a way to speculate the level of performance. Job performance therefore, can be said to be an act of executing a command, duty, purpose, promise. It can also be seen an observable, or measurable behavior of a person in a particular situation, (Thompson, 1992).

Every establishment aims at high productivity or performance without which the goal and objective of such establishment

cannot be realized. It is evident that the efficiency of an organization such as the library depends immensely on the attitude of workers towards their job and their level of commitment to job performance. Generally, societal progress will not be fully attained unless productivity is high and workers are satisfied. According to Buchanan (2002), an individual performance is generally determined by factors such as motivation, the desire to do the job, the capability to do the job, and the work environment, the tools, material and information needed to do the job. If the problem is with the environment, the library management can adjust to promote higher performance. If a librarian lacks ability, the person can be trained, though the effect of such trainings seems unsatisfactory with some staff in terms of output. Most libraries therefore spend huge sums of money for training librarians for better performance; considering the vital roles of University library and their librarians. University libraries vary in shape, size, objectives and goals, but the function are both academic and administrative, and are all designed towards the achievement of the educational objectives of the institution. It is a central service unit of operation established to provide materials and facilities for study, teaching and research carried out in the

university. The vision, mission and strategies which are selected by universities as a guide for meeting these functions, form the foundation on which the roles of university library are based. Therefore, the library caters for the information needs of the university by providing reading materials for the various programmes of the university.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The need for librarians and library services to the university community is so enormous that the university cannot function effectively without it. Continuous researches in the university might not be possible without effective function of libraries and librarians. Ekere (2006) stated that the university library is supposed to serve all the areas of knowledge taught in the university. Therefore, to achieve these ends, the librarians have a veritable role to play. Aguolu (1986) explains that the librarians are entrusted with the responsibility of having to select from a universe of rapidly proliferating records, growing at exponential rate, those that may be needed by their actual and potential users. Equally stating that the librarians are responsible for acquiring, describing, classifying, administering, preserving and organizing these materials by introducing effective access control devices

and interpret their contents through personalized services. However, despite these important roles of librarians, some librarians still exhibit poor attitude towards their work and those they serve. This apparent attitude exhibited by some librarians might be linked to lack of job satisfaction and this leads to lack of commitment to work which makes them perform below expectations. This however will affect meeting the information needs of library users thereby hindering the general progress in research, scholarship and the institutional development. This state of affairs can be attributed to the fact that sometimes, the importance of libraries are overlooked in budget allocation, and this creates an undesirable state of affairs, which will manifest in poor working environment, security, and poor working structures. However, Abifaram (1997) stating that librarians generally are not satisfied with their work environment as a result of poor funding of universities shows that some of these factors that constitute job satisfaction such as good salary, promotional opportunities, good working environment and good interpersonal relationship, well defined library goals, opportunity for achievement and recognition are not adequately in existence, and these can result to job dissatisfaction which might give rise to

lateness to work, laziness, lack of motivation, inability to meet targets, constant sick leave and poor health condition. If the above scenario becomes the case performance may be negatively affected.

Therefore, it is important to investigate this problem, in order to gain an understanding of how job satisfaction affects performance of librarians in university libraries in Ahmadu Bello University Zaria.

1.3 Objective of the Study

The general objective of this study is to investigate the job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria. This study will specifically investigate:

- i. Factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library.
- ii. The extent to which job satisfaction influences librarian's performance in Kashim Ibrahim library
- iii. Factors that can hinder job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library
- iv. Strategies for enhancing job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library.

1.4 Research Questions

This study investigates the job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim and specifically seeks answers to the following questions:

- i. What are the factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library?
- ii. To what extent does job satisfaction influence the performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library?
- iii. What are the factors that can hinder job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library?
- iv. What are the strategies to be adopted to enhancing job satisfaction and performance among librarians in Kashim Ibrahim library?

1.5 Literature Review

Job satisfaction can be seen as a positive attitude of a worker towards his job and a pleasurable emotional state resulting from the perception of one's job as fulfilling (Adeyemo, 2000). Hodson and Sullivan (1990) view job satisfaction as a summary attitude that people experience about their work. It is the result of their task, the

characteristics of the organization. Similarly Parmer and East (1993) describe job satisfaction as relating to individual's feeling or emotion towards work. The happier people are with their job, the more satisfied they will be. Job satisfaction (JS) as defined by Cranny, Smith and Stone, (2002) is conceived as effective reaction to one's job. Weiss (2002) on his own part argues that job satisfaction is an attitude, but points out that it should be clearly distinguished, the objects or cognitive evaluation which affect emotion, behaviors" and beliefs. The relationship between a worker and his job can be described in terms of the meaning, which the work holds for the persons. A person who engages on a particular job has certain values for the job; such values are strongly related to the basic needs of the individual. That is why Eze (1998), continued that job satisfaction refers to the degree to which personal needs, material and physiological, intrinsic and extrinsic are realized by the individual while performing the tasks involved in his job. Schneider (1991) describes job satisfaction as personality evaluation of conditions existing on the job. Therefore, librarian job satisfaction deals with how contented librarians are with the work they do; an emotional mind set which enables librarians perform their duty as librarians

with every enthusiasm, energy and conviction. This also entails the tendency of librarians to execute their duty with joy and happiness being committed to the achievement of library goals and objectives. Job satisfaction and performance are vital issues in any establishment, be it an institution or corporate organization. In fact, anywhere work is done, the issue of satisfaction and level of performance or productivity can never be over emphasized; this explains the rationale behind job appraisal, evaluation, job redefinition and restructuring; because every establishment including the library faces the need for maximum performance, need to enhance staff satisfaction, and need to reduce loose and maximize profit. The achievements of these needs are vital for the sound and successful operation of the establishment. Societal progress will not be fully attained unless productivity is high and workers are satisfied. And the following according to Ezema (2003) can constitute sources of job satisfaction for a librarian: good wages, supervisory responsibility, a good working condition, challenging job, cordial relationship in the work place and interesting work. The absence of these conditions might manifest in a decline in the physical and

mental health of the worker, absenteeism, and apathetic attitude.

1.6 Core value of Development

The concept of development has literally been defined as a futuristic concept, meaning to bring forth from a latent state, to cause to grow into a higher fuller and mature condition. In this sense it is assumed that a country has certain latent or potential properties that need to be activated into a more dynamic or desired social form. Various economists have attempted to define development:

Michael Todaro (1978), posits that: Development must therefore be perceived as a multi-dimensional process involving changes in structures, attitudes and institutions as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty. "Thus according to Todaro Development= growth (improvement in income and outputs) + Change (institutions, attitudes, customs and beliefs)

Development is much broader than economic growth. Economic growth focuses on short-run changes. It considers such factors as Gross Domestic Products (GDP), per capita, Investment per capita, and household consumption per capita. Development

considers the whole question of human welfare. Essentially it is concerned with the problems that have hindered the Third World countries in their attempts to break away from underdeveloped state. These problems are not only economic conditions. Thus during the 1970s development came to be redefined in terms of the reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment within the context of a growing economy.

In essence there are different interpretations and concepts of development since each society has its unique values, lifestyles, and preferences e.t.c. which determines what constitutes the desired conditions for a good society. It constitutes a wide range of variables which include the social, economic, cultural, political and environmental processes that result in perceptible and cumulative improvement in the standard and quality of life for an increasing proportion of the population.

The quality of life has been conceptualized by the UNDP in form of Human Development Index (HDI) as an appropriate measure of development of all Nations.

1.7 Relationship Between Job Satisfaction and Performance

For years back, a common assumption among managers has been that staff who are more satisfied in their work tend to be more productive. It makes an intuitive sense that a satisfied employee is a productive employee. However, research by organizational behaviorists on these two variables in numerous studies has concluded that there is no simple direct relationship between Job satisfaction and job performance. (Pinder, 1984). This conclusion follows from related evidence that shows it is Seldom the case that attitude lead to specific behaviour in a predictable fashion. Despite the common sense belief that satisfaction leads inexorably to better performance. Research according to Bhagat (1982) has shown that this is not amiably true. For instance, a highly satisfied individual can become complacent and then coast along on his or her past contributions. Conversely, an individual with a low level of satisfaction may be very productive if he or she perceives that performance will be rewarded by a promotion, a pay increase, or choice for another job elsewhere. However, Hackett, Bycio and Hausdorf (1994), Maintained that commitment does not seem to be strongly related to performance. That is, an employee

can be psychologically attached to an organization but not be particularly good worker.

If it is true that that managerial attempt to improve job satisfaction will not necessary result in improved staff performance or productivity. The question arises as to why managers should be concerned about job satisfaction at all. Several responses can be offered first, the fact that manager tend to assume there is more of a connection between staff attitude towards their job and staff performance, that in fact does not mean necessarily that there is never a connection. Research results have shown that, while there is not always a cause and effect relationship, sometimes there can be a direct relationship (Pinder, 1984). This can be in the form of negative consequence of the opposite of job dissatisfaction. A staff member who is chronically dissatisfied with his or her job will manifest this by any or several behaviors, including absenteeism, tardiness and turnover. This might result in expensive losses for the organization. From a strictly humanitarian point of view a manager concern about the staff satisfaction will deal with these elements or the work setting which affects the quality of work like or each member of the staff; that is making the work setting an enjoyable and pleasant place to

come daily. While many element external and physical condition or an individual, no one could fault the manager who shows a human to make their jobs as satisfying and fulfilling as possible.

Therefore, job satisfaction is a complex and multifaceted concept, which mean different things to different people. Job satisfaction is naturally linked with motivation, but the nature of these relationships is not clear. Therefore, Buchanan (2002) maintained that the relationship between job satisfaction and performance is an issue of continuing debate and controversy.

According to Thierry (1998) satisfied people will put more effort in their job, but dissatisfied people may also work harder, hence there is no link between job satisfaction and performance. However, other studies reveal that there is a relationship between job satisfaction and performance. Keller (1997) reported positive relationship between organizational commitment and performance. Bankhoff and Bhatt (1997) on their part stated that satisfaction is related to both involvement and commitment; while Querles, (1994) see satisfaction as a predictor of turnover. Thompson et al (1992) equally stated that a person's attitude towards their work may have an effect on their performance. Given the conditions under

which attitude and behaviour are consistent, it will be expected that job satisfaction would be an excellent way to speculate about workers performance (that is, if you are happy at work, you will work harder). There could be other factors that affect this relationship such as organizational factors (reward system, interest value of work, quality of supervision, work load, physical working environment and personal factors-personality traits, status, life satisfaction, and genetic factors) These factors may determine who is satisfied with job. However, Tett & Meyer (1993) stated that when job satisfaction is high, employees are likely to stay at their jobs longer and possibly expend more effort than when it is low.

As Hendrix (1990) stated, if one is a real contributor in an organization, work will be more satisfying than if you simply get by with a minimum performance. He further continued that, a causal analysis of this suggests that performance is more likely to cause satisfaction than vice versa (a productive worker is a happy worker.) Dissatisfied workers are likely to be absent in order to avoid job events or conditions causing the dissatisfaction. The ultimate question still remains, „is a happy or satisfied worker a productive worker“? For decades, researchers have been concerned with this.

The behavioural correlates of job satisfaction should be higher work performance, lower absenteeism and lower staff turnover. Equally, Mathieu and Zajac (1990) agrees that low satisfaction or organizational commitment can result in low turnover, and absenteeism. However, research has failed to establish a strong link between job satisfaction and work place behaviour. Job satisfaction and performance seems to be relatively independent of each other. This is explained firstly that in many jobs, variations in satisfaction cannot lead to variations in productivity and secondly, where correlations do occur they may be spurious in that both may be associated with other factors. According to Smither (1998) it appears that the relationship between satisfaction and performance or productivity is not as straight forward as once assumed. For example, dissatisfied employees can be highly productive, just as satisfied employees can be highly unproductive.

Although the relationship between job performance and satisfaction is not straightforward, evidence still suggests that dissatisfied employees are more likely than those who are satisfied to leave. Since turnover can be very expensive for an employer, many have attempted to raise

levels of job satisfaction in order to increase the turnovers of their employees.

1.8 Factors Affecting Job Satisfaction and Performance

In libraries as in any organizational setting, the issue of job satisfaction and performance is very paramount. In which ever nomenclature you call it; whether it is called motivation, loyalty, and contentment. Its importance is manifested in its reoccurrence in management and administrative literature. The literature of staff management in particular, abound with articles dealing with job attitudes and their correlate motivation and much on the writings centers around the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of negative employees attitude manifested in such problems as absenteeism, turnover, underproduction and withdrawal from job. Smith as quoted in Obioha (2003) identified five factors that influence job satisfaction and performance as follows:

- i. People on the present job.
- ii. Supervision on the job.
- iii. Opportunity for promotion.
- iv. Present pay.
- v. Work on the present job.

1.9 Work Redesign

Berlinger et al (1988) Stated that studies by organizational behaviorist have shown that work redesign is a consistently effective way to improve performance. In undertaking such an effort, Siggins (1992) continues that administrator and staff should focus on specific steps which may include:

- i. Reduce routine and repetitive tasks which tend to be avoided by staff. A reduction in the dysfunctional behaviour of avoidance should improve satisfaction and performance.
- ii. Restrictive job into meaningful units. This may uncover and reduce unnecessary supervision or coordination imposed when work was broken down into units. A higher quality output and work may also result.
- iii. Re-think work flow and structure. New methods may be discovered for performing the work more effectively.
- iv. Staff needs to participate in redesigning their job. Being that they will expect their new jobs to be better than the old ones their performance may improve.

- v. Steps should be taken to improve job clarity and reduce role ambiguity. Even highly motivated and able staff will perform less effectively and be less satisfied if they are unclear as to what they are exactly supposed to do.

1.10 Introducing Professional Development and Training Programs

Closely related with the desire for enriched jobs is the need for maintaining the skills required to be effective. Training programmes designed to provide staff with the techniques for doing their job better will help the organization directly; by sustaining competent staff. It will equally provide a degree of security that the staff member will remain employable, even if not employed, if layoffs occur. According to Kanter (1989) employment, during budget cuts and reductions of staff, is dependent upon continuing employability. To do this effectively, organizations must involve in an ongoing programme.

1.11 Methodology

The research method adopted for this study is the survey method. It involves gathering of extensive data from the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, as the study area covered by this study. The justification for using the

survey research method is as a result of the widely scattered population (Fagbemi, 2009). The area of the study covers Kashim Ibrahim Library of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Kaduna. Population is the total number of persons inhabiting a country, city or any district or areas Sincare (2012) define population as a subset of subjects that is representative of the entire population that must have sufficient size to warrant statistical analysis. The population of study constitutes hundred (100) staff and student of ABU Zaria. The sample selected for the purpose of this study is fifty (50) staff and student were selected from Kashim Ibrahim Library ABU Zaria for the study. The researcher intends using simple random sampling technique since selected number of samples will be made for the purpose of getting definite and specific data that will suit the attainment of this study. The main instruments for data collection in this study are questionnaires and personal observations in schools. The reason for the use of this instrument is due to the form of population under study as well as to validate the quality of information gathered. The research instrument chosen for this study was designed to bring about valid responses from the respondents, it was carefully design by the researcher, the method has insured the capability of eliciting the required

information from the respondents. To obtain reliability for factual questions, the intended checks in the form of local test questions will be included. In line with this, a number of questions were built into the questionnaire and tested with selected librarians from other tertiary institutions in Nigeria. The instrument was reliable because it has been used over time and it has been proved effective. A total number of one hundred (100) questionnaires will be produced and distributed randomly in Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) library Zaria. The researcher will also make personal observations during library sessions for a week (date) the institution under study. The data that will be collected is questionnaire, which will be sorted into categories. The quantitative data collected from questionnaires under the purpose of study will be in percentage (%) and will be tabulated. The data gathered will be analyzed, interpreted and findings will be generalized to the existing institution.

1.12 Results and Discussion

To achieve the aim of this research work, fifty (50) copies of questionnaires were administered to the respondents at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Kaduna, which was

returned representing 100% of the response rate of the respondents. Twelve (12) out of the questionnaires were given to the staff while the remaining forty-eight (48) were given to the students.

Table 1: Response rate of the sex of their staff

Sex	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Male	35	70%
Female	15	30%
Total	50	100%

Source: Survey 2023

Table 1: shows that majority of the respondents which is 70% are males while 30% were females. This simply means that they have more of male staff in the library to female staff.

Table 2: What are the educational qualifications of the staff?

Qualification	Frequency	Percentage (%)
DLS	10	20%
BLS	13	26%

MLS	12	24.7%
Others	15	30%
Total	50	100%

Source: Survey 2023

Table 2 shows that the educational qualification of the respondents' analyses proved that ten (10) of the staff are diploma holders which is represented by 20%, thirteen (13) others are BLS holders and another twelve (12) with 26% are also DLS holders. However, the categories of the other six (6) 50% have other qualifications that were not stated here.

Table 3: The Designation of Experience (years)the Staff

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1 – 5 years	10	20%
6 – 10 years	13	26%
11 – 15 years	12	24%

16 and Above	15	30%
Total	50	100%

Source: Survey 2023

The table 3 above shows the designation of experience years of staff in the library, 20% of the staff have stayed for 1 – 5 years, 26% said they have worked for 6 – 10 Years, 24% of the respondents said they have worked for 11 – 15 years, while, 30 of the staff said they have worked for 16 years and above. This analysis proved that majority of the staffs have more than 16 years of working experience.

Research Question One

What are the factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria?

Table 4: Presents the result collected on factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Kashim Ibrahim

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
My salary status	15	30%

Opportunity for promotion	5	10%
Good working environment	6	12%
Good interpersonal relationship in the work place	4	8%
Challenging nature of the job	13	26%
Good retirement benefits	7	14%
Total	50	100

Source: Survey 2023

Table 4, shows that, 30% of the respondents said that their salary status are the factors that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 10% said Opportunity for promotion, 12% said Good working environment, 8% said Good interpersonal relationship in the work place, 26% said Challenging nature of the job and 14% said Good retirement benefits. This implies that salary status is the factor that constitute job satisfaction and performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Research Question Two

To what extent does job satisfaction influence the performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University ?

Table 5: Presents the result collected on the extent to which job satisfaction influence the performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University Library, Zaria

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
If I am satisfied with my job it will make me perform better	4	8%
Satisfaction with my job has no relationship with my performance	2	4%
My performance will determine my level of satisfaction	4	8%
I will be more productive if I am in a different job	7	14%

Some aspects of my job influences my performance while some do not	13	26%
If I am motivated I will perform better	20	40%
Total	50	100

Source: Survey 2023

Table 5, shows that, 8% of the respondents said that If they are satisfied with their job it will make them perform better this is the extent to which job satisfaction influence their performance, 4% said that Satisfaction with their job has no relationship with their performance, 8 % said that their performance will determine the level of satisfaction, 14% said they will be more productive if they are in a different job, 26% said Some aspects of

their job influences their performance while some do not and 40% said If they are motivated they will perform better in their job. This implies that motivation will help workers perform better in their job as this is the extent to which job satisfaction influence the performance of librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Research Question Three

What is the level of job satisfaction by the Librarians in Kashim Ibrahim?

Table 6: Presents the result collected on the level of job satisfaction by the Librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
I am satisfied with my Job as a librarian	15	30%
I will be more satisfied doing another job	5	10%
My job gives me pleasure and that makes me satisfied	6	12%
If I am to make a choice, I will chose to remain in this job until I retire	4	8%

I am satisfied with some aspect of my job, but not with all	20	40%
Total	50	100

Source: Survey 2023

Table 6, shows that, 30% of the respondents said they are satisfied with their Job as a librarian, 10% said they will be more satisfied doing another job, 12% said that their job gives them pleasure and that makes them satisfied, 8% said If they are to make a choice, they will choose to remain in their job until they retire and 40% said that they are satisfied with some aspect of their job, but not

with all. This implies that majority of the librarians are satisfied with some aspect of their job, but not with all.

Research Question Four

Factors affecting job satisfaction and performance of Librarians in Kashim Ibrahim ?

Table 7: Presents the result collected on the Factors affecting job satisfaction and performance of Librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Lack of opportunities for promotion	4	8%
Poor working environment	2	4%
Level of management interest in my well being	4	8%
Lack of job description	7	14%
Opportunity for further training	10	20%
Cooperation among colleagues	5	10%
When my reward is not commensurate to my input	3	6%
When my salary is little when compared with people in other profession	15	30
Little opportunity to use personal initiative on my job	0	0%
Total	50	100

Source: Survey 2023

Table 7, shows that, 8% of the respondents said that Lack of opportunities for promotion is one of the Factors affecting job satisfaction and performance of Librarians in Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 4% said that Poor working environment, 8 % said that Level of management interest in my well being, 14% said they Lack of job description, 20% said Opportunity for further training, 10% said

Cooperation among colleagues, 6% said When their reward is not commensurate to my input and 30% said When their salary is little when compared with people in other profession. This implies that the Factors affecting job satisfaction and performance of Librarians in Kashim Ibrahim is When their salary is little when compared with people in other profession.

Table 8: Presents the result collected on the strategies that can enhance job satisfaction and performance.

Variables	Frequency	Percentage (%)
If I am given opportunity to participate in decision making	2	4%
When there is future for my job	2	4%
A good interpersonal relationship with my boss	2	4%
If I am promoted accordingly	2	4%
Increment in salary	15	30%
The existence of opportunity for training	5	10%
A conducive working environment	3	6%
Cordial relationship with co-workers	5	10%
The existence of well set library goals.	4	8%
When there is a concrete job description	4	8%
By restructuring my work pattern	2	4%
A sincere annual appraisal	4	8%
Total	50	100

Source: Survey 2023

Table 8, shows that, 4% of the respondents said If they are given opportunity to participate in decision making it can enhance job satisfaction and performance, 4% said When there is future for their job, 4% A good interpersonal relationship with my boss, 4% If I am promoted accordingly, 30% said that Increment in salary, 10% said that The existence of opportunity for training, 6% said that A conducive working environment, 10% said that Cordial relationship with co-workers, 8% said that The existence of well set library goals, 8% said that When there is a concrete job description, 4% said that By restructuring my work pattern, and 8% said that A sincere annual appraisal. This implies that the strategies that can enhance job satisfaction and performance is Increment in salary.

1.13 Conclusion

The existing constituents of job satisfaction can be sustained and improved through constant evaluation of the librarians on these areas to ascertain whether there is a shift in what previously constituted job satisfaction for them and when there is, quick effort should be made to adjust to it. Similarly, due to fast introduction of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in library services, work pattern has equally changed. What takes a week to accomplish can be

accomplished in a day or two. What a librarian do with many errors can accurately be performed with ICT. Therefore, it is important that appraisal system be restructured to accommodate these changes for better result. For instance, the recent policy of promotion of academic staff based on publication in impact-facto journals.

1.14 Recommendations

- i. Effort should be made when recruiting librarians, to recruit those who have liking for the profession and will perform better when the conditions surrounding the job are not so favourable, and will perform best when there is a favourable environment.
- ii. It is recommended that librarians be giving opportunities to participate in workshops, seminars and trainings outside their domain to learn what others are doing that will enhance their job.
- iii. Great level of job satisfaction showed by the librarians should be sustained and The enhanced by ensuring that library policies are reviewed as and when due to fit into changes in

education, economic and political system.

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satisfaction among self and organizationally employed males. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. 77: 738-741.

ASSESSMENT OF WORLD BANK INTERVENTION IN COMBATING POVERTY IN BAKOLORI IRRIGATION SCHEME IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The quest for robust food production and the importance attached to it for a productive population as well as the interventionist role of one of the supra international financial organisation; the World Bank, concatenate with a view to eradicating poverty, generating employment and checkmate the incidence of rural-urban migration in the Bakolori Irrigation scheme. The work adopts both primary and secondary sources of data. For the primary method the research uses questionnaire and In-depth interview while for the secondary data the work adopts the use of text books, journals, reports, documents and other relevant information sourced from the internet. The shrink of the role of the state after the 1980s led to the takeover of liberal internationalism as an instrument of free market, deregulation and privatisation, hence the work adopts Neo-Liberal Theory whose proponents include Kant, Hayek, Oakeshot, Friedman and Harvey. The theory emphasises the centrality of free market based on the reduced role of the state in economic decision making and the participation of international financial institutions like the World Bank for individual entrepreneurial development. The population of the study area covers smallholder irrigation farmers in the Bakolori irrigation area, comprising three Local Government Areas namely, Bakura, Maradun and Talata Mafara with total population of 38,400 farmers covered under the Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria, TRIMING programme. The sample size of the study stood at 400. Thus, three hundred and eighty copies of questionnaire were distributed, while twenty respondents were interviewed. For the In-depth interview the key informants were officials of the TRIMING Programme at Talata Mafara, staff of the Bakolori Irrigation Scheme and some prominent farmers under the programme. Findings discovered that youth especially graduates paid a lip service to irrigation farming in the area. Secondly, the work discovered that poverty in Bakolori irrigation is reduced to a bearable level due to the World Bank programme. Insecurity likewise threatens the smooth operation of the World Bank Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria TRIMING programme. This work therefore concludes that the impacts of World Bank intervention especially the TRIMING programme are both positively and negatively felt. Thus, it is recommended that more efforts should be intensified to educate the irrigation farmers especially the youth on how to boost their obtainable yields. Agro-allied processing plants should also be sited in the area in

order to resuscitate the already ailing agro economy of the Bakolori dam and security situation should be given a serious concern so that the robust food production could be maintained.

KEYWORDS: Bakolori, Poverty, Trimming, World Bank.

INTRODUCTION

The World Bank has become the major international agency that prescribes economic development policy to the world's nation-states in the last 74 years. It was strategically placed to offer advice to Sub-Saharan African countries after achieving national independence in the second half of the 20th century (Havnevik, Bryceson, Birgegard, Matondi & Beyene, 2007). Generally, the goals of the World Bank are anti-poverty inclined. Gros and Propokovych (2005) noted that a policy that emphasised poverty reduction did not necessarily contravene the World Bank ideology, inasmuch as such a policy relied mainly on market methods and continued to equate economic growth, especially in the agricultural sector, with development (Gros and Propokovych, 2005). Abbass (2014) submits that since its establishment in 1946, the World Bank, as part of its policies over time has evolved a policy of granting loans for the development of agriculture with a view to combating poverty (Abbass, 2014).

The Bank is owned by its shareholders, and was set up with a subscribed capital of \$ 37 billion, in which one tenth (\$ 3.7 billion) is paid in. The Bank operates by borrowing, mostly from the US, Japan, West Germany, Switzerland and the OPEC countries (Hodd, 1996). Its programmes on agriculture such as Agricultural Development Programmes, National Fadama Development Project and currently Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria, (TRIMING), are all aimed at reducing poverty and empowering the rural populace.

Another World Bank programme on agriculture in Nigeria was the Avian Influenza project which was carried out in 2006. It was a \$ 50 million emergency project with a three – year implementation horizon. Its objective is to help reduce the health risk to poultry and humans from highly pathogenic avian influenza. The project attempts to control the disease at the source in domestic poultry by setting up early detection and response systems for reporting the disease in both poultry and in humans.

The specific programme of concern in this study is Transforming Irrigation

Management in Nigeria (TRIMING) which is also a World Bank project in agriculture. It is a seven-year collaborative effort of the Federal Government of Nigeria with World Bank to diversify welfare improvements for the Nigerian citizens through improving access to irrigation and drainage services and strengthening institutional arrangements for integrated water resources management and agriculture service delivery in selected large-scale public irrigation schemes in Northern Nigeria (Abdurrahman, 2019). The International Development Agency (IDA) has approved a credit facility for the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) towards the cost of Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria (TRIMING) projects. The project is funded by Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Water Resources and the World Bank (<https://www.acdivoca.org/projects>). With Nigeria's projected population reaching 200 million (www.macrotrends.net), TRIMING under Bakalori Irrigation Project constitutes a strategic conduit for national food security that would guarantee Nigeria's sustainable economic growth and even produce more agricultural outputs for global consumption, hence lubricate the locomotives of the country's wheels of development in her quest to put priority on agriculture as an instrument of conducting international trade

and as a crucial silver lining as seen in the Doha Round of Trade in 2001 and an instrument of food diplomacy. TRIMING is currently impacting on the irrigation farming programme in the Bakalori Irrigation scheme. The introduction of this programme and specifically its launch under the Bakalori irrigation scheme is expected to alleviate poverty.

1.2. Statement of the Research Problem

Despite the strategies and various agricultural policies put forward by successive administrations in Nigeria in general and Zamfara state in particular, including TRIMING, there remains a food deficit and food insecurity, as there still exist, households that persistently lack the ability to either buy food or to produce their own. This work intends to find out the role of the World Bank's TRIMING programme in boosting irrigation farming under Bakolori Irrigation scheme with a view to identifying the factors militating against effective implementation of the programme.

Nigeria is the world's largest producer of cassava, yam and cowpea. It is also a major producer of fish. Yet, it is a net food-deficit nation and imports large amounts of grain, livestock products and fish. The average agriculture output growth between 2011-2020, which stood at 3.5% against the

backdrop of over 2.6% population growth rate, accounts for the present food insecurity, hunger and malnutrition in Nigeria (Aiyedogbon, Anyanwu, Hezekiah, Petrushenko, Zhuravka, 2022). Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria (TRIMING) Programme as one of those strategies initiated by the Federal Government in collaboration with the World Bank expected to address the problem of food deficit, poverty, and welfare improvements for the Nigerian citizens through increasing access to irrigation. The low performance of irrigation under the Bakalori project, despite the previous World Bank intervention led to the emergence of TRIMING. Therefore, the focus of this research is to examine the policy of TRIMING as a means of addressing food deficit, rural –urban migration and poverty. It should be noted that irrigation farming generally consists of the production of such crops as onions, rice, tomatoes, watermelon, maize, wheat, pepper, cucumbers, livestock rearing and fishing. Therefore, the work intends to fill the gap in the literature which preceded this research by examining the World Bank intervention in Bakalori Irrigation Scheme, specifically the TRIMING programme.

The research thus raised the following questions:

iHow has the World Bank (TRIMING) Programme in the Bakalori Irrigation Scheme impacted on the development of irrigation farming in Zamfara State?

iiWhat are the factors responsible for the World Bank TRIMING Programme in the Bakalori Irrigation Scheme in Zamfara State?

Aim and Objectives of the Study

The aim of the research is to assess the role of World Bank intervention in combating poverty in Bakalori Irrigation Scheme. It is therefore designed to achieve the following objectives:

1. To investigate ways in which the World Bank (TRIMING) programme has impacted on Bakalori irrigation scheme in Zamfara state.
2. To identify the factors militating against effective implementation of TRIMING.

Assumptions

1. World Bank TRIMING programme affects irrigation farming positively in the Bakalori irrigation scheme.
2. The World Bank TRIMING programme affects irrigation farming negatively under the Bakalori irrigation scheme.

Significance of the Study

In the Bakalori irrigation scheme, the World Bank has become key player for the development of irrigation farming. This work would investigate the tendencies of the Bank interventions specifically the TRIMING programme in the Bakalori irrigation project especially as it differs from the literature consulted which did not deal with the impact of the programme on Bakalori irrigation project. Thus, it's centered on the researcher's intention to fill the existing gap in the literature.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The role of the World Bank intervention and its effect have become like a wild fire or a common household name globally as the international financial institution stakes virtually in every sector of the economies of developing and less developed countries ranging from education, environment, agriculture, health and climate change. From Kathmandu in the south East Asia to Buenos Aires in the Latin American sub-continent to Kaduna in north western Nigeria, World Bank had played and is still playing roles that are critical to the economic development of

these countries. Some of its impacts were positively felt while majority accuses the Bank of conniving with the international finance capital to ruin and subjugate the countries struggling to throw away the yoke of poverty. However, the mandarins of the Bank and of course its apologists defend it as an institution ready to extend the tentacles of liberal credo to help the poverty –stricken parts of the world to combat poverty.

World Bank Intervention on Agriculture in the Third World Countries

Agriculture according to Titilola, is of great strategic importance to the nation and must be recorded the highest priorities in development plans and programming because food is essential for national survival. Titilola even reveals that historical evidence shows that there are few cases of successful national economic development in which agricultural growth and development; and abundant food security did not precede or accompany national development (Mbachu and Yesufu, 2007). This may be a reason why the Bank intervenes to help the Less Developed Countries LDC's developmental stride especially in the agricultural sector. Most African countries have implemented World Bank development policy and African

agricultural sector, in effect; demonstrate through continuous low growth rates and deepening rural poverty the impact of World Bank policies. Meredith (2006) points that Senegal in 1976 became the first African state to obtain a 'structural adjustment' loan from the World Bank. One by one, others followed (Meredith, 2006). However, the Bank activities have been criticising as destructive in transforming African farming systems and African peasantries (Bernstein, 1989). Thomas in Taylor and Williams (2004) notes that the IMF and World Bank will not be able to do their job effectively if they remain tied to structures that reflect the balance of power of the Second World War. These Bretton Woods institutions are accused of being power domineering hegemony, vehicles for the exercise of 'G-7 economic priorities or even for the pursuit of US foreign policy (Taylor and Williams, 2004). Similarly, Hentz in Taylor & Williams (2004) argues that the IFIs continue to be an important proxy for US interests in Africa (Taylor and Williams, 2004). The crux of the matter is the advanced capitalist nations of Western Europe and the United States carry out policies out of these institutions and implement them through. The major organ of international finance capital, where the state serves as an intermediary is the World Bank.

The state therefore is an agent of capital (Abbass, 2014). To bring into picture how state and international capital relate, the position of Gerald Berthoud is here desideratum. He posits that development has been promoted by two institutions; the state and the market, indissolubly linked by the project of modernity. He notes that, even as a welfare agency the state does not work against the market. Rather, it is a complementary institutional device which promotes the extension of the market (Sachs, 2010). Moreover, the IMF and the World Bank are label as agents promoting a dominant role for market forces in the economy, deregulation, devaluation of national currencies, retrenchment of workers in the public and private sectors, privatisation of public property, withdrawal of subsidies and government retreat in the area of social provisioning and welfare services (Toure, 2006). African states (including Nigeria, emphasis mine) and the World Bank have collaborated albeit as sometimes uneasy partners, in the pursuit of agricultural modernisation; moreover, the technical packages and detailed planning of agricultural projects have been supplied by the World Bank as well as other aid agencies (Bernstein, 1989). The World Development Report, 2008 emphasises the relevance of

agriculture as a key to poverty alleviation, especially for African smallholder farmers. It maintains that agricultural growth has unique potential to alleviate poverty in agrarian-based economies (Havnevik et al, 2007). However, rural development strategies (Cheru and Modi, 2013) throughout Africa have mainly benefit local elites, middle-class farmers and their foreign partners, to the detriment of the small-scale farmers in whose name these strategies were implemented (Cheru and Modi, 2013). Abbass (2014) contends that, the World Bank's solution of removing traditionalism for modernization (westernisation) with a belief that traditionalism impedes development is catastrophic. Hence, he notes that whenever the funding stops, the images of the mirage of rural development automatically cease and vividly unfold to its barest realities (Abbass, 2014). Moreover, there are instances in which government indifference hampers agricultural and rural development. Gros and Prokopovych, 2005 maintain that the powerlessness of poor farmers, vis-à-vis wealthy local landlords and their lack of voice in the national political process, government corruption by which aid for the poor such as fertilisers, seeds and credit are intercepted (Gros and Propokovych, 2005). Abbass (2014) clarifies that the major

features of the World Bank projects are all geared towards lending of money for a variety of projects in the under-developed regions of the world. One of the major challenges agriculture and especially irrigation farming is facing in the Third World Countries, is the exogenous interference of the Global Financial Institutions especially the World Bank. This Bretton woods institution has been playing roles that from the Third World perspective is perceived as a capitalist incursion in the agricultural production. Xi and Li, 2013, submit that in Sub-Saharan African countries (including Nigeria), agricultural development strategies and policies have been either externally or regionally (Africa) initiated, and have been poorly implemented at the country level (Cheru and Modi, 2013). For example, (Adejumobi, 2006) explains that the economic crisis, which manifested by the early 1980's in many African countries prompted the involvement of International Financial Institutions of the World Bank and the IMF in the design of economic policies in those countries. As a result, the Structural Adjustment Programme SAP emerged. He maintains that SAP was meant to deconstruct the barriers that stifled rural agricultural production, increase the income level of the farmers and adjust government expenditure

profile that was excessively in favour of the “parasitic” urban population. Adejumbi frowns at the SAP’s policies on agriculture. He notes that first; the SAP has succeeded in dismantling of administrative controls on the agricultural sector by abolishing state produce marketing boards. He points the aim was to yield higher income levels for the export producers. Secondly, he based it on exchange rate deregulation. According to him a state controlled exchange rate regime subsidised imports for urban consumers who have insatiable appetite for imported goods (Adejumbi, 2006). Gros and Propokovych (2005) vigorously argue that there were very few occasions in which the World Bank involvement in the rural sector went to the roots of rural poverty. They maintain that the poor farmers were denied access to such things as fertilizers, seeds and credit by the wealthy local landlords (Gros and Propokovych, 2005). Abbass (2014) holds similar view that the expectations of an overall food sufficiency and an enhanced condition of living towards alleviation of poverty have further become as elusive as ever (Abbass, 2014). Part of the reasons why the sector is performing low, one could argue may be in conformity with what Gros and Propokovych (2005) call “greater control”. They note that the Bank in the 1980’s moves

away from funding projects to funding policies. Furthermore, African countries imports fertilisers, tractors and water pumps, nearly every input that is needed to increase agricultural output (Gros and Propokovych, 2005). However, these implements are bought from industries in the parent headquarters where the Bank resides creating suspicion that the Bank may be deriving benefits from the sweat of the Third World Countries. Meredith (2006) holds a view that in comparing the state of agriculture between Africa and Europe, he noted that; determined to protect their own producers, industrialised countries operate a system of subsidies and tariff barriers that have a crippling effect on African producers. He implied that the total value of their agricultural subsidies amounts to 1 billion dollars a day - \$ 370 billion a year. Bellman (2019) reveals that in the U.S state of California, the Central Valley of California received up to \$416 million per year in federal water subsidies for the production of fruits and wine. Also, in India the state of Andhra Pradesh provides significant subsidies to develop irrigation for rice production. Studies however show that annual subsidies for irrigation projects in Andhra Pradesh were estimated at \$ 282 million per year between 2004 and 2008 (Bellmann, 2019). What this implies is,

developing countries, Nigeria most especially should rather devise means of applying subsidy on agriculture instead of relying on World Bank to do everything for them; so that their agricultural produce can be able to compete with the rest of the world agricultural produce in a competitive global market, while still retaining lower cost at the home market. This will help reduce the dumping of and insatiable appetite for foreign agricultural products at home.

World Bank Interventions on Agriculture in Nigeria

The place of agriculture for human development is unquantifiable. In Nigerian specific example, it has been explained that development in country is incomplete without special focus on agriculture (Yahaya, 2002). Different scholars differ on the roles or impacts the World Bank plays on agriculture in Nigeria. Akinola (1995) laments that scholars of Nigerian agriculture and political economy differ on the extent to which programme outcomes are influenced by the Bank or by local circumstances. He further reveals the most vocal view being that espoused by Marxist or Marxian academics and supported largely by macro data or northern Nigeria material. He maintains that

the scholars have suggested that the Bank's increased presence in Nigerian agriculture since the 1970's have reflected a global campaign to 'self-liquidate' the peasantry in order to promote capital-intensive agriculture. Another school of thought that, Akinola points was that of Ibadan University and other institutions. According to him this school of thought describes the Bank presence as a price worth paying to make peasant food-farmers more responsive to technical change or to make incentives. The third perspective sees the Bank as a *hobble giant*, global in outlook but lacking its own executive agency as well as the institutional capacity to assist the poorest even if (or where it) had wanted to do so (Akinola, 1995). Ekong (1992) explains that the World Bank's first post-independence association with Nigeria's agriculture had been in 1971 when it assisted the then government of Western Nigeria in the rehabilitation of its cocoa farms. By 1985, the World Bank had been involved in twenty seven (27) agricultural and rural development related projects. With these projects consuming almost U.S \$ 1,367.7 million, he maintained that the World Bank has become the single most prominent multilateral organisation in Nigeria's agricultural scene (Ekong, 1992). Dunmoye expresses similar view when he

notes that the Bank's involvement in agriculture started in 1974, and by 1978 it had given thirteen agricultural related loans to the tune of \$ 292.2 million out of a total loan of \$ 947.9 million which covers other sectors, such as education, transport and electricity. He describes Nigeria as (then) by far the largest recipient of the World Bank's loans in Sub – Saharan Africa (Dunmoye, 1982). The World Bank begins its second phase of agricultural projects in 19 states in September 1980. The Bank established projects in Kwara, Niger, Oyo, Ondo and Ogun states (Oculi, 1986). Titilola (2007) maintains that soon after 1983, the agricultural domestic supply began to fall short of demand due to the evolving structural changes in the Nigerian economy as a result of the distortions affected the agriculture and food production, he further posits that such a situation created a gap between production and supply of food and agro-industrial raw materials. The situation he opines led to the introduction of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in July 1986 (Mbachu and Yesufu, 2007). In the area of food policy, Oculi (1986) demonstrates the influence of the World Bank in Nigeria's Ministry of Agriculture especially on agricultural policy in general, and food policy in particular (Oculi, 1986). Wallace (1980) reveals the

extent at which the Bank relates to Nigeria: the three World Bank Projects in Sokoto, Bauchi and Kaduna states were funded by World Bank loans, state and Federal Government and focus on improving wet season agricultural output by supplying seeds, fertilisers, pesticides to farmers within their existing farming system. The outputs as Abbas elucidates has been persistent shortage of food production in rural Nigeria which has also been attributed to the application of such chemical fertilisers, pesticides and they are also responsible for soil erosion etc which are injurious and harmful to the farms. He therefore blames the agricultural programs like RBDAs, ADPs and Dam constructions as the causative agents for the crisis (Abbas, 2014). The loan as posits by Oculi is tied to purchasing the technological inputs and in this way consolidating the linking of Nigerian agriculture directly with the industrial-export sector of the multinational corporations (Oculi, 1986). This neoliberal economic institution partakes in most of the country's economic affairs notably agriculture. To back this argument Wallace (1980) notes that, the World Bank projects involve extensive foreign loans and both involve dependency on imported machinery, expertise and agricultural inputs such as fertilizer,

pesticides and new seeds. She defends the Bretton Woods institution as being the one promoting agriculture in Nigeria. Wallace explains that; World Bank projects and modern irrigation schemes tackle the problem of increasing the production of surplus food for the urban market by altering the cropping patterns. She also implies that, these projects greatly increase the penetration of commercial farming into the rural areas, and attempt to force the farmer to use his land primarily to make money –to grow crops for sale, rather than agriculture with food as priority (Wallace, 1980). High Yielding rice and wheat seeds (Akinola, 1995) elucidates that they produce ‘a large edible proportion in the total dry matter’ per unit weight. He maintains that High Yielding Variety increased output to both labour and capital and without much input HYVs produce higher yields than unimproved seeds. He also notes that they are less labour intensive (Akinola, 1995). The High Yielding Variety of crops introduced by the World Bank has significantly affected the quality and proteineous content of the food produced and as such relegated the local variety of crops Wallace (1980). But Abbass (2014) notes that the HYVs are more of chicken fed than human consumption. Both Wallace and Abbass agree that the World Bank projects

have favoured the growing of maize crops, primarily for animal feed as it is not very palatable. Furthermore, Abbass unequivocally submits that the World Bank is the major thrust of the agricultural and rural projects in Nigeria. However, he locates the Bank’s fault as being the imposition of external forces on Nigeria’s drive to development. Thus, the withdrawal of local variety seeds compatible with the local environment or conditions was the greatest tragedy the peasantry is paying dearly (Abbass, 2014). Indeed, the peasants are rendered irrelevant even to their own rural communities.

To further expose the conspiracy of international capital and neo –liberal economic policies of the western capitalist societies, Rodney (1972) reveals how the west rejected anything that has to do with African agriculture, he exposed that in Nigeria, the oil was still sent to Europe as a raw material for industry, but European industrialists did not then welcome even the simple stage of processing groundnuts into oil on African soil (Rodney, 1972). Hence, spatting on the corpse of agriculture in the country, thus the relationship between Nigerian agriculture and capitalism was a long one. In the first place, (Abbass, 2014) the agricultural sector was gradually

incorporated in the main stream of the world capitalist market economy. Secondly, the state power was used to force or reorient peasants' allocation of factors of production to suit the colonial exigencies (Abbass, 2014). It is with strong point one would argue that the contact Nigeria had with the international finance capital does not in any way aided the agricultural development in terms of robust food production, as farming in Nigeria is still largely carried out manually. Rodney (1972) points a similar argument that; in centuries before the contact with Europeans, the overwhelming dominant activity in Africa was agriculture. However, this vital economic activity is sunk into the quicksand of economic destitution and relegated to the background. He notes that the only change agriculture witnessed in Africa was the introduction of iron tools, such as axe and the hoe (Rodney, 1972). The point here is Rodney was rhetorical in the narrative as such implements are no longer relevant in exploitation and tilling of lands to meet the demands of modern age. The World Bank gangsterism on the Nigerian economy is obvious; the latent collaboration between the state and the World Bank on Nigerian agriculture was in the area of granting loans by commercial banks. Under the structural adjustment program preached by the bank,

commercial banks were directed to give up to 35% of their loans to manufacturing sector and 40% of the merchant bank loans, against agriculture which was allocated 15% of commercial bank loans and 10% of merchant bank loans (Ake, 1996). Hence, agriculture in Nigeria has long been regarded as a neglected stepchild of Nigeria's development. Based on the above, Ake concludes that "agriculture has not been given the importance it deserves, and agriculture policy and development have tended to disappear in the struggle between the state and political elites".

In order to exonerate itself from the accusing fingers of the third world countries, the World Bank uses two of its reports; the Berg report entitled *Accelerated Development in Sub Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (1981)* and the *World Development Report 1982*. These reports (Havnevik et al, 2007) identify African state policy intervention, particularly in the form of producer subsidies and parastatal marketing as key problems to resolve in order to achieve higher agricultural productivity (Havnevik et al, 2007). In another perspective, to construct a link between Nigeria's agriculture and the World Bank, Titilola (2007) argues that in Nigeria, the increase in food prices occasioned by the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) led

to violent crisis and threatened the security of the state. Abbass supports this view that, the expansion of the rural bourgeoisie paved way for the social erosion of the rural poor with phalanxes of state machine which have all together produced new dimension for appropriation, accumulation, class alliances and class struggles (Abbass, 2014). Thus, it can be argued that the Bank's intervention in the agricultural sector fans the embers of insecurity and posed challenge on the corporate existence of the Nigerian state by widening the gap between the owners of capital and the poor small holder farmers. Benazir Bhutto once remarks that: huge economic disparities between social classes in a society strain national unity, creating a gap between the rich and the poor (Kegley and Raymond,). cheru and Modi, 2013 argue that no country will enter into industrial age without developing the agriculture (Cheru and Modi, 2013). In Nigeria the sector is not only neglected but underrated as an activity of rural dwellers and peasants. The issue of non-performance of agriculture should not be taken as an excuse because in the past other countries had the same challenge but they overcome it. Xi and Li, 2013 note that the so-called emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil, experienced long periods of chronic hunger and food insecurity as a result

of the underdevelopment of their agricultural sectors (Cheru and Modi, 2013). As a result of their commitments they were able to transform their countries to industrialisation thereby becoming important players in the global economy. Lack of coherent and sustainable policies on agriculture in Nigeria starve her of fighting hunger and poverty one could argue. for example in the Bakalori, the land is enough to produce what can feed a significant population, however this could not be realised. Simply put exogenous interference of institutions such as the World Bank and of course the intervention of strong men representing the neo-liberal credo of the Bank in collaboration with the state agency to empower the capitalist incursion in the country's agriculture as opposed to the peasants affects the activity of agriculture in Nigeria. This is why Oculi strongly accuses and locates the ostensible intention of the Bank as the creation of capitalist farmer-class in rural Nigeria, he proved that the Bank did the same in the Phillippines in 1971 (Oculi, 1986). Xi and Li, 2013 argue that because of her good policies on grain production and food policy, China grows sufficient food to meet the needs of a fifth of the world's population on less than a tenth of the world's arable land and with a quarter of its global water resources (Cheru and Modi, 2013). In

conformity with the position of Xi and Li, Oculi cites the development of agriculture in China to the Chinese minimization or elimination of the dependence on foreign technology for equipment and spare parts (Oculi, 1986). Comparatively, the Bakalori dam is neglected by the Nigerian state waiting to be taken care of by the World Bank. However, as the most expensive water reservoir in West Africa, it could not feed even people of Maradun. Thus, hunger, poverty, unemployment and the spillover effect of rural-urban migration are ubiquitous in the area. In terms of heavy dependence and the lip service paid to agriculture, without considering the growing population, Nigeria could best be described as a 'grown up man still wearing diapers'. Quintessentially, Ake (1976) describes this kind of dependence as an exploitative relationship which impoverishes Africa materially and spiritually (Ake, 1976).

Irrigation Farming in Nigeria

Irrigation as a method of efficient and prudent management of water for agricultural purposes is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. The colonial administration started irrigation pilot projects in Nigeria in 1925, although with limited success.

The impact of the World Bank on irrigation especially rice farming was captured by Odihi (1993) that with the aid of the Bank, a dam was constructed on the Alau lake about 14 km south of Jere in Borno state during the second half of the 1980s. He maintains that the result was an admixture. While the rice farmers were the target for increase production, on the other hand it intensified the aridity thereby causing food scarcity and financial insecurity. He opined that these were as a result of frequency, extent, depth and duration of floods in Jere Bowl (Proceedings of National Policy Workshop, 1993:2). However, Atala and Voh (1993) recognise the utilisation and sustainability of Fadama with particular reference to input and extension delivery. They also locate the centrality of water pumps and fertilisers (Proceedings of National Policy Workshop, 1993). The Bank also supports a number of other analytical studies, including a review of the rural and agricultural sector institutions (prepared together with the African Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development) an inter study of agricultural research and extension services and a report on the forestry sector. It is likewise noted that the highly successful Fadama II project is the only major Bank operation that has attempted to tackle the

agricultural issues in Nigeria. The report maintains that it was to allow communities on Fadama land (low lying plains) to determine their own needs and invest in infrastructure needed to raise agricultural productivity such as farm- to market roads, shallow wells along livestock trails or irrigation improvements. The International Food Policy Research Institute evaluation which involved the 12 Bank funded Fadama states, reveals that household incomes of beneficiaries increased by about 60 percent within one year of the initiation of the project (Nigeria Country's Assistance Evaluation, 2010).

The Bakalori Community and the Irrigation Project

Bakalori is the name of a rural community (Yahaya, 2002) in Sokoto (now Zamfara state) North West Nigeria. The community which is situated in Maradun Local Government Council of Zamfara state is an agrarian area with rich fertile soil for both wet and dry season farming. It consists of predominantly peasant population whose major occupation is farming. The nature of their farming has been subsistence and hardly makes a market profit. The Bakalori irrigation project was commissioned in 1979 and construction of a major portion of the

scheme was completed by 1983. In total 23,000 hectares were developed, of which 15,000 ha were planned for sprinkler irrigation and 8,000 ha for surface irrigation by gravity. The sprinkler systems installed in the area developed for pump irrigation are no longer operational. The area with functioning irrigation is therefore limited to 7,500 ha irrigated by gravity. The site hosts approximately 22,000 farmers. Recently information indicates that there are a total number of 38,400 farmers across the three local governments of Maradun, Bakura and Talata Mafara (ESMF-Proposed TRIMING Project Final). Current crops being cultivated include rice, maize, cowpea, Sweet potato, groundnut, vegetables, sugarcane, millet and guinea corn. Fishery activities are ongoing in the area (ESMF for proposed TRIMING project –Final). Adams (1985) the Bakalori dam is situated on the western edge of the basement complex rocks across which the River Sokoto flows in its upper reaches, and stores water to irrigate the 30,000 ha irrigation scheme constructed on flood plain and terrace land downstream, the Bakalori Agricultural Project. The farmers in the area specialised in cereal and vegetable farming. Given the abundant water resources in the country and its potential for increasing agricultural production in Nigeria, the

Federal Government established the River Basin Development Authority (RBDA) (Yahaya, 2002). Bakalori irrigation scheme (Oiganje, Igbadun, Ahmed & Oliver 2015) is directly being supervised by the Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority (SRRBDA). Bakalori Reservoir is being fed by Rivers N’kaba and Tarka within Niger and join river Rima after entering Nigeria. It has a capacity of 450 million m³ lake area and length of 8000 Ha and 19 km and a spillway discharge of 1650 m³/s at the time of construction in 1979. The dam had 450 million cubic meters water storage capacity but its capacity is estimated at 351,010,027 m³ in 2013. The Bakalori irrigation scheme has its project office in Talata Mafara, Zamfara state and was commissioned in 1983. A huge dam on the Sokoto River at Bakalori, built by the Italian consortium that constructed Ghana’s Volta River dam. More than three miles long, including its earth-filled flanks, the dam is longer than Aswan. It is the most expensive irrigation project in West Africa. Yet its main purpose is to irrigate a mere 70,000 acres. The project (Oiganje, Igbadun, Ahmed & Oliver, 2015) covers three local governments: Talata Mafara, Bakura and Maradun, commanding 23000 hectares; 65% irrigated by sprinkler system (15000 ha). They reveal several

setbacks within the irrigation system at Bakalori. They explain complete nonfunctioning of the hydroelectric power station at the Dam. Failed sprinkler system originally covering 15000 hectares of which 3000 ha is now converted to surface irrigation through the use of tube wells. The failed dyke close to the rice area needs urgent intervention, de-silting of the drainage ditches across gravity fed areas needs to be done, because it has made the drainage ditches indistinguishable from adjacent farm lands; hence farmers now use drainage section for farming operation which was not the primary purpose which was rather to remove excess water from the system (Oiganje and Igbadun, Ahmed & Oliver, 2015).

The original goal (Yahaya, 2002) of the project was to supply irrigation water to the estimated population in the project area of about forty to fifty thousand farm families. The majority of the peasant farmers on this valley engage in both rain fed and traditional irrigation farming in the dry season. Yahaya noted that the project was designed to support agricultural and economic development in the region. The project was designed to supply irrigation water to 11,200 km area by gravity and 12,000 ha area by sprinkler and power capacity of 12,000 KVA of electricity.

It also involved in the construction of 200 km road network and assisted farmers by providing them with needed inputs (Yahaya, 2002). The economic appraisal of the scheme Adams (1985) points that was depended on the possibility of double – cropping throughout the area, on the development of a commercial sugar estate, and the production of tomatoes for local processing facilities which it was hoped would develop. The reservoir of the dam he noted covers over 4000 ha, storing 414 mm³ of water (Adams, 1985). But the production of both sugarcane and tomatoes in the Bakalori is not yet to any appreciable level.

Yahaya, (2002) maintains that the dam has 450 million cubic metres water storage capacity. The reservoir he explained covers 8,000 hectares and extends some 119 km up stream, he elucidates that, during the 1979, the project was completed. Fifteen km - supply canal carries water from the dam down streams of irrigation area where the water is distributed through several hundreds of kilometers secondary and tertiary canals.

The Bakalori irrigation project was described as a ‘confluence of devastation’. A serious clash erupted when people of the area were forcefully compelled with the power of a barrel of gun to vacate their residents ready to be taken over by the dam construction.

Yahaya (2002) elucidates that the fracas resulted in the death of fourteen farmers, a police man and fifteen others. However, the escalation of the crisis by the end of June 1980, led to further loss of less than three hundred and eighty six people, the looting of property and burning of valuables such as granaries, houses and vehicles (Yahaya, 2002). This situation was an attempt by the peasants to demand for justice. The above scenario captures exactly the statement of Sachs (2010) that economic growth is of cannibalistic nature; it feeds on both nature and communities, and shifts unpaid costs back onto them as well (Sachs et al, 2010). Any benefit that the Bakalori dam may bestow on the poverty stricken people of the north are unlikely to offset the tragic damage that has already begun. People in forty villages and a town of 14,000 inhabitants are being uprooted; it appears that only a minority are to be moved into the irrigated area. The inevitable failure of corrupt officials to pass on compensation money to those disposed of their land caused a riot at the end of August 1978, which put several police in hospital. When the construction of Bakalori Dam began, the people of Maradun area including the neighbouring villages were shocked when they were given an order to leave for new settlement. Worse still was the

inability of both the government and the company in charge of the project to compensate them considering that leaving their old settlements would mean losing their means of survival. Beckman in Yahaya (2002) accuses the Italian firm for bringing suffering to the project area since 1975 when it entered the area. (Oculi, 1986, Bangura, 2020) flatly reveal how the project cost the people of the Bakalori farming community. They opined that the project disorganised the farming lives and systems of 60,000 well-established farmers at Talata Mafara and drowned under water the homes, farms and fruit trees of another 13,000 people at Old Maradun in an area covering about 4,200 hectares. They also contend that it had disrupted water supply to 20,000 hectares of land that was traditionally farmed by river-bed irrigation (Fadama) downstream from Talata Mafara to Argungu. As a result Oculi concludes 24,000 hectares of fertile land have lost to well establish farming systems in order to irrigate 25,000 hectares. He notes the hardship encountered by people of the area, as a result of resettlement as pathetic, such that due to lack of water in the New Maradun, many families sold their small animals (goats, sheep, chickens) in order to buy water for their wives; while those who were farming had to travel eight to ten kilometers

away to the farms. As a way of compounding their situation, in October 1979, guinea corn was destroyed when it was almost ready for harvest, with no compensation paid, warning or justification to the farmers (Oculi, 1986, Bangura, 2020).

The number of peasants had been decimated, many of them got the meagre payment and migrated, yet others abandoned farming altogether (Dunmoye, 1982).

The World Bank intervention on agriculture especially with particularistic example of the Bakalori irrigation should reflect what Samir Amin referred to as “economic miracles of crop expansion”. Amin notes the miracles of groundnut on the economy of Senegambia, cocoa on the Ghanaian economy and multi-crop production on the Ivory –Coast economy in the 1950’s and 1960’s (Freund, 1981).

The ESMF document exposes the state of Bakalori dam as deplorable in its propose TRIMING project; the Bakalori Irrigation Scheme has depreciated badly primarily due to a lack of maintainance. Agricultural produce extensively cultivated within the scheme, are not adequately exploited due to the increasing lack of access roads to the farms, lack of storage or processing facilities and ineffective Water Users Association (WUAs) which have been established in the

Bakalori irrigation area, but which appear to be unable to fulfill their intended purposes. It further describes the failures of the dam which is located on the River Sokoto and designed to function as multi –purpose dam for irrigation, water supply, hydropower generation, flow regulation and flood protection has been reduced to a moribund structure facing challenges ranging from general lack of maintainance, loss of the hydropower generating capacity, silting of the primary, secondary and tertiary canal systems, breakdown of parts of the primary canals and secondary canals, weeds growth in the canals and pests infestation of the project, especially quella birds, rabbits and termites (ESMF for proposed TRIMING – Final,).

Gaps in the Literature Review

There are factors which have necessitated this research on the Assessment World Bank intervention in combating poverty in Bakolori Irrigation Scheme in Nigeria among which is the extant literature which have preceded this work, talk more on the Bakalori irrigation scheme and the World Bank. For example, Wallace (1980), Dunmoye (1982) Adams (1985), Yahaya (2002) and Abbass (2014) have established the position of irrigation as central to the development of

agriculture and even economy generally. Their writings are classics as far as the political economy of Nigeria is concerned, but are limited in investigating the effectiveness of the role of World Bank intervention in converting poverty: A focus on Bakalori Irrigation scheme with a specific emphasis on the World Bank programmes and policies such as the Transforming Irrigation Management in Nigeria TRIMING. This research is aim at bridging the gap identified in the said literatures and make its own contribution to knowledge.

2.10. Theoretical Framework

This study was conducted using a Neo-Liberal Theory of Development. The proponents of this theory, according to Raymond Plant study of neo-liberal state is based on the writings of Hayek, Oakeshott and Nozik (Venugopal, 2015). By the early 1980s, neo-liberalism was used in a very different way, as it came to describe the wave of market deregulation, privitisation and welfare state withdrawal that swept the first, second and third worlds. By the early 1990's, neo-liberalism had become elevated to an epochal phenomenon, and was often used as loose short hand for a prevailing dystopian zeitgeist. Neo-liberalism draws on the

conclusion of orthodox neoclassical economics and rational choice-based theory of human behaviour to advocate a tightly delimited role for the state in regulating economic activity (Venugopal, 2015). Belief in the moral necessity of market forces in the economy therefore, defines the core value of this theory. According to the liberal perspective, the world economy is beneficial factor in economic development, interdependence and economic linkages of advanced economies with less developed economies tend to favour the latter societies. Through trade, international aid and foreign investment the less developed economies acquire the export markets, capital and technology required for economic development (Gilpin, 1987).

According to the theory therefore, its central arguments are:

- i. At least, ideally, politics and economics exist in separate spheres. Markets should be free from political interference for the sake of efficiency and growth (Smith, El-Anis and Farrands, 2011).
- ii. Markets are allowed to operate freely.
- iii. States should be able to trade openly with each other.
- iv. The role of the state in economic affairs should be kept to a minimum.

- v. The role of the international norms and institutions in facilitating international cooperation.

Relevance of the Neo-Liberal Theory of Development to the Study

Thus the link becomes glaringly obvious in an attempt to explain human liberation through entrepreneurial freedoms. For example, to justify this nexus, Harvey (2005) adumbrates neoliberalism as ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’ (Regmi, 2016). Through the IMF and World Bank, Neo-liberal ideas have translated into a “package of measures” which proved to be very liberal and exalt the virtues of the market, which are then offered to the developing countries through aid and structural adjustment. Thus the World Bank intervention under Bakalori irrigation project is being supported by the Bank in order to liberate the farming community to become self-sufficient in their entrepreneurial activities which may alleviate poverty and sustains prosperity.

Criticisms of the Neo-Liberal Theory of Development

The theory is criticised on the issue of cooperation. The realist opprobrium on the theory was how it is possible to assess realistically the possibilities for cooperation and peace between states unless we recognise the role of anarchy in creating suspicion and distrust. The realist contends that if one ignores or reduces the importance of such considerations, thinking can quickly become utopian with little relation to reality.

Realists also argue that states often have fundamentally different interests in which the drive for relative material gains makes conflict inevitable and part of the eternal landscape of international relations. The theory is also criticised on the basis that market reform policies fail to meet their own criteria for success in terms of stabilisation and growth, and point to de-industrialisation and the lost decade of development in Africa and Latin America during the 1980's as evidence. Another critique is that neoliberal policies are excessively technical, economistic, 'cookie-cutter', context-blind, and politically naïve.

Additionally, neo-liberal institutions have a potential inherent in them to subvert the state sovereignty. Thus, the neoliberal model of development (Neilson 2020) has been

accused of delivered recurring global accumulation crises, deepening ecological instability, destructive zero-sum competition between unevenly developing nation states, and escalating social security and inequality. However, the theory could be described as an instrument of humanitarian gesture aim at liberating human race from the dicey tendency of poverty and encourage individual sacrifices aim at prosperity for economic liberation of human wellbeing.

The theory is also a factor for checkmating executive highhandedness of some leaders especially in the third world countries who are known to have developed a 'rent seeking' culture. The spread of democracy is just one factor that liberalism cites to account for the rise of complex interdependence.

After the World War II, wealth began to be distributed around the world to more economies as well, instead of being concentrated in Europe. The spread of wealth by the United States through its aid packages such as Marshall Plan to war torn Western Europe is an example and by the 1980s, newly rich economies sprang up in Asia: in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Indonesia. This new distribution of wealth meant that more countries and their economies were tied together more than ever before.

In fact, Neo Liberal Theory helps in strengthening democracy and encourages social justice in the allocation and distribution of resources in the society.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This work is a case study survey as such applied primary method including questionnaire and interview. The primary data were collected through the use of questionnaire and oral interview as well as personal observation. For the interview method, the technique enabled the researcher to generate extensive information that would otherwise not easily be derived by using the questionnaire technique and it allows the expression of opinions freely. The study adopted cluster survey method because the area under study has a large population. The application of this design is paramount considering the fact that a significant percentage of the data is presented in a statistical form. Cluster Survey method which involves the collection of data from a selected portion of large population so as to deduce information about the population as it is very difficult to study the whole population. This is based on the fact that a

proportion of a large population can represent the whole population.

Location of the Study Area

The study area which is Bakolori Irrigation area is located in Zamfara West in Zamfara state comprising mainly three neighbouring Local Government Councils of Bakura, Maradun and Talata Mafara. The dam area is covered around the three Local Governments and the area is largely populated with large scale irrigation farmers.

Population of the Study Area

The dam land area covers 4000 ha; storing 414mm³ of water (Adams, 1985). However, Yahaya (2002) the reservoir covers 8,000 hectares and extends some 119 km upstream. The population of the study covers smallholder irrigation farmers in the Bakalori irrigation area, comprising three Local Government Areas. The LGAs are Bakura, Maradun and Talata Mafara with total population of 38,400 farmers covered under the TRIMING project (ESMF for proposed TRIMING project –final: 39). Two groups of respondents were identified in the course of conducting this work viz:

1. The farmers covered under the Bakolori Irrigation Scheme.
2. The officials of the World Bank office as well as staff of the Bakolori Irrigation Project at Talata Mafara.

Sample Technique and Sample Size

The sampling size is a portion population of the study. Using Taro Yamane formula (1967) for the determination of sample size, purposive sampling technique is employed in selecting the sample from the study population. There are 38,400 smallholder farmers and are dispersed among the three Local Government Councils.

The Taro Yamane formula is arranged as follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where n= the sample size

N= the population size

e= error of sampling (0.050)

$$n = \frac{38,400}{1 + 38,400} (0.05)^2$$

$$n = \frac{38,400}{1 + 38,400 \times 0.0025}$$

$$n = 400 \times 38. \frac{38,400}{38,400}$$

$$n = 400$$

Based on the above formula computed, the sample size stood at 400.

However, to have a proportion of the respondents, the formula is also used to determine the number of copies of the questionnaire distributed to 400 respondents.

$$\frac{n \times n_i}{N}$$

Where n= sample size

n_i = population of the local government

N= Population size

Sample Size Determination

The research used purposive sampling technique. Thus, cluster sampling technique was employed.

Therefore, nine Villages from the three outline Local Government Councils were randomly selected with 44 copies of the questionnaire administered in each Village. In Bakura Local Government Rini, Birnin Tudu, and Yar Kufoji were selected. While in Maradun, Gidan Kano, Maradun North, and Dosara were selected. And in Talata Mafara, Mafara, Tungar Miya, and Mutuzgi were also selected.

Methods of Data Collection

The instruments used in this work include the administration of questionnaire and conduct of in depth interviews (IDI).

The Questionnaire

The copies of the questionnaire were used in conducting this work and administered to the respondents. It was prepared to get information from farmers as beneficiaries of the World Bank TRIMING programme.

The In-depth Interview

The in-depth interviews were also used. Snow ball technique was applied which enabled the researcher to be linked with one respondent after another. The method allowed the researcher to source information about the assessment of World Bank intervention in combating poverty in Bakolori Irrigation Scheme in Nigeria. The method of questioning that was employed in conducting the interview was open ended questions; questions where respondents were allowed to express their views freely on the topic. The respondents under this method are officials of the TRIMING programme, staff

of the Bakalori irrigation project and some prominent farmers under the programme.

Research finding

The data is presented using triangulation because the research which happened to be a case study uses mixed method which includes quantitative and qualitative data as well as personal observation. The aim is to enhance in the overall conclusions drawn from the study.

Analysis of Tables

Table 1: Gender Distributions of

Respondents

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Male	318	79.5%
2.	Female	82	20.5%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

Table 1 which dealt with the gender distribution of the respondents clearly shows how male gender dominates irrigation activity in Bakalori irrigation area under the World Bank Agricultural Programme called TRIMING, this is because 79.5% of the irrigation farmers fall under the category of masculine gender which commands majority

of the irrigation farmers while remaining 82 farmers i.e 20.5% are females.

Table 2: Occupational Distributions of the Respondents

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Rain fed irrigation	242	60.5%
2.	Dry season irrigation	158	39.5%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

The above table indicates that out of 400 farmers, 242 are rain – fed irrigation farmers, i.e the rain – fed irrigation farmers form 60.5% of the entire population of the irrigation activity under the TRIMING programme. Thus, the dry season irrigation farmers under the Bakalori irrigation Project are 158 with 39.5% percent.

Table 3: Age Category of Respondents

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Below 20years	113	28.25%
2.	21 – 30 years	173	43.25%

3.	31 – 40	112	28%
4.	41 – 50 years	02	0.5%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research 2024

Age category of 21 – 30 years dominated the irrigation activity as represented in table 4.3 with the percentage of 43.25% while age category of below 20 years follow it with 28.25% and 28% fell on the age category of 31 – 40 years. The least age category that is not actively participating under TRIMING programme is 41 – 50 years with a minuscule percentage of 0.5%.

Table 4: Educational Distributions of Respondents

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	S.S.C.E	90	22.5%
2.	DIPLOMA	76	1.9%
3.	B.sc & H.N.D	38	09.5%
4.	None of the above	196	49%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research 2024

Educational qualification of the respondents as represented in table 4.4 shows those without formal education dominating the irrigation farming under the TRIMING

programme in the Bakalori irrigation project. They form 49% of the active farmers followed by those with S.S.C.E result with 22.5%; while university and polytechnic graduates having only 09.5% in the activity. Diploma holders control 1.9% of the irrigation farmers. What this connotes is; much has to be done to enlighten educated people especially the teaming unemployed graduates to embrace the age – old economic activity.

Table 5: Farmers Awareness about TRIMING

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Yes	397	99.25%
2.	No	03	0.75%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

It can be argued that TRIMING has done well in sensitising the farmers in creating awareness on the programme as table 4.5 revealed that out of the 400 respondents, 397 i.e. 99.25% responded in affirmative noting that they are aware of the World Bank Programme. However, three farmers with 0.75% revealed that they are not aware of TRIMING.

Table 6: World Bank (TRIMING) Specific Interventions to Farmers

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Agro chemicals	153	38.26%
2.	Improved seeds & extension services	91	22.75%
3.	Monetary incentives	156	39%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

Table 4.6 noted the impact of the World Bank specific intervention under the TRIMING programme. 38.26% of the respondents confirm the receipt of agro chemicals from the Bank as intervention, while 22.75% received improved seeds and extension services; however, 39% noted that they received monetary incentives under the programme.

Table 7: How World Bank Incentives affect Irrigation Farming

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Positively	178	38.26%
2.	Negatively	91	22.75%
3.	No effect	156	39%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

Table 4.7 has significantly provided a genuine reason how the incentives affect irrigation farming under the Bakalori irrigation project B.I.P. Thus, 44.5% of the respondents agreed that the incentives affect them positively while 31.75% disagreed; they opined that the incentives affect them negatively. There are others also who do not either been affected positively or negatively 39% form the basis of this category who have not felt any effect of the incentives given by the TRIMING.

Table 8: Whether Dam's Facilities Are in Good Shape

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Yes	363	90.75%
2.	No	37	9.25%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

The dam's facilities according to data in table 4.8 are in good shape. 90.75% of the respondents are of the opinion that the Bakalori dam which is the back bone of the project is in good shape; only 9.25% of the respondents argued that the dam is not in good shape.

Table 9: Whether the Dam's Presence Encourages the Development of Cities and Towns Surrounding It

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Yes	391	97.75%
2.	No	09	2.25%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

Table 4.9 revealed the nexus between the dam's presence in the area and development of towns and cities around. 97.75% of the respondents accept the cities and towns around the dam developed because of its presence while 2.25% argued that the presence of the dam does not encourage the development of cities and towns around it.

Table 10: The Performance of TRIMING in Food Production from 2017 – 2021

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Good	197	49.25%
2.	Very good	195	48.75%
3.	Poor	08	0.2%
4.	Very poor	NIL	0%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

Table 4.10 which essentially and basically can be said to be the most crucial of this work indicates the remarkable performance of TRIMING in food production from 2017 – 2021. 49.25% noted that the programme

performance in food production under the period mentioned above is good. However, 48.75% corroborates that performance of TRIMING is very good. Only a small percentage of 0.2 rated it as being poor.

Table 11: General Workings of TRIMING Programme around the Bakalori Irrigation Area.

S/N	Variables	Frequency	Percentage
1.	Excellence	73	18.25%
2.	Very Good	210	52.5%
3.	Good	109	27.25%
4.	Poor	08	0.2%
	TOTAL	400	100%

Source: Survey Research, 2024

The general workings of the TRIMING programme around the Bakalori irrigation area are very encouraging. This is contained in table 4.11. The data represented the views of the respondents as follows: 52.5% of the respondents are in support of the programmes working very well. Furthermore 18.25% pointed that the general workings of TRIMING are excellent, moreover, 27.25% described the World Bank's programme as good. But 0.2% lauded the workings of the programme as poor.

Recommendation

- i. Government should redouble its effort to ensure that farmers patronise their farms and engage in productive activities; this is particularly a function that is solely rests with it. The appeal is necessary looking at how insecurity became a Sword of Damocles in the state.
- ii. TRIMING should as a matter of necessity try to implement fishery farming especially in Jankarawa as proposed by the programme. This would boost their livelihood and prevails an opportunity for self-reliance. This is because fishery is not given the expected priority as observed by the researcher; something indicative of the negative effect of the TRIMING as captured by objective ii and iv of the work.
- iii. At this juncture the work recommends the linking of rural areas especially irrigated farms with feeder roads in order to make it accessible to market.
- iv. There should also be presence of agro-allied preservation method to avoid wastage of some farm produce.
- v. There is need to also encourage agronomic irrigation i.e production of

such produce as tomatoes, pepper, cucumbers, lettuce and carbage.

Conclusion

It is unequivocal to note that agriculture and specifically irrigation farming occupies an important place in the issues of International development, thus, the intervention of World Bank to improve the individual entrepreneurial development of farmers for self-reliance as occasioned in the neo-liberal credo is apt. World bank therefore, in collaboration with the Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Water Resources are making effort to improve major irrigation infrastructures and facilities in Northern Nigeria including the Bakalori Irrigation Scheme for robust food production with a view to fighting hunger and provide shield for food security.

Recommendations

The value and importance of agricultural activities to an economy cannot be overemphasised. This is why Arthur Lewis has pointed three simple ingredients that if they are put into considerations any economy can develop: adequate rainfall, a system of secondary education and sensible government. That is true as crops need water

to grow; thus there is need for enough and sustain water channeling throughout the year to avoid desiccation of farms.

This work recommends the construction of new feeder roads and rehabilitation of the existing ones for easy transportation of food from rural areas to markets in the cities.

There is need for more incentives especially fertilizers at affordable price in order to encourage the irrigation farmers.

There should also be provision of silos and other means of preservation of raw foods to avoid loss due to possible decomposition.

Zamfara State government should collaborate with the World Bank to extend the TRIMING programme to other parts of the state which could help in more positive impact of the World Bank presence in the state.

With the current population of 200 million in Nigeria the present land area of 23,000 hectares is not sufficient, the work recommends increase of more hectares so as to have more improved food production

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